Stackhouse v. Pure Oil Co.
| Decision Date | 23 May 1935 |
| Docket Number | 14070. |
| Parties | STACKHOUSE v. PURE OIL CO. et al. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; M. S Whaley, County Judge.
Action by T. B. Stackhouse against the Pure Oil Company and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Thomas Lumpkin & Cain, of Columbia, and W. F. Wimberly, of Charlotte, N. C., for appellants.
Melton & Belser, of Columbia, for respondent.
G. B GREENE, A. A. J.
Mrs. Elizabeth H. Stackhouse of Columbia, the owner of a lot with improvements at the N.E. corner of Lady and Sumter streets, by written lease dated the ------ day of September, 1929, let said premises to Palmetto Petroleum Company, a corporation, for a period of three years, beginning January 1, 1930, and ending December 31, 1932, at a rental of $410 per month, payable in advance. At that time the said corporation, which was controlled by Grover C. Richey, was engaged in the distribution of the products of the Pure Oil Company, a corporation under the laws of the state of Ohio. By a written instrument dated March 12, 1930, and signed by Mrs. Stackhouse, Grover C. Richey, and Palmetto Petroleum Company, the said lease was assigned to the said Richey, he thereby succeeding to all the rights and privileges and assuming all the obligations of the original lessee. Soon thereafter the Palmetto Petroleum Company went out of business in Columbia, and People's Oil Company, a corporation, was organized under the laws of this state, on April 23, 1930, and thereafter handled the products of the Pure Oil Company until its business was taken over by Pure Oil Company of the Carolinas, a corporation under the laws of the state of North Carolina. Just what contractual relations existed between People's Oil Company and the Pure Oil Company and between Pure Oil Company of the Carolinas and the Pure Oil Company does not fully appear. All three of them were made defendants in this action, and in their joint answer the agency of the other two for the Pure Oil Company was denied. However, the question of agency was eliminated at the trial of the case as shown by order for judgment in which this appears: "At the hearing it was conceded by counsel for the defendants that no distinction should be made between the several defendants."
Mrs. Stackhouse died March 2, 1931, leaving a will by which she devised all her real estate to her husband, T. B. Stackhouse, plaintiff in this action, for life, and under that will he became entitled to the rents accruing under said lease. At this time Grover C. Richey was commission agent for defendants in Columbia and continued as such for some time thereafter. It appears that he continued to sell the products of the Pure Oil Company on commission as late as 1933.
This action was brought in January, 1934. In paragraph 7 of the complaint it was alleged:
The complaint further alleged:
Plaintiff demanded judgment in the sum of $1,250, with interest.
By their answer defendants denied that they had entered into such an agreement with plaintiff as was alleged in the complaint, and in connection with this denial they alleged: "* * * that by virtue of agreement between the plaintiff, T. B. Stackhouse, and the said Grover C. Richey, and by the directions of the said parties, the defendant, People's Oil Company, agreed to if, as and when the said Grover C. Richey had commissions on hand with it, pay the said rental on or before the 10th day of each month to the said plaintiff, T. B. Stackhouse, and obligated itself no further in the premises."
The answer further denied that during the months of April, May, October, and November, 1932, there were any funds in their hands to the credit of Grover C. Richey with which to pay said rents. It also contained a general denial of any liability whatsoever on their part to the plaintiff on account of the matters alleged in the complaint.
The case came on for trial in the county court for Richland county, Hon. M. S. Whaley, county judge, presiding. A jury trial was waived. At the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony counsel for defendants moved for a nonsuit upon the grounds: (1) That there was no evidence tending to prove that defendants entered into any agreement that would bind them as parties to the alleged lease or as guarantors thereof; and (2) that the evidence showed that plaintiff without the knowledge or consent of defendants had taken additional security from Richey and extended the time for the payment of said rent, thereby releasing defendants from any agreement they might have made in regard thereto. This motion was overruled. After all the testimony was in, counsel for plaintiff moved to amend the complaint by striking out the words "in writing," in line two of paragraph seven of the complaint. Counsel for defendants at the same time moved to be allowed to amend the answer by setting up the defense that plaintiff without the knowledge or consent of defendants had accepted security from Richey and had extended the time for the payment of said rent, thereby releasing defendants from any liability whatsoever. Both amendments were allowed by the presiding judge. Counsel for defendants then moved for a directed verdict upon the same grounds as those upon which the motion for nonsuit was made. This motion was overruled. After argument on the merits of the case, the presiding judge signed an order giving plaintiff judgment against all of the defendants in the sum of $1,417.20. Said judgment was duly entered and the case appealed to this court.
The main question raised by the exceptions is by an assignment of error on the part of the presiding judge in not granting a nonsuit and directed verdict in favor of defendants, and in not granting judgment in their favor upon the ground that there was no evidence to support a verdict and judgment for plaintiff upon any theory of the complaint. We have heretofore quoted from paragraph 7 of the complaint in which it was alleged that plaintiff by agreement with defendants reduced the rental on the premises in question and extended the time for payment thereof "with the understanding and upon the condition that the defendants would pay the said rental of $375.00 per month and would see that said amount was paid to this plaintiff by check dated between the first and the 10th of each month." It seems to us that under this allegation it was open to plaintiff to prove liability on the part of defendants either as original promisors or as guarantors in respect to the payment of these rents. Such was the construction placed upon the complaint by all of the parties and by the presiding judge as shown by the record.
Was there sufficient evidence upon which to base a finding that there was an original undertaking or promise on the part of defendants to pay the rental of $375 on or before the 10th of each month? It must be borne in mind that defendants were charged in the complaint with liability on a new agreement and not on the original lease. There was put in evidence a series of letters passing between plaintiff and defendants during the months of April and May, 1931. These letters were as follows:
Atlanta, Ga.
In re: Palmetto Petroleum Company and G. C. Richey lease .
Dear Sir:
Some three months ago I agreed to reduce the rent on the building leased to your company, located at the N.E. Corner Lady and Sumter Streets, Columbia, S. C., from $410.00 per month to $375.00 per month, conditioned upon your writing me a letter that from that date until the expiration of the lease a check for $375.00, in payment of rent in advance, would be in my hands not later than the fifth of each month; and Mr. Richey promised to have you write me a letter that this rent would be paid as above stated.
I have not received such letter and today am in receipt of a check for $375.00, signed J. M. Bottomly, for $375.00 in payment of April rent, said check being dated April 6th and sent to me by hand today by Mr. Richey.
Will you please confirm the agreement as above outlined if in accordance with your arrangement with Mr. Richey?
Columbia, South Carolina.
Dear Mr. Stackhouse:
I am receipt of your letter 11th...
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Cooper & Griffin, Inc. v. Bridwell
... ... executed, as well as the negotiations between the parties ... leading up to the execution thereof. See Stackhouse v ... Pure Oil Co. et al., 176 S.C. 318, 180 S.E. 188 ... Furthermore, the authorities hold that when a written ... agreement is couched in ... ...