Stackpole v. Hancock

• Citation: 40 Fla. 362,24 So. 914
• Parties: STACKPOLE et al. v. HANCOCK et al. HANCOCK et al. v. STACKPOLE et al.
• Decision Date: 03 December 1898
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

24 So. 914

40 Fla. 362

STACKPOLE et al. v. HANCOCK et al.

HANCOCK et al. v. STACKPOLE et al.

Florida Supreme Court

December 3, 1898

Appeal from circuit court, Hernando county; William A. Hocker Judge.

Bill by W. P. Stackpole and others against William S. Hancock and others. From the decree, both parties appeal. Affirmed as to one defendant, and reversed, with directions, as to the other parties.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. Where the parties to a chancery suit, after a plea is filed and set down for argument, fail to bring it on for hearing but proceed to take testimony as to the merits of the plea and further bring the case on for final hearing, the decree rendered will not be reversed unless there is error on the merits.

2. Ordinarily, the mere expression of an opinion as to value, or a statement as to the uses for which real estate is wanted will not, unless used as part of fraudulent means to mislead and prevent an examination of the property, suffice to set aside a deed thereto on the ground of fraud.

3. By the rule of the common law, a vendee who has information of a mine on the land of another of which the latter is ignorant is under no legal obligation to disclose such fact in making the purchase. Under such circumstances, the vendee may remain silent, and not disclose facts in his knowledge, or answer inquiries as to such facts, but, if he undertakes to do so, he must disclose the whole truth, without concealment of material facts, and without doing anything calculated to prevent an investigation on the part of the vendor, especially if he does not reside near the land and the vendee does.

4. While a vendee, under the circumstances stated in the preceding headnote, may remain silent and purchase, yet a very little is sufficient to affect the application of this principle, and statements ordinarily regarded as an expression of an opinion may be considered as sufficient when calculated to mislead and prevent an examination of the property on part of the vendor.

5. Where an answer in chancery contains the usual general denial found in such a pleading, it is sufficient to make an issue on material allegations in the bill not admitted, and to which no direct response is made, and as to them there must be, at least, a preponderance of sustaining proof.

6. The separate answer of one defendant cannot be used as proof against the others, in the absence of showing that he occupied such a relation to them as to bind them by his representations.

7. A bill charging an agreement and combination on the part of several defendants to fraudulently obtain a deed to them to real estate will be sustained by proof of the fraudulent representations of one in securing the deed, if in fact he was acting for the others, though they did not authorize such representations, and did not know of them when the deed was made to them.

8. Where some of the representations made by a vendee in procuring a deed to land are true, and some are false and sufficient to set aside the sale, and it appears that the latter might and did influence the vendor in the disposition of the land, the sale should be canceled.

9. Under chapter 3681, Acts 1887, when land is returned to the assessor by an owner, and the assessor acts upon the return in assessing the property, it must be assessed to the party making the return. Under such circumstances, an assessment to a party not the owner, and not the one making the return, is void.

