Stafford v. Ballinger

• Decision Date: 19 January 1962
• Citation: 18 Cal.Rptr. 568,199 Cal.App.2d 289
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Guy N. STAFFORD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Glenwood BALLINGER and Title Insurance and Trust Company, a corporation, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 25565.

Page 568

18 Cal.Rptr. 568

199 Cal.App.2d 289

Guy N. STAFFORD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Glenwood BALLINGER and Title Insurance and Trust Company, a corporation, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 25565.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Jan. 19, 1962.

Hearing Denied Feb. 13, 1962.

Hearing Denied March 14, 1962.

Guy N. Stafford, appellant, in pro. per.

R. Leslie Sparks, James F. Healey, Jr., Arthur G. Bowman, Donald J. Burdine, Frank X. Ball, John R. Engman, Los Angeles, for respondents.

FOX, Presiding Justice.

Appellant seeks to acquire title to certain real property either through a judgment quieting title or by a decree of specific performance; he also asks damages as an alternative to these remedies.

Respondents' demurrers to appellant's third amended complaint were sustained without leave to amend. Appellant, however, served and filed a fourth amended complaint. Respondents moved to strike this last pleading and to dismiss the action as to them. These motions were granted and judgments of dismissal as to respondents were entered. Appellant has appealed from these judgments.

In form, appellant has alleged two causes of action. The first is a conventional pleading to quiet title; the second sets forth in detail the facts and circumstances upon which appellant's claim of title is based.

In an action to quiet title, the complaint should allege, inter alia, the interest of the plaintiff in the property at the time the action is commenced. (Peck v. Martinez, 46 Cal.App.2d 855, 856, 117 P.2d 7.) If plaintiff owns the property in fee, a general allegation of ownership of the described property is sufficient. (Meyer v. O'Rourke, 150 Cal. 177, 178, 88 P. 706.) However, a general allegation of ownershp is treated as a conclusion if the detailed facts upon which the claim of ownership is predicated are also alleged, and in such case, the specific facts will control rather than the general allegation in determining whether the complaint states sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. (Gruwell v. Seybolt, 82 Cal. 7, 9, 22 P. 938; Carlson v. Lindauer, 119 Cal.App.2d 292, 302, 259 P.2d 925; Lucas v. Sweet, 47 Cal.2d 20, 22, 300 P.2d 828.) Actually, in such circumstances only one cause of action is stated. (Ephraim v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 28 Cal.2d 824, 832, 172 P.2d 501.) Accordingly, if the specifically pleaded facts affirmatively reveal the absence of an essential element in a plaintiff's claim of title, no cause of action is stated. (Martin v. Hall, 219 Cal. 334, 338, 26 P.2d 288; Ephraim v. Metroplitan Trust Co., supra; Shive v. Barrows, 88 Cal.App.2d 838, 842, 199 P.2d 693.)

In his second cause of action appellant alleges that on July 24, 1940, A. M. Cravath was the owner of Lot 21, Block 19 of Athens, County of Los Angeles, State of California, as per map recorded in Book 8, pp. 146-147 of Maps, in the office of the County Recorder in said county and state; that on said date appellant purchased said lot from Cravath for $400; that he made a down payment of $50; that the balance of $350 was to be paid within five days; that Cravath agreed to deliver a deed conveying said lot to appellant when the balance was paid; that Cravath signed and delivered to appellant a document reading: 'July 24, 1940. Received of Guy N. Stafford Fifty and no/100 Dollars on the purchase of lot 21 Blk 19 of Athens. Bal of $350.00 to be paid at Security First Nat'l Bank 47 and Brdy., within 5 days. Lot sold subject to oil lease of record and taxes 1939-1940. A. M. Cravath.' Cravath further agreed to deliver evidence that said lot was free and clear except for said oil lease and taxes when he delivered a deed to the lot to appellant.

Appellant further alleges that on August 10, 1940, he was informed by Cravath that he considered the sale of July 24, 1940 to be without effect and that the lot was not for sale; that Cravath did not return or offer to return the down payment; that soon thereafter appellant contacted Cravath and offered to complete the sale; that Cravath refused to complete the transaction.

