Stagecoach Motel v. Krause, CA

• Decision Date: 23 January 1980
• Docket Number: No. CA,CA
• Citation: 267 Ark. 1093,593 S.W.2d 495
• Parties: STAGECOACH MOTEL, Appellant, v. Maevaughn KRAUSE, and Commissioner of Labor, State of Arkansas, Appellees. 79-105.
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

Page 495

593 S.W.2d 495

267 Ark. 1093

STAGECOACH MOTEL, Appellant, v. Maevaughn KRAUSE, and Commissioner of Labor, State of Arkansas, Appellees.

No. CA 79-105.

Court of Appeals of Arkansas.

Jan. 23, 1980 Released for Publication by the Court of Appeals Feb. 13, 1980.

M. Morrell Gathright, Pine Bluff, for appellant.

Thelma M. Lorenzo, Little Rock, for appellee.

PILKINTON, Judge.

This is an unemployment compensation case. Appellee worked for the Stagecoach Motel on a permanent, full-time basis from November 1977 until August 1978 when she was discharged. Following her discharge, appellee accepted temporary employment during the Christmas season at K-Mart and at the race track for the duration of the racing season. She filed a claim for unemployment benefits on May 2, 1979, stating that she had been discharged by appellant Stagecoach Motel for failing to collect room rent in advance from a guest who left without paying. While employed by Stagecoach, appellee was the afternoon shift desk clerk. All of the desk clerks were to obtain payment from guests for their room in advance when registering. In the case of guests staying over for another day, the afternoon desk clerk had the primary responsibility of contacting the guest and obtaining payment in advance of their staying over. If the afternoon desk clerk was unable to contact the guest or obtain payment, the manager was to be contacted.

The incident triggering appellee's discharge involved a motel guest named Woodall who paid for one night's rent when he checked in on Sunday. He stated then that he did not know how long he would be staying. Each day of that week thereafter, he paid for one night in advance until Friday. Appellee tried unsuccessfully to contact Woodall on Friday. Ms. Krause claims she told the manager, Richard Sampo, on either Friday or Saturday that she had not been able to contact Woodall to obtain payment. In any event, appellee as well as the morning shift clerk continued to try to contact Woodall, but without success. On Sunday, after again trying to contact Woodall, Ms. Krause attempted to telephone the manager at his home to report the continuing problem. She testified that she repeatedly telephoned him at one-half hour intervals, but got no response. Ms. Krause also says that she drove to the manager's house when she got off from work at 10:30 p. m. on Sunday to apprise him of the situation, but did not stop because there were no lights in the house and she thought the manager had retired for the night. Appellee called the manager early Monday morning at the motel office, and advised him of the situation, but by that time Woodall had left the motel without paying for Friday, Saturday and Sunday. Ms. Krause was discharged that same day for failure to follow the policy of the employer.

The Employment Security Division denied compensation. The agency held that "failure to follow the policy of the employer is an act against the employer's best interest." Ms. Krause appealed the denial, and the Appeals Tribunal reversed, the Referee holding that there was not a sufficient showing of deliberate conduct against the employer's best interest. The Board of Review adopted the decision of the Appeals Referee as the decision of the Board, and affirmed the allowance of compensation. The employer has appealed to this court from the decision of the Board of Review.

I.

Appellant first claims that the decision of the Board of Review is based upon a misstatement and misapplication of the law. It is argued that under Ark.Stat.Ann. § 81-1106(b)(1) disqualification attaches if an individual is discharged from their last work for misconduct in connection with the work, and that a showing of Deliberate misconduct is not required.

The general rule is that misconduct (within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Act excluding from its benefits an employee discharged for misconduct) must be an act of wanton or wilful disregard of the employer's interest, a deliberate violation of the employer's rules, a disregard of the standard of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees. 76 Am.Jur.2d, Unemployment Compensation, § 52. 26 A.L.R.3d 1356. See also Parker v. Ramada Inn, 264 Ark. 472, 572 S.W.2d 409 (1978); Harris v. Daniels, 263 Ark. 897, 567 S.W.2d 954 (1978). Consequently, in the case before us we cannot say that appellee's action did, as a matter of law, constitute misconduct within the meaning of ...