COUNSEL

T. S. Coogler, G. C. Martin, and Angus Paterson, for plaintiffs.

Sparkman & Sparkman, John P. Wall, and Geo. P Raney, for defendants. The amended bill, filed by appellees, W. P. Stackpole, James Connor, Rosanna Connor, Eugene Connor and wife, Johanna, and W. J. Connor, against W. S. Hancock, John J. Hale, John M. Taylor, C. C. Keathley, and George T. Ross, alleges that complainants were, on and before the 1st day of June, 1890, seised in fee and possessed of the W. 1/2 of S.W. 1/4 of section 12, township 22 S., range 20 E., situated in Hernando county; the said W. P. Stackpole being the owner of an undivided half interest in said land, and the other complainants being the owners of the other undivided interest as heirs at law of one John Connor, deceased. The object of the bill is to cancel certain quitclaim conveyances made by complainants to defendant W. S. Hancock, a quitclaim deed from the latter to the defendants Hale, Taylor, and Keathley, and certain tax deeds acquired and held by the defendants. The grounds upon which the cancellations are sought are stated by the bill as follows: 'Your orators and oratrixes, being so seised and possessed of said lands, were approached by the defendant Wiliam S. Hancock, on or about the 1st day of June, 1890, and solicited by him to sell him their respective interests therein, which your orators and oratrixes were willing to do, provided that the sum offered by the said Hancock was as much as said lands were then worth in the market, but, not knowing the then market value of said lands, they relied entirely upon the representations of him, the said Hancock, for a truthful statement of the market value thereof. That thereupon the said Hancock represented and asserted to them that said lands were utterly valueless, except for the small amount of pine timber standing thereon. That there was an English syndicate which intended to erect a mill in the neighborhood of said lands, but would not do so unless it could purchase at least one thousand acres. That he (Hancock) owned some adjacent lands, and, by obtaining the lands of your orators and oratrixes, he could make up the one thousand acres, and thus effect a sale of his own lands to the said syndicate. That there were no deposits of phosphate, then recently discovered in Florida, or other valuable deposits of minerals, on said lands, and that, save for the timber aforesaid, they would command no price and were utterly unsalable in the market. That said lands had been sold again and again for taxes, and tax deeds unnumbered clouded their title, and that the sums, aggregating $1,000, which he then offered them, were really more than said land was then worth or would sell for in the market. That upon these representations of said Hancock, on which your orators and oratrixes relied as being truthful and free from deception, and by which alone they were induced to sell said lands to him, your orators and oratrixes did, for the aggregate sum of one thousand dollars, so offered as aforesaid, execute to the said Hancock quitclaim deeds to the said lands, viz. your orator William P. Stackpole, on the 2d day of June, A. D. 1890, executed a quitclaim deed to said Hancock for his interest in said lands for the sum of two hundred dollars; and, in order to obtain the signature to said deed of your orator for said nominal consideration, the said Hancock first induced your orator to drink freely with him (Hancock) of spirituous liquors, and your said orator thereby became intoxicated, and in that condition was made to execute said deed. That said deed was afterwards recorded in Book 6, page 107, in the records of the clerk of the circuit court for Hernando county, Florida.

'That on the 26th day of September, A. D. 1890, your orators and oratrixes James Connor, Rosanna Connor, Eugene Connor, and Johanna Connor, wife of the said Eugene Connor, executed their quitclaim deed for their interest in said lands to said Hancock for the consideration of six hundred dollars, said deed being recorded in said clerk's office in Book 6, on page 108. That your orator W. J. Connor executed to said defendant Hancock a quitclaim for his interest in said lands on the 5th day of December, A. D. 1890, for the sum of two hundred dollars, which said deed is recorded in said clerk's office in Book 6, on page 282.' The bill further alleges that complainants afterwards discovered, and so allege, that all of said representations and assurances made by Hancock were utterly false in every particular, and were made by him solely to circumvent, cheat, defraud, and swindle complainants, and obtain from them the aforesaid deeds. That, in truth and fact, no such English syndicate existed, and the lands were not solely valuable for the pine timber standing thereon, but there did exist large and valuable deposits of phosphate on said lands, and said deposits rendered them exceedingly valuable, which fact was well known to Hancock and his co-defendants and conspirators, as hereinafter charged, but was entirely unknown to complainants, and studiously concealed from them by said Hancock. That said lands, at the time of the execution of said deeds, were worth at least the sum of $30,000. It further alleged that the defendants, well knowing the great value of complainants' land, and their ignorance thereof by reason of their residence in a distant state, conspired and confederated together to oppress, injure, and defraud said complainants out of said land, and for this purpose said defendants deputed and sent Hancock, as agent, to complainants, to obtain, by the false and fraudulent statements and representations aforesaid, the said deeds from them. That, after Hancock and fraudulently thus obtained from complainants said quitclaim deeds, he, on the, to wit, 20th day of February, 1891, executed to his said co-conspirators a quitclaim deed for an undivided three-fourths interest in said land, and said deed was recorded in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of Hernando county, in Book 6, page 388.

In reference to tax deeds, it is alleged that complainant Stackpole and one John Connor, deceased, and whose heirs are co-complainants in this suit, purchased the land in controversy in October, 1882, and obtained a deed therefor from the board of education of the...