Stafford v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.
| Decision Date | 16 October 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-CV-70107-DT.,90-CV-70107-DT. |
| Citation | 749 F. Supp. 781 |
| Parties | Franklin J. STAFFORD, Plaintiff, v. ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
James A. Burns, Birmingham, Mich., for plaintiff.
Martin T. Wymer and Bruce S. Friedman, Southfield, Mich., for defendant.
Presently before this Court are the issues relating to future relief, i.e., reinstatement and front pay, which the Court reserved to itself for decision following the July 1990 jury trial in this wrongful discharge/breach of employment contract lawsuit.1 The parties have briefed their respective positions on the reinstatement and front pay issues, and the Court heard oral argument on them on September 13, 1990. This Memorandum Opinion and Order reflects the Court's ruling on these future relief issues.
During the course of trial, the Court ruled on a pre-trial request of Defendant Electronic Data Systems Corporation ("EDS") relating to Plaintiff's entitlement to future damages, and held that the jury would be instructed that if it found for the Plaintiff on the issue of liability, then it was to determine an award of "back pay" damages (i.e., lost wages and benefits from the date of termination through the date of trial). The Court ruled, however, that questions relating to future relief would not be submitted to the jury for decision. Rather, the Court held that it would determine the issues of whether Plaintiff would be awarded reinstatement and/or future damages ("front pay") after the jury returned its verdict on liability and back pay.
The jury returned its verdict on July 25, 1990. The jury found for the Plaintiff on the issue of liability and awarded him back pay in the amount of $78,055.36.2
On August 1, 1990, the Court entered an Order directing the parties to appear for a hearing on the remaining future relief issues on September 13, 1990, and further directed the parties to submit briefs on the issues to be decided at that hearing, i.e., the appropriateness and nature of future relief, if any, to be accorded to Plaintiff Franklin Stafford.
The parties complied with the Court's August 1 Order and submitted briefs addressing their respective positions regarding the issues of (1) whether reinstatement of Plaintiff to employment with EDS is an appropriate remedy; (2) whether the Court should order a monetary award of future damages instead of reinstatement; (3) what the amount of an award of such future damages should be; and (4) what limitations, if any, should be placed on any such future damages award. The Court reviewed the Plaintiff's and the Defendant's briefs, and also heard the oral arguments of the parties on these issues at the September 13, 1990 hearing.
The parties disagree as to whether reinstatement is an appropriate remedy in this case, although it appears that since trial, the parties have now effectively "switched places" and have reversed their respective original positions on this issue.
Defendant EDS originally argued — in both of the briefs it submitted on the future relief issues and in its initial presentation of its position at the September 13, 1990 hearing — that the Court should order reinstatement (in lieu of a monetary award of front pay) because it is a remedy that is "clearly feasible" in this case. EDS based this contention on the facts that (1) reinstatement "is the remedy requested by Plaintiff himself in his Complaint" and (2) EDS has stipulated that it is willing to reinstate Stafford to a "substantially equivalent job" to the one that he held at the time of his discharge.3
EDS argued that it is "only where antagonism and hostility between the parties is so intense as to prevent the resumption of an employer-employee relationship" — which it contends is not the case in this action — "that reinstatement is precluded." Defendant's Post-Trial Brief, pp. 3-4. Defendant further argued at the September 13, 1990 hearing that it could reinstate Plaintiff to a "comparable" position (to the one from which he had been discharged) in a different division, in a different EDS office, and in a different supervision line, and that by such a placement in a "totally new environment", it could alleviate any fear Plaintiff may have of encountering antagonism or hostility on the part of other EDS personnel. Thus, EDS argued for a ruling that reinstatement is the appropriate future relief that should be awarded to Plaintiff.
At the time of filing his Complaint, Plaintiff initially requested reinstatement to employment with EDS. See Partial Transcript of Trial Proceedings on July 18, 1990, Partial Direct Examination of Frank Stafford, p. 54. However, at trial, Plaintiff had changed his position and argued that reinstatement would not be appropriate in this case. Id. Although Plaintiff conceded that there were not any "open hostilities" between himself and former EDS co-workers/supervisors, any honest and trusting employer-employee relationship he may have had with EDS and its managerial personnel during the course of his employment has been irreparably severed as a result of this litigation. See pp. 6-10 of Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief. This contention is supported by Plaintiff's trial testimony. See 7/18/90 Partial Trial Transcript, pp. 56-57. Thus, Plaintiff originally urged the Court to rule that reinstatement is not a feasible remedy in this case.
After hearing the Court's dialogue with Plaintiff's counsel, (and apparently anticipating the Court's ruling on the reinstatement issue), and after conferring with his client, counsel for EDS told the Court that Defendant withdrew its previously stated opposition to a determination that reinstatement is inappropriate. EDS did not, however, affirmatively withdraw its earlier stipulation of its willingness to offer Plaintiff reinstatement to a "comparable position" in a "new environment".
Plaintiff, on the other hand, completely reversed his position on the reinstatement issue. After hearing the Court's dialogue with counsel on the future relief issues at the September 13, 1990 hearing, although he had previously voiced his opposition to reinstatement — both at trial and at the beginning of the September 13 hearing — Plaintiff informed the Court that he now wanted to be reinstated to employment with EDS.
Because it appeared to the Court from the parties' change of positions on reinstatement that they might be able to resolve the future relief issues among themselves, the Court withheld rendering an opinion on the matter on September 13, 1990, directed the parties on September 13th to try to resolve their differences, and requested that they advise the Court by September 24, 1990 of the status of their negotiations. The Court further informed the parties that if they were unable to reach an extra-judicial resolution of the future relief matters, the Court would then decide the issues concerning future relief.
Counsel for the parties contacted the Court on September 24th, and informed the Court that the parties had reached an impasse and were not able to work out a resolution of the matter on their own. Therefore, in accordance with the Court's September 13, 1990 bench directive, this Opinion and Order sets forth the Court's ruling on Plaintiff's entitlement to future relief.
Reinstatement is among the equitable remedies that a trial court, in its discretion, may order as relief in a wrongful discharge/breach of contract action. The Michigan Court of Appeals at least implicitly sanctioned reinstatement as one of the remedies available to a trial court in Toussaint4 breach of contract actions. See, Ritchie v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 163 Mich.App. 358, 413 N.W.2d 796 (1987).
In Ritchie, the Court of Appeals was called upon to review the trial court's refusal to grant relief from the operation of the monetary judgment entered pursuant to the jury's verdict (which included an award of front pay as well as an award of back pay) in a Toussaint breach of employment contract action where the defendant had agreed to reinstate the plaintiff to employment.
In denying the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court, noting that no Michigan Appeals court had, to that date, ruled on the propriety of front pay damages in a Toussaint case, explained:
... The award of front pay is an issue governed by the sound discretion of the trial court. Davis v. Combustion Engineering, 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir.1984). This Court finds that front pay is permissible in this case. Plaintiff was dismissed from her job after accusations of wrongdoing. Although the jury in this case found her actions did not constitute wrongdoing, it is likely the accusations will make it more difficult for her to obtain employment. In addition, given Plaintiff's education it is unlikely that she will be able to find employment at near the same level as her previous employment.
Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court on the future damages question, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling on this issue. Id. at 804.5
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