In September, 1940, appellant executed and delivered a deed conveying the lot here in question to David Owen and wife, which deed contained the following recital: 'And particularly my interest in that agreement of purchase dated July 24, 1940, signed A. M. Cravath'; in the following November Owen and his wife deeded the lot back to appellant; both deeds were duly recorded.

In April, 1955, defendant Leaver informed appellant that he was negotiating with Cravath for the purchase of Lot 21 and had obtained a title report from respondent Title Insurance and Trust Co., which disclosed that appellant had an interest in this lot by reason of two quitclaim deeds; appellant advised Leaver of his claim of ownership and basis therefor. Leaver thereupon informed appellant that he would discontinue negotiations for the property.

Appellant also alleges that about 30 days prior to filing this action he discovered, upon searching the official records, that Leaver had caused the Cravaths (title to the lot had previously been converted into a joint tenancy between Cravath and his wife) to convey Lot 21 to Arlene E. Rowland, a business associate; that in July, 1955, Rowland deeded the property to respondent Ballinger.

Appellant alleges that prior to Rowland taking title to the lot she knew of appellant's interest in it; and charges that Leaver and Rowland entered into a conspiracy to defeat appellant's rights therein.

It is further alleged that prior to respondent Ballinger taking title to the lot that respondent Title Insurance Co. issued a title report to the United Escrow Co., which was handling the Rowland-Ballinger escrow showing the quitclaim deed by appellant to Owen and wife of this property in September 1940 with the reference therein to the transaction between appellant and Cravath of July 24, 1940, and the quitclaim back to appellant in November 1940 by Owen and his wife; that respondent Ballinger was unwilling to accept a deed to Lot 21 without a policy of title insurance which did not mention these two deeds; that respondent Title Insurance Co. then deleted mention of these two deeds and insured the title of the lot to be in Ballinger, free and clear of any interest of appellant therein; that Ballinger thereupon accepted the deed to the property and policy insuring the title; that Ballinger became a part of the Leaver-Rowland Rowland conspiracy to deprive appellant of his rights in said lot. Finally, it is asserted that when the Title Insurance Co. insured the title of respondent Ballinger it knew of appellant's interests in Lot 21; that the Title Insurance Co., by insuring Ballinger's title to the lot 'tended to concur in said conspiracy between said other parties'; that appellant has suffered loss and detriment by the aforesaid actions of respondents in excess of $10,000.00.

It appears that Cravath died in 1958 and Rowland died in April 1960.

The foregoing summary of the allegations in appellant's third amended complaint affirmatively reveals the absence of an essential fact in his claim of title, and, therefore, that he fails to state a cause of action against respondents. The allegations disclose that appellant does not have legal title to the property in question; that respondent Ballinger is alleged to be the legal owner, having acquired his title by mesne conveyances from A. M. Cravath and wife. At most, it appears that appellant may at one time have acquired some equitable rights by virtue of his deal with Cravath under date of July 24, 1940. It has been held consistently that the owner of an equitable interest cannot maintain an action to quiet title against the owner of the legal title. (G. R. Holcomb Estate Co. v. Burke, 4 Cal.2d 289, 297, 48 P.2d 669; South v. Wishard, 123 Cal.App.2d 642, 653, 267 P.2d 827.) It is thus apparent that the third amended complaint does not state a cause of action to quiet title to Lot 21.

Further examination of the allegations in appellant's third amended complaint discloses that any cause of action he may have had is barred by statutes of limitation.

No action for the recovery of real property can be maintained unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed of the property within five years before commencement of the action. (Sec. 318, Code Civ.Proc.) Also, the burden is on the plaintiff to show the requisite seizin or possession. (Haney v. Kinevan, 73 Cal.App.2d 343, 344, 166 P.2d 361.)

In like manner section 319, Code Civ.Proc., applies 'to actions for rent or damage to real property, or the like'. (Crane v. French, 39 Cal.App.2d 642, 648, 104 P.2d 53, 57.)

An action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing must be commenced within four years. (Sec....