Warren v. Cnty. Comm'n of Lawrence Cnty.

• Decision Date: 01 December 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 5:08–CV–223–VEH.
• Parties: Baronica WARREN, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY COMMISSION OF LAWRENCE COUNTY, ALABAMA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

826 F.Supp.2d 1299

Baronica WARREN, Plaintiff,

v.The COUNTY COMMISSION OF LAWRENCE COUNTY, ALABAMA, Defendant.

Case No. 5:08–CV–223–VEH.

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northeastern Division.

Dec. 1, 2011.

Gregg L. Smith, Gregg L. Smith, Esq., Birmingham, AL, Russell L. Sandidge, Attorney at Law, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Jamie K. Hill, Kendrick E. Webb, Webb & Eley PC, Montgomery, AL, David L. Martin, III, Attorney at Law, Moulton, AL, Kristi A. Dowdy, Law Offices of Kristi

A. Dowdy PC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the following post-trial Motions: the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial (Doc. 217) (“Motion for New Trial”), filed pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and the Plaintiff's Motion for Equitable Relief (Doc. 206) (“Motion for Equitable Relief”), which seeks an award of front pay. The parties have fully briefed the Motions, and they are now under submission. The Court has carefully considered the Motions and all exhibits thereto, the applicable law, and the trial testimony and evidence in this case, and has determined that the Motion for New Trial is due to be DENIED IN PART to the extent it seeks a new trial and GRANTED IN PART to the extent it alternatively seeks remittitur pursuant to the applicable statutory cap. Further, the Motion for Equitable Relief is due to be GRANTED as set out below.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Baronica Warren (“Ms. Warren” or “Plaintiff”) filed claims against the Defendant County Commission of Lawrence County, Alabama ¹ (the “Commission” or “Defendant”) for unpaid overtime and for retaliation. ( See 2d Am. Complt., Doc. 34 at 26–27, 28–29; Pretrial Order, Doc. 180 at 9, 16). In one count, Ms. Warren alleged she was denied payment in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., of earned overtime she accrued while employed by the Commission. The other count is a claim that Ms. Warren was retaliated against by the Commission in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. These claims were tried before a jury from June 13, 2011, to June 16, 2011.

Ms. Warren prevailed on both her FLSA and Title VII claims. The jury rendered a verdict of $450.64 in favor of Ms. Warren and against the Commission as to Ms. Warren's FLSA claim for overtime compensation. (Doc. 203 at 1). Further, on Ms. Warren's Title VII retaliation claims, the jury rendered a verdict awarding her $330,000.00 as compensation for her emotional pain and mental anguish,² as well as $70,600.00 for her lost pay and benefits, which equaled a total award of $400,600.00 on her retaliation claims. (Doc. 203 at 2–5). Consistent with the jury verdict, the Court entered a Partial Final Judgment in favor of Ms. Warren and against the Commission in the amount of $400,600.00 on her retaliation claims, and $901.28 on her FLSA claim, of which $450.64 was awarded as unpaid compensation, and $450.64 was awarded as liquidated damages. (Doc. 208).

Following the trial, the parties submitted the Motions that are now pending before the Court. Defendant's Motion for a New Trial (Doc. 217) contains an alternative request for remittitur based on the 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) statutory cap, and Plaintiff's Motion for Equitable Relief (Doc. 206) seeks front pay. The Court held a telephone conference with the parties on October 3, 2011, to discuss issues pertaining to Defendant's request to reduce the jury verdict pursuant to the mandatory statutory cap. That conference resulted in the Court's re-opening of discovery limited to one issue relating to application of the cap, and the setting of an evidentiary hearing for December 6, 2011. (See Order, Doc. 228). Subsequently, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation (Doc. 231) agreeing to application of the cap, obviating the need for further discovery, and the Court accordingly cancelled the evidentiary hearing.

The only matters left pending before the Court, therefore, are the Motion for New Trial and Motion for Equitable Relief. The Court will address each in turn.

II. COMMISSION'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIALA. Request for New Trial

The Commission first asks the Court to grant a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 217 at 1). However, nowhere in its Motion for a New Trial does the Commission set out the legal standard for a new trial under Rule 59. Rule 59(a) provides that, following a jury trial, the court “may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues-and to any party ... for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(1)(A). The only reason for granting a new trial presented in the Commission's Motion relates to the “excessive” verdict for the compensatory damages awarded by the jury on Ms. Warren's retaliation claims relating to her emotional pain and suffering. ( See Doc. 217 at 1).

Although the district court has discretion to grant a new trial where the excessiveness of a jury verdict is challenged, the Eleventh Circuit adheres to an exceedingly high standard for granting a new trial on those grounds:

It is true that a grossly excessive award may warrant a finding that the jury's verdict was swayed by passion and prejudice and thus necessitate a new trial. See Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 283 (5th Cir.1975). However, a new trial should be ordered only where the verdict is so excessive as to shock the conscience of the court. Thompson v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 827 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035, 101 S.Ct. 611, 66 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); Williams v. Steuart Motor Co., 494 F.2d 1074, 1085 (D.C.Cir.1974); Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Abbott, 287 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir.1961). Whether a new trial is required is within the sound discretion of the district court, and a refusal to grant a new trial will not be overturned unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088, 1095 (5th Cir., Unit B, 1981).

Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1447–48 (11th Cir.1985) (emphasis added).³ Neither in its initial Motion for New Trial nor its Reply brief to the Plaintiff's opposition to its Motion does the Commission argue that “the verdict is so excessive as to shock the conscience of the court.” See id. Because the Commission provides no factual or legal basis upon which the Court could conclude that the verdict is so excessive as to “shock the conscience of the court,” the Commission's Motion for New Trial (Doc. 217) is due to be DENIED to the extent that it requests a new trial.B. Alternative Motion for Remittitur

Although not styled as such, the Commission's Motion for New Trial alternatively contains a Motion for Remittitur, stating: “The court may also allow a plaintiff to avoid a new trial by agreeing to remit the excessive portion of the damages awarded her.” (Doc. 217 at 2, citing Johansen v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320,1328 (11th Cir.1999)).⁴ Specifically, the Commission seeks a reduction in the amount of compensatory damages awarded pursuant to the applicable statutory cap on compensatory damages. (Doc. 217 at 3 (requesting a reduction from $330,000.00 to $50,000.00 based on application of the statutory cap).⁵

The amount of compensatory damages recoverable by prevailing plaintiffs in intentional discrimination cases, including Title VII employment discrimination, is limited by the statutory framework set out in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). See U.S. E.E.O.C. v. W & O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 612–14 (11th Cir.2000) (applying the Section 1981 statutory cap to plaintiff's recovery on Title VII claims). That statute limits recovery of compensatory and punitive damages based on the number of employees employed by the defendant-employer during a designated time period as follows:

(3) Limitations

The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party—

(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $50,000;

(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $100,000; and

(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $200,000; and

(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).

The cap applies to each individual prevailing plaintiff, rather than to each individual claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); Hudson v. Chertoff, 473 F.Supp.2d 1286, 1289 (S.D.Fla.2007) (agreeing with the analysis and decisions of the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits that “the statutory cap applies to each action rather than each claim”). Further, the cap is for the Court, not the jury, to apply; the statute expressly forbids the Court from informing the jury of the statutory limitations on recovery before deliberations. Id. § 1981a(c)(2).⁶ By necessity, therefore, the cap comes into play only after the jury awards its verdict. See Parrish v. Sollecito, 280 F.Supp.2d 145, 155 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (“The statutory cap is properly excluded from jury instructions, and only after a verdict is submitted, the trial court must ensure that any award complies with the relevant statutory...