Stackhouse v. Stanton
| Decision Date | 13 February 1936 |
| Docket Number | 14230. |
| Citation | 184 S.E. 105,179 S.C. 506 |
| Parties | STACKHOUSE v. STANTON. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Dillon County; G. Dewey Oxner, Judge.
Action by Wade Stackhouse against H. C. Stanton. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Decree of Judge Oxner directed to be reported follows:
The above-entitled suit, commenced in the court of common pleas for Dillon county on the 23d day of November 1934, sought the recovery of the tract of land mentioned and described in the complaint, which was regular in form containing 155 acres, more or less, located in the said county, and bounded on the north by lands of H. M. Rogers; on the east by lands of J. E. Cottingham; on the south by lands of J. E. Cottingham and R. M. Jackson, and on the west by lands of R. M. Jackson and lands formerly of Mrs. Effie Evans.
In due time the defendant answered admitting the execution of a deed to the plaintiff on or about the 14th day of January, 1929 but alleging that at the time of the conveyance defendant was indebted to plaintiff in the sum of approximately $600, and to other parties in varying amounts, all of which were secured by mortgages on the property, and that the plaintiff agreed at the time of the execution of the deed to cancel his mortgage and to assume the other mortgages and carry them for the defendant, with the right on his part to pay the said indebtedness, upon which being done the premises should be reconveyed to the defendant; in other words, that the deed was intended as security for debt, and hence a mortgage.
The cause came on to be heard before me in open court during the April term of the court of common pleas for Dillon county. The testimony was taken, and it was agreed among counsel that it should be argued before me at Chesterfield, S.C. Arguments were duly had, and briefs were filed with me by counsel for both plaintiff and defendant.
As appears from the testimony, the facts are as follows:
That at the date of the execution of the deed on the 14th day of January, 1929, the defendant, H. C. Stanton, was indebted to the Federal Land Bank of Columbia in the sum of $3,992.40 two of the payments on the mortgage being delinquent; to the Bank of Dillon in the sum of $1,111.36 as of March 16, 1928 to Edgar Stanton in the sum of $200 as of February 20, 1928, and to the plaintiff, Wade Stackhouse, in the sum of $600 as of the 16th day of March, 1927, and to the said Stackhouse in an additional sum of $90. He was also due on his land taxes for two years, 1927 and 1928, amounting to $312.70, making a total of $6,306.46, liens against the property at that date, without interest. The Bank of Dillon had gone into the hands of a receiver and was pressing for its indebtedness and the Federal Land Bank was insisting upon the payment of its past due installments. The Bank of Dillon, the only banking institution in the community, which was a consolidation of three banks existing in that town of Dillon, had closed its doors on November 6, 1928, just about sixty days before the transaction herein questioned. The South Carolina State Bank had opened up a branch in the town, and, perhaps the Peoples State Bank, and a few days before the execution of the deed the defendant had gone to Dillon and had learned that the banks probably would not make advances during the subsequent year to any considerable extent. He therefore went to the plaintiff, and, according to the testimony, sought to make arrangements for advances during the following year. The plaintiff, however, refused to consider making such advances. Financial conditions in the community were at a low ebb, and it appears that the plaintiff, instead of having money to lend, or to make advances with, had himself just a short time previously borrowed on school bonds from the South Carolina State Bank the sum of $7,500, to run with during the year, and in the year 1929 bought all of his fertilizer on credit. He was not a money lender and at no time made investments in the way of loans. The indebtedness from the defendant to the plaintiff was a result of advancing him supplies during the year 1927, the defendant failing to that extent to pay the indebtedness due plaintiff.
It is not clear from the testimony who made the proposition, but it does appear that the parties finally agreed that the defendant would convey to the plaintiff the tract of land mentioned and described in the complaint by warranty deed, and that the plaintiff would allow the defendant to remain on the premises as a share cropper. The plaintiff thereupon went to attorneys and conferred with them about making the deed and subsequently the defendant went to the offices of Gibson and Muller, attorneys, and executed it.
