Stafford, Application of

• Decision Date: 05 May 1958
• Docket Number: Cr. 6193
• Citation: 324 P.2d 967,160 Cal.App.2d 110
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Application of Guy N. STAFFORD for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Page 967

324 P.2d 967

160 Cal.App.2d 110

Application of Guy N. STAFFORD for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 6193.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

May 5, 1958.

Hearing Denied July 2, 1958.

Guy N. Stafford in pro. per., for petitioner.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Robert C. Lynch, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondent.

VALLEE, Justice.

Proceeding in habeas corpus to determine the validity of orders of the superior court finding petitioner in contempt, sentencing him to the county jail, imposing fines, and directing that he be imprisoned until the fines are satisfied.

On May 13, 1952 a judgment was entered in an action in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County titled Stafford v. Russell, number 568668, which 'perpetually enjoined, restrained, and debarred' petitioner 'from making, asserting, claiming or demanding any estate, right, title or interest whatsoever by action, proceeding or in any other manner whatsoever adverse or hostile to' certain defendants named therein in or to certain described property or in or to the leasehold estate of G. M. Russell covering said property. The judgment became final.

On August 25, 1955 the People brought suit to condemn certain of the property described in the judgment in action 568668. The defendants in action 568668 were named parties defendants in the condemnation suit. Petitioner was not named as a party therein.

On June 4, 1956 petitioner filed an answer in the condemnation suit and also filed a cross-complaint against the defendants therein. The answer and cross-complaint asserted claims in and to the property sought to be condemned. They were ordered stricken from the files. On September 10, 1956 petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the order striking the cross-complaint. On September 19, 1956 he filed a 'Notice of Election to Prosecute Appeal on a Settled Statement.' On January 21, 1957 the notice was ordered stricken. On October 7, 1957 petitioner appeared at a pretrial conference in the condemnation suit and filed a memorandum wherein he urged a claim to the property and the oil and gas lease described in the injunction.

On November 13, 1957 petitioner was ordered to show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt. One count charged the filing of the notice of appeal in the condemnation suit. Another charged the filing of the notice to proceed with the appeal on a settled statement. A third charged the appearance at the pretrial conference and the filing of the memorandum.

The court found petitioner in contempt on each of the three counts. As to each count the court imposed a fine of $500 and five days' imprisonment in the county jail; the imprisonment with respect to each of the three counts to run consecutively. The court ordered that in default of payment of the fines petitioner be imprisoned one day for each $5 of the fines not paid. Petitioner has served the five days' imprisonment and paid the fine imposed as to Count I.

The function of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is to secure the issuance of the writ; and when the writ is issued, the petition has accomplished its purpose and becomes functus officio. The writ requires a return by the officer or other person having custody of the person claimed to be unlawfully detained. The return is to the writ, not the petition. To the return the petitioner may present exceptions raising questions of law, or a traverse raising issues of fact, or both. As a rule the parties stipulate at the hearing that the petition be treated as a traverse to the return. When the return sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for holding the person, such process being produced at the hearing (Pen.Code, § 1480), and the traverse alleges matter tending to invalidate the apparent effect of the process, the burden of proving such new matter is on the petitioner. In re Collins, 151 Cal. 340, 342, 90 P. 827, 91 P. 397; In re Egan, 24 Cal.2d 323, 330, 149 P.2d 693. In the present case petitioner did not present any exceptions raising questions of law nor did he file a traverse to the return; nor did the parties stipulate that the petition be treated as a traverse. However, at the argument the parties treated the matter as if the petition was a traverse to the return and we shall do the same. In re Silverstein, 52 Cal.App.2d 725, 126 P.2d 962.

The first question is: Was petitioner guilty of more than one contempt? He asserts he was not.

'Where separate contemptuous acts are committed, the contemner can be fined for each offense in the amount authorized by the code. [Citations.] Petitioners contend that they were not guilty of separate contemptuous acts, but rather of a single course of conduct for which but one $500 fine could be imposed. However, the trial court could properly consider the several acts of the petitioners--in renting apartments to persons other than members of their own family, in failing to remove apartments from the main structure and to reconvert the same to a single-family dwelling, and in failing to remove the apartments from the garage--as separate contemptuous acts. [Citations.] Each act, or failure to act, considered alone could be the basis for a contempt proceeding.' Donovan v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.2d 848, 855, 250 P.2d 246, 250.

Every separate act of disobedience of the injunction was a separate contempt. (Golden Gate Con. H. M. Co. v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 187, 3 P. 628, discharging mining debris into a stream on three separate occasions in violation of an injunction--three separate contempts; Ex parte Stice, 70 Cal. 51, 11 P. 459, refusal to be sworn as a witness in a criminal action on February 27 and again on March 1, 1886--two separate contempts; Solano Aquatic Club v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. 278, 131 P. 874, operating a ferry service on three separate days in violation of a temporary restraining order--three separate contempts; Blodgett v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. 1, 290 P. 293, 72 A.L.R. 482, filing a contemptuous affidavit, citation for contempt therefor, sending scandalous letter to judge before citation heard and producing same in open court at contempt hearing--two separate contempts; In re Shuler, 210 Cal. 377, 292 P. 481, broadcasts on four days--each broadcast a separate contempt for which the punishment could run consecutively; Hume v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.2d 506, 110 P.2d 669, filing a complaint in an action on June 5, 1940, filing amended complaint and an affidavit on June 8, 1940 all in the same action--three separate contempts; Lindsley v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.App. 419, 245 P. 212, publication of newspaper articles containing contumacious matter on four different days--each publication a separate contempt.)

In his answer to the order to show cause petitioner alleged that the judgment in which the injunction was granted is void on its face for lack of jurisdiction. The only facts alleged in support of this conclusion were that the injunctive judgment was without evidentiary support. A judgment...