Stadiem v. Harvell

Decision Date10 April 1935
Docket Number390.
PartiesSTADIEM v. HARVELL.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from Superior Court, Lenoir County; Parker, Judge.

Action in summary ejectment by H. Stadiem against Rufus Harvell. From a judgment of the Superior Court, affirming a judgment of a justice of the peace for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

This was an action in summary ejectment commenced before a justice of the peace under C. S. § 2365 et seq., as amended, and heard upon appeal by the plaintiff to the superior court by Parker, J., and a jury, at the February term, 1935, of Lenoir.

Issues were submitted to and answered by the jury as follows:

"1. Is the defendant a tenant of the plaintiff and does he hold over after the expiration of the tenancy? Answer: No.

2. What amount, if any, is the defendant indebted to the plaintiff for rent per month for the house and land? Answer: Nothing. (By consent.)"

His honor entered judgment "that the tenancy of the defendant has not expired and that the plaintiff is not entitled to the possession of the tract of land and the buildings described in the complaint in this action," and "that the defendant is tenant of the plaintiff and as such tenant, is entitled to the possession of said lands and buildings during the year 1935." From this judgment the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, assigning errors.

Allen & Allen, of Kinston, for appellant.

Sutton & Greene, of Kinston, for appellee.

SCHENCK Justice.

The perplexity presented on the record arises from the way the first issue was drawn. If we had only the issue and its answer to enlighten us, it would seem that however the issue was answered the defendant must lose, since if the answer should be in the affirmative, there would be a finding that the defendant was a tenant and that he was holding over after the expiration of his tenancy, and therefore should be ejected; and if the answer should be in the negative there would be a finding that the defendant was not a tenant and not holding over after his tenancy expired, and therefore not being a tenant was a trespasser, and should be ejected. A case for the plaintiff of "Heads I win and tails you lose." Albeit, that conflicts in the findings of essential and determinative facts in a verdict will vitiate it, it is well recognized that a verdict should be liberally and favorably construed with a view of sustaining it, if possible, and that resort may be had to the pleadings evidence, and charge of the court in order to obtain a proper interpretation of a verdict. Donnell v. Greensboro, 164 N.C. 330, 80 S.E. 377; Sitterson v. Sitterson, 191 N.C. 319, 131 S.E. 641, 51 A. L. R. 760; Wilson v Fertilizer Company, 203 N.C. 359, 166 S.E. 76, and cases there cited.

While the first issue may be inartificially drawn, by reference to such pleadings as were in this case, the affidavit and summons in the court of first instance, and to the evidence and charge in the superior court, it is apparent that his honor instructed the jury to consider the issue as if it read substantially: "Does the defendant as a tenant of the plaintiff hold over after the expiration of his tenancy?" Construing the issue as so reading, we think any error or irregularity was fully cured. Richardson v. Edwards, 156 N.C. 590, 72 S.E. 482.

By reference to the affidavit of the plaintiff before the justice of the peace and his testimony in the superior court, it will be seen that the plaintiff contended that he rented the lands to the defendant for the years 1932, 1933, and 1934, that he made a separate rental contract for each year, and that the defendant's term expired December 31, 1934. And by reference to the defendant's testimony in the superior court it will be seen that the defendant contended that the rental contract under which he held was made in September, 1933, and covered the three years of 1933, 1934, and 1935, and that therefore the defendant's term expired on December 31, 1935. Neither party contended that the defendant was not at one time a tenant of the plaintiff by virtue of an oral contract of lease, or that the defendant was not then in possession, and the sole issue of fact raised was whether this tenancy expired on December 31, 1934, or on December 31, 1935.

The controversy was narrowed to one question...

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