Stafford v. Stafford

Decision Date01 January 1874
PartiesELLEN E. STAFFORD v. JOHN T. STAFFORD.
CourtTexas Supreme Court
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

ERROR from Victoria. Tried below before the Hon. T. C. Barden.

Mrs. Ellen E. Stafford, brought suit against her husband, John L. Stafford, for divorce, on the ground of cruel treatment. The instances of cruelty charged were numerous, and the verdict of the jury found most of the allegations of cruelty to be true. On the trial, Mrs. Stafford testified as a witness in regard to the acts of cruelty alleged. The action of the court overruling the objection to her testimony, based on her not being a competent witness under the statute, was assigned for error. Deeds were executed by Stafford to his wife embracing all property designated in the verdict as “separate property.” These deeds were absolute on their face conveying the fee, and mentioned the consideration of “natural love and affection and one dollar paid.” The defendant, in his answer, alleged that these deeds were made upon certain trusts, to wit: that the defendant should enjoy the rents and profits during his life, and that, if the marital relation was determined by the death of the defendant, the plaintiff should have the property; but if it was determined by the death of the plaintiff or by divorce, the defendant should have it. Stafford thereupon prayed the court to cancel these deeds in case a divorce should be granted. Mrs. Stafford's counsel excepted to this part of the answer, but the exception was overruled.

The verdict of the jury, after specially mentioning the acts of cruel treatment which they found established by the evidence, continued as follows: We further find that all the deeds executed by the defendant of property mentioned in defendant's answer was for the purpose of preventing said property from being taken for the liquidation of defendant's debts. We, the jury, further find that all the property mentioned in defendant's answer was separate property, except lot No. 1, block No. 1, range No. 1, containing four and a half acres of land, and lots Nos. 2, 3, and 4, block 15, range 1, rents and revenues derived from rent of Wheeler's store, and horse, stock, and cattle, including work oxen, now in possession of defendant, which is community property.”

Though the evidence of both parties established the marriage between them, the fact of the marriage was not found by the jury.

The court decreed a separation from the bonds of marriage, and gave to Mrs. Stafford the real estate designated in the verdict as community property, while to the husband was decreed certain land embraced in the deeds above referred to from him to his wife.

The court overruled a motion to reform that portion of the decree which attempted to divest Mrs. Stafford of the title which she had derived from her husband, and she excepted, and assigned as error this action of the court.

The defendant also assigned errors, as follows:

1. The court erred in admitting the testimony of plaintiff herself to go to the jury in regard to matters affecting the question of divorce.

2. The court erred in decreeing a divorce, because the verdict of the jury was not sufficient to authorize such a decree.

Glass & Callender, for plaintiff in error.

Phillips, Lackey & Stayton, for defendant in error.

DEVINE, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE.

The plaintiff in error brought a suit in the District Court of Victoria county to obtain a divorce from defendant in error, on the alleged ground of cruel treatment. A verdict was rendered, and judgment entered decreeing a divorce in her favor, and alloting to her certain property in Victoria county, from which judgment she has sued out a writ of error to this court. The defendant, John F. Stafford, has likewise assigned errors.

It is not necessary, so far as plaintiff's rights are concerned, to notice her exceptions taken or assignment of errors, as it is admitted that her whole cause of complaint is embraced in the following statement contained in her counsel's brief: “The plaintiff filed a motion to correct and reform the decree, so as to assign to her the real estate to which she held the title. This motion was overruled. Plaintiff excepted, and now brings the decree to this court to be revised and corrected in regard to this property question alone; and this is substantially set forth in plaintiff's assignments of error, numbered 3 and 4.

The court, in the charge to the jury, directed them to inquire and state whether the deed conveying certain property to plaintiff by her husband, the defendant, was intended as an absolute gift or donation, and if not, for what purpose was it executed?

The jury, after finding the alleged cruelties on the part of the husband, as regarded intoxication and other matters, replied to the charge respecting the execution of the deeds, that “all the deeds executed by the defendant of property mentioned in defendant's answer, were for the purpose of preventing said property from being taken for the liquidation of defendant's debts.” The jury further found that the real estate embraced in the deeds from defendant to plaintiff “was separate property.” The court, however, decreed to defendant the property found by the jury to be separate property, although the execution, acknowledgment, delivery, and registration of the deeds conveying this property in consideration of love and affection and one dollar received, was in evidence before the court. The finding of the jury, with this evidence before it, could only have meant that it was the separate property of plaintiff, and as such it was error in the court to adjudge it to defendant. The finding of the jury, that this property was conveyed to plaintiff for the purpose of preventing creditors from seizing it, places defendant in no better position than when the deeds were executed and delivered to his wife.

It is contended by counsel for defendant in error that this property, being acquired during the coverture, became by reason thereof community property. We do not so consider it in the present case. It was a gift or...

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13 cases
  • Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 16–0328
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • June 29, 2018
    ...court ignored jury findings that "extend to issues of fact from which the status of property is determined") (citing Stafford v. Stafford , 41 Tex. 111, 118–19 (1874) ; Rice v. Rice , 21 Tex. 58, 66 (1858) ; Baker v. Baker , 104 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1936, no writ) ); ......
  • Mortensen v. Mortensen, 11475.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • February 14, 1945
    ...being that the husband and wife were still regarded as incompetent witnesses against each other in a divorce case. In Stafford v. Stafford, 1874, 41 Tex. 111, the Texas Supreme Court said: "The law changing the common-law rule of evidence in permitting parties in interest to testify in a su......
  • Cockerham v. Cockerham
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • July 9, 1975
    ...jury, it may not ignore the jury's answers which extend to issues of fact from which the status of property is determined. Stafford v. Stafford, 41 Tex. 111 (1874); Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58 (1858); Baker v. Baker, 104 S.W.2d 531 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1936, no writ). This is particularl......
  • Claveria's Estate v. Claveria
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • February 11, 1981
    ...whether ceremonial or common-law, is proved by the same character of evidence necessary to establish any other fact. Stafford v. Stafford, 41 Tex. 111 (1874); O. Speer, Texas Family Law § 5:89 (5th ed. 1975). Thus, proof of common-law marriage may be shown by the conduct of the parties, or ......
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