It was admitted in open court that neither party made the slightest suggestion to the attorneys that the deed was intended as anything else than what it purported to be, namely, an absolute conveyance, upon the consideration of Dr. Stackhouse canceling the debt that was due by the defendant to him and assuming the other outstanding obligations against the property.
Immediately upon the execution and delivery of the deed, on January 14, 1929, the plaintiff canceled the note and mortgage of the defendant. On September 17, 1929, he took over from the Bank of Dillon its mortgage and had it canceled on the records as of that day, and on the same day paid and had canceled the mortgage to Edgar Stanton. He also paid up the delinquent installments on the mortgage of the Federal Land Bank, and has since that time regularly made the payments thereon. On September 31, 1929, he paid the 1927 and 1928 taxes, and has since kept the taxes paid on the premises.
The defendant, Stanton, testifies that on the day of the execution of the deed, or immediately prior thereto, he and the plaintiff had an oral agreement that he might repay the plaintiff within a short time, or that if he could not do this that the plaintiff would permit him to stay upon the premises, work the same, and apply the net proceeds of crops made to the indebtness until it was paid in full, when he would reconvey. This the plaintiff denies and testified equally as positively that there was nothing said at the time as to any reconveyance. The deed was duly recorded on the 21st day of January, 1929, and the defendant remained upon the premises and since that time has been working a share crop thereon. During the years 1931, 1932, and 1933, Dr. Stackhouse has had another share cropper on the place working a part of it, which share cropper was employed by Dr. Stackhouse and accounted to him.
On March 6, 1929, in response to a letter written by defendant to plaintiff, plaintiff wrote defendant agreeing to let him "buy back" the place if he would pay back the money he had advanced. On April 30, 1929, he gave him a letter in the nature of an option giving him the right, on or before December 1, 1929, to buy back the place upon the payment of all indebtedness and the further sum of $1,000. In this letter it is stated, This agreement was extended to December 1, 1930, and on November 20, 1930, was again extended to December 1, 1931.
Defendant testified that some time in the early part of 1929 he carried to the plaintiff a check of H. M. Rogers, signed in blank, with authority from Mr. Rogers for the plaintiff to fill it in for the amount due him, and Mr. Rogers testified that he did give the defendant such check; that he was a neighbor and that he stated that he had "deeded the lands" to Dr. Stackhouse and was worried about the transaction; that he made arrangements to advance the money as a neighborly act. The plaintiff testified that he had no recollection of the tender of the check and that he does not believe it was ever presented to him, but that in any event there was no request to deed the land back to Mr. Stanton, but in a conversation with Mr. Rogers, Mr. Rogers wanted the land deeded to him. This, however, is denied by Mr. Rogers. The defendant remained on the land, received advances from Dr. Stackhouse each year and divided the crop with him each year up to the time of the institution of this action.
It appears that during the year 1934, Dr. Stackhouse again made the defendant the proposition to sell the land back to him if he could get a government loan sufficient to pay him a certain amount. The parties disagreed as to what this amount was, the defendant contending that it was $4,100, for which amount the Land Bank approved the loan, the plaintiff that it was this amount in addition to the book account which Stanton owed him amounting to approximately $2,000. However, this may be, the plaintiff testified on the stand that he was willing now to sell back and had offered for some time past to sell back to the plaintiff for a consideration of $8,000, which amount would include the sum now due on the Federal Land Bank mortgage, which is approximately $2,000.
After due consideration of the testimony and the law applicable to such transaction, I have reached the conclusion that at the time of the execution of the deed it was intended by both parties to be merely a fee-simple title to the premises. There are numerous decisions in the reports in such cases but in the last analysis certain legal principles must be applied to the facts of each case, and each case has to be determined largely upon its own facts. I think the following may be stated as the chief legal...
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