Stacy v. Stroud

• Decision Date: 27 July 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3:91-1145.
• Citation: 845 F. Supp. 1135
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Parties: James Randall STACY, Plaintiff, v. B.Q. STROUD, et al., Defendants.

845 F. Supp. 1135

James Randall STACY, Plaintiff, v. B.Q. STROUD, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 3:91-1145.

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, at Huntington.

July 27, 1993.

Carter S. Zerbe, Michael Kelly, Charleston, WV, for plaintiff.

R. Carter Elkins, Laura L. Gray, Campbell, Woods, Bagley, Emerson, McNeer & Herndon, Huntington, WV, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

STAKER, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on plaintiff's application and petition for attorneys' fees.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In Mingo County, West Virginia, during the early hours of November 19, 1989, James Randall Stacy was arrested for driving under the influence ("DUI"). At the county jail, during booking procedures, an altercation took place, resulting in injuries to Stacy. On November 14, 1991, Stacy filed suit against various Mingo County officials, alleging violations of his civil rights.

Named in the original suit were: Mingo County Sheriff Gerald Chafin, Mingo County Deputy Sheriffs B.Q. Stroud, R.C. Justice, James Pack and Robin B. Findley, Mingo County Sheriff's Department correctional officers J.R. Hensley and Eugene Crumb, Mingo County Chief Correctional Officer Harley Dempsey, Jail Administrator William "Mooch" Justice, (all of the above named individually and in their official capacity), the Mingo County Sheriff's Department and Mingo County Commissioners Larry Cline, Curtis Fletcher, Jim Hatfield, Ronald Rumora, and their successors.

The complaint alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1988, as well as violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The court granted summary judgment in favor of Harley Dempsey and granted summary judgment for all defendants with regard to the First and Sixth Amendment claims. The plaintiff voluntarily dropped all claims against Jim Hatfield and all claims based on supervisory liability, failure to train, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

On July 7, 1992, the parties assembled for trial. Before trial commenced, and on plaintiff's motions, defendants Gerald Chafin, Harley Dempsey, William Justice and Jim Hatfield were dismissed. A jury was thereafter empaneled and the case proceeded to trial on the remaining claims with the remaining defendants. At the close of plaintiffs evidence, on defendants' unopposed motions, the court dismissed defendants James Pack, Eugene Crumb, the Mingo County Sheriffs Department, Larry Cline, Curtis Fletcher and Ronald Rumora. On July 11, 1992, the jury returned a special verdict.

The jury found that B.Q. Stroud had used excessive force against Stacy and that B.Q. Stroud and J.R. Hensley had shown deliberate indifference to Stacy's serious medical needs. The jury did not find that defendants R.C. Justice and R.B. Findley had engaged in any wrongdoing. Stacy was awarded $4147.25 for medical costs and pain and suffering.

Stacy's attorney thereafter submitted a petition and application for attorneys' fees in accordance with the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Act of 1976. The defendants responded, the plaintiff replied and the defendants responded to the reply. A hearing was held on October 13, 1992, and the parties were given leave to submit additional briefs, which they did. The defendants also filed another supplemental brief on January 5, 1993. The matter is now mature for this court's consideration.

ANALYSIS

I. Determining the Lodestar

The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 1981 & 1993 Supp.), provides, in pertinent part, that:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.

Id. at § 1988(b).

A. Prevailing party

Attorneys' fees may only be awarded to parties who have prevailed on the merits of their case. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980). Therefore, the court must first determine whether the party requesting a fee award is the prevailing party. The Supreme Court has held that "`the touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.'" Farrar v. Hobby, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573, 121 L.Ed.2d 494, 503 (1992) (quoting Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1493-94, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989)). A civil rights plaintiff must obtain some relief on the merits of his or her claim through an enforceable judgment, consent decree or settlement. Farrar v. Hobby, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 573, 121 L.Ed.2d at 503. The plaintiff in the case at hand received an enforceable judgment and is, therefore, a prevailing party. The court will accordingly consider whether or not the plaintiff should receive attorneys' fees.

B. Court's discretion

An award of attorneys' fees falls within the trial court's discretion. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). In determining a fee award, the court begins by multiplying a reasonable number of hours by a reasonable hourly fee to arrive at the lodestar figure. See id. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939. The court may consider twelve factors in determining the lodestar figure:

(1) the time and labor required;

(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;

(3) the skill requisite to properly perform the legal service;

(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;

(5) the customary fee;

(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;

(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;

(8) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys;

(10) the "undesirability" of the case;

(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and

(12) awards in similar cases.

Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1075 n. 2, 1077 (4th Cir.1986) (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974)) (the "Johnson factors").

C. "Special circumstances"

The defendants argued that, even if the court determines that the plaintiff is the prevailing party, "special circumstances" preclude the award of attorneys' fees, citing, among other cases, Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072, 99 S.Ct. 843, 59 L.Ed.2d 38 (1979). The cases cited by the defendants, however, involve unusual facts which provide no appropriate analogies to the situation at hand. The defendants asserted that this was a private action brought only to benefit the plaintiff. The defendants claimed that no public benefit is implicated in this matter at all. Therefore, "special circumstances" require the court to deny Stacy's request for attorneys' fees in its entirety.

The defendants have utterly disregarded the jury verdict. The jury found here that Mingo County officers used excessive force against the plaintiff and showed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The jury determined that public officials acting under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of his federally-protected civil rights. The conduct of public officials is an important public concern. Citizens and taxpayers necessarily benefit when public servants are deterred in their efforts to exceed their lawful authority. See Gonzales v. Jillson, 642 F.Supp. 908, 909 (D.Mass.1986) (noting the important public interests vindicated in police brutality cases). The defendants' argument is without merit.

D. Proportionality

The defendants further argued that the plaintiff is not entitled to a fee award because he received only nominal or de minimis damages, citing Farrar v. Hobby, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). The plaintiff received over $4,000 and his damages cannot be characterized as technical, nominal, or de minimis. As discussed above, the suit here implicated important public concerns and the damages sought need not be proportionate to the damages eventually obtained. Moreover, the fee award need not be proportionate to the damages. See Wallace v. Mulholland, 957 F.2d 333, 339 (7th Cir.1992); Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 522, 527 (2d Cir.1991) (collecting cases); Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 951 (4th Cir.1987) (citing Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986)).

E. Johnson factors

More importantly, consideration of the twelve factors used in the fee award analysis should serve to eliminate those cases in which attorney's fees are not warranted. The court will review those twelve factors in determining the fees, if any, which should be awarded in this matter.

(1) Time and labor expended: The plaintiff's attorneys, Mr. Zerbe and Mr. Kelly, submitted itemized schedules of their hours and expenses. They adjusted their requests in a number of instances in response to the defendants' objections. The court has reviewed the specific items contained in the fee requests and any amendments or objections thereto in determining which requests are proper. The court has prepared appendices which appear at the end of this opinion. See Appendix A (Zerbe hours), Appendix B (Kelly hours) and Appendix C (Expenses). In the interests of clarity and convenience the court has consolidated the fee petition with any supplements thereto. The court has also indicated the extent to which the specific items requested will be awarded. Discussion of specific items will be left to parts II and III of this opinion.

(2) The novelty and difficulty of the questions: There is no indication that this case was any more or less complicated than any other average civil rights case.

(3) The skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered: This case required an average, but not...