Stack v. Nolte

Decision Date19 July 1902
Citation29 Wash. 188,69 P. 753
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesSTACK v. NOLTE et al.

Appeal from superior court, Skagit county; George A. Joiner, Judge.

Action by Charles J. Stack against G. Nolte and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Kerr & McCord, for appellants.

Jas. F McElroy and Million & Houser, for respondent.

HADLEY J.

This action was brought by respondent against appellants to compel the surrender of a certain quitclaim deed, and for other relief as hereinafter indicated. The complaint alleges substantially, that respondent was at all times mentioned the owner of certain real estate in Skagit county, Wash.; that on the 10th day of November, 1899, there were delinquent and unpaid taxes owing upon said land for the years from 1891 to 1896, inclusive, in the sum of $162.26; that at the same time there were also due upon the same land taxes for the years from 1897 to 1899, inclusive, in the sum of $69.57; that on said date the appellants Smith and McDonald procured from the treasurer of said county a certificate of delinquency upon said land for the taxes due for the year 1896 and prior years, and at the same time they paid to the treasurer the subsequent taxes above mentioned; that on the 9th day of February, 1901, appellant G. Nolte, at the instigation of appellant Eaton, commenced an action to foreclose said certificate of delinquency, and alleged in the application for the judgment of foreclosure that on the 22d day of December, 1900, said Smith and McDonald assigned to said Eaton all their interest in said certificate, and that on the 29th day of January, 1901, said Eaton assigned and transferred the same to said G. Nolte; that said action is still pending; that said Eaton and Nolte did on or about the 22d day of December, 1900, enter into a conspiracy for the purpose of defrauding respondent out of said land, and in pursuance thereof said Eaton approached said Smith and McDonald and represented that he and said Nolte were the agents of respondent, and were desirous, in behalf of respondent, of paying said taxes, and said Smith and McDonald, relying upon and believing said representations accepted the money due on said certificate of delinquency, and surrendered it to said Eaton and Nolte, who thereupon pretended and claimed that it had been assigned to them, and caused said action to be brought to foreclose the same; that in pursuance of said conspiracy said Eaton, representing said Nolte, went to the home of respondent, at Akron, in the state of Ohio, and then and there, on the 4th day of May, 1901, well knowing that respondent was in entire ignorance of any action having been taken for the purpose of acquiring tax title to said property, did pretend and represent to respondent that said land had been sold for taxes, and that respondent no longer had any valid or subsisting interest therein; that said representations were false, and were well known by said Eaton to be false at the time they were made, and were made by him for the purpose of inducing respondent to convey said land for a sum much less than its real value; that respondent, not having been a resident of the state of Washington for several years, and being ignorant of the laws of said state and the procedure necessary to procure a tax title to the property, was led to believe said representations, and did believe and rely upon the representations that he had no further subsisting interest in said land; that said Eaton represented at the said time that the only purpose for which he desired a conveyance was to clear up the title, assuring respondent that he (respondent) had no substantial right thereto, and offering to pay him $500 for a quitclaim to the property; that respondent, in ignorance of his true rights, and in ignorance of the facts, and being induced by said false statements, did execute and deliver to said Eaton a quitclaim deed to said property, conveying the same to said G. Nolte; that at the time of making said representations said property was, and it is now, of the value of $2,500; all of which facts were well known to said Eaton and Nolte, but were unknown to respondent, and respondent relied upon said Eaton's representation that said property was of no greater value than $500. It is further alleged that said Nolte and Eaton threaten to file said deed with the auditor of said Skagit county, thus placing the record title of the property in said Nolte, and that, if they be permitted to do so, a cloud will thereby be placed upon respondent's title, and he will suffer irreparable damage in consequence thereof; that respondent now tenders into court the amount of said taxes, together with all interest, penalties, and costs, and also tenders the said sum of $500. A restraining order is prayed, prohibiting appellants from taking any further steps in said foreclosure proceedings, from placing said deed of record, or from conveying the land to any person pending this action. It is further prayed that upon the trial of the cause upon its merits the court shall compel the surrender of said deed into court for cancellation, and that the court shall adjudge to whom the taxes are payable, and shall grant any other proper relief. The answer, in the main, consists of denials of the material averments of the complaint. The cause was tried by the court without a jury. The court found, in substance, as follows: That respondent acquired title to the land from the United States about the year 1891; that appellant G. Nolte is the owner and holder of tax certificates thereon for the years 1891 to 1899, inclusive, and that there is now due and owing him thereon, together with interest, the sum of $353.46; that on the 4th day of May, 1901, at Akron, in the state of Ohio, the appellants procured from respondent a quitclaim deed to said property, which deed is now in the possession of appellant Neal, as auditor of said Skagit county, and is held by him by virtue of a stipulation between the parties that he shall retain it subject to the final determination of this cause; that, for the purpose of procuring said deed, false representations and statements were made to respondent, upon which he relied, and was thereby induced to execute and deliver the same in consideration of the sum of $500; that the property was at the time of the execution of the deed of the value of $1,600; that respondent announced at the time of the trial that he was ready and willing to deposit with the clerk of the court the said sum of $500, together with interest thereon from May 4, 1904, at the lawful rate, and to likewise deposit, for the benefit of the holder of said certificate for taxes, the full amount thereof; that, if said false statements and representations had not been made to respondent, he would not have executed and delivered said deed. Upon the foregoing facts the court concluded, as matters of law, that respondent is the absolute owner of the land, and that said deed is void; that appellants are entitled to have repaid the said sum of $500, with interest from the date respondent received it, and that they are also entitled to have paid them said sum of $353.46, taxes, and interest thereon; that, upon the payment of such sums forthwith into the registry of the court, a decree be entered directing the appellant Neal to surrender said deed to respondent; that appellants be enjoined from asserting any right or claim to said land, or any part thereof. Thereafter judgment was entered upon the foregoing, which recites that respondent has deposited with the clerk of the court the sum of $865,--the same being the amount directed to be paid for the use and benefit of appellants; and it is adjudged and decreed that the deed in the possession of appellant Neal be surrendered to respondent for cancellation, and that the appellants, and each of them, and all persons...

