Stafford v. Hannibal & St. J.R. Co.
Decision Date | 24 May 1886 |
Citation | 22 Mo.App. 333 |
Parties | EDWARD S. STAFFORD, Respondent, v. THE HANNIBAL & ST. JOSEPH RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from Livingston Circuit Court, HON. JAMES M. DAVIS, Judge.
Affirmed.
Statement of case by the court.
This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff, a passenger on defendant's railroad train in leaving its station at Chillicothe, Missouri. The facts in substance, are that plaintiff was a passenger on one of defendant's trains of cars, to be carried for hire to its station at Chillicothe. The train was due at this station at eleven o'clock p. m.; but did not arrive until 11:30 p m.
The plaintiff lived at Chillicothe, and was familiar with the station and its surroundings. The night was unusually dark so much so that one could not well see his way without the aid of a light. The train came from the east, going west, stopping on the south side of the depot. In order to go home, which was the usual traveled way for passengers leaving the depot to go up town, he had to pass west along the platform until he reached the southwest corner of the depot building, then, turning north, he had to pass along the west side of the building along the platform to the northwest corner. The platform here was three feet from the ground, and in order to reach the ground he had to pass down a narrow stairway or flight of steps.
The platform on the south side was lower than along the west side, so that in passing from the south to the west side he ascended a flight of steps. There were no railings, or other barriers along the outer edge of the platform on the west side. A lamp was usually kept burning at the northwest corner of the depot building to light the west platform and the steps descending therefrom, down which the plaintiff had to pass. But this lamp was not lighted that night, nor did the defendant have any other light which fell upon this platform and the steps at the northwest corner. There were some hacks standing on the west side, which had lamps, but the evidence quiet clearly showed that they gave no light at the steps in question, at the time of the accident. The platform and steps were covered with ice.
On alighting from the train, the plaintiff started for his home, and, passing from the south side, up the steps to the west side, he approached the steps, and, supposing he had reached them, stepped to go on them, when he fell to the ground, crippling him in his foot and ankle, and otherwise slightly bruising his body.
The negligence imputed to the defendant in the petition, was the improper construction of the platform, the failure to erect and maintain any railing or other barrier to prevent persons from stepping or falling from the platform in the night time, and the failure to have any light at the place of injury.
The answer, after tendering the general issue, pleaded contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff.
On behalf of plaintiff the court gave the following instructions:
On the part of defendant, the court instructed the jury as follows:
The court refused to instruct, as requested by defendant, to the effect that if plaintiff could have passed safely from the depot by another way known to him, he could not recover.
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, assessing his damages at four hundred and fifty dollars. Defendant appealed.
STRONG & MOSMAN, for the appellant.
I. The first instruction given for plaintiff and the second given for defendant are in direct and irreconcilaable conflict. For this, the judgment should be reversed. Stevenson v. Hancock, 72 Mo. 614; Price v. Railroad, 77 Mo. 512; Goetz v. Railroad, 50 Mo. 474; Thomas v. Babb, 45 Mo. 388. So the said first instruction assumed the failure to erect railing was negligence, as matter of law. It is error for the court to assume a fact that the jury ought to determine. Staples v. Canton, 69 Mo. 593; Loewer v. Sedalia, 77 Mo. 431. So, the said first instruction subjected defendant to a higher degree of care for plaintiff's safety than is imposed by the law, under the facts in evidence. Loewer v. Sedalia, 77 Mo. 437; Imhaff v. Railroad, 20 Wis. 347; Waller v. Railroad, 83 Mo. 608; Strauss v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 190.
II. Plaintiff's second instruction is in direct conflict with the second instruction given for defendant. Cases cited, supra, under I; Bank v. Armstrong, 62 Mo. 59; Waldhier v. Railroad, 71 Mo. 471; Price v. Railroad, 72 Mo. 414. It permitted recovery on an issue which was withdrawn from the jury; and stood as though that issue had not been made in the pleadings. Hassett v. Ruet, 64 Mo. 325. It did not (nor did any of the instructions) define or submit the facts which constitute contributory negligence pleaded in defences. Harrison v. Railroad, 74 Mo. 369. Nor the facts which constitute " a negligent and improper construction of said platform." Harrison case, supra. It referred the jury to the pleadings, which was error. Eidleman v. Transfer Co., 3 Mo.App. 503.
III. The petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that it disclosed and averred such facts as constituted contributory negligence of plaintiff. And the court erred in overruling defendant's objection to evidence, and defendant's motion in arrest. Centralia v. Krause, 64 Ill. 19; Durkin v Troy, 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 437; Parkhill v. Brighton, 61 Iowa 103; Corlett v. Leavenworth, 27 Kan. 675. The court erred in overruling motion for new trial. Plaintiff's evidence showed...
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