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11 cases
  • Hetland v. Bilstad
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 24 Noviembre 1908
    ...153 N.Y. 576 (47 N.E. 883); Horton v. Lee, 106 Wis. 439 (82 N.W. 360); McDonald v. Smith, 139 Mich. 211 (102 N.W. 668); Stack v. Nolte, 29 Wash. 188 (69 P. 753); Mountain v. Day, 91 Minn. 249 (97 N.W. Morgan v. Dinges, 23 Neb. 271 (36 N.W. 544, 8 Am. St. Rep. 121). The rule is forcibly stat......
  • Hetland v. Bilstad
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 24 Noviembre 1908
    ...153 N. Y. 576, 47 N. E. 883;Horton v. Lee, 106 Wis. 439, 82 N. W. 360;McDonald v. Smith, 139 Mich. 211, 102 N. W. 669;Stack v. Nolte, 29 Wash. 188, 69 Pac. 753;Mountain v. Day, 91 Minn. 249, 97 N. W. 883;Morgan v. Dinges, 23 Neb. 271, 36 N. W. 544, 8 Am. St. Rep. 121. The rule is forcibly s......
  • Conta v. Corgiat
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 10 Junio 1913
    ... ... that the defrauded party would make no personal ... investigation. Stack v. Nolte, 29 Wash. 188, 69 P ... 753; Nelson v. Title Trust Co., 52 Wash. 258, 100 P ... 730; [74 Wash. 34] Wooddy v. Benton Water Co., ... ...
  • Westby v. Gorsuch
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 19 Julio 2002
    ...The statements which most frequently come within this branch of the rule are those concerning value[.]" Stack v. Nolte, 29 Wash. 188, 196, 69 P. 753 (1902) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §§ 878, 879). See also Boonstra v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 64 Wash.2d 621, 6......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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