Stakelback v. Neff

Decision Date05 February 1929
Docket NumberNo. 20518.,20518.
PartiesSTAKELBACK v. NEFF.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Anthony F. Ittner, Judge.

"Not to be officially published."

Action by Laura Stakelback against Mathies Neff. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Wilbur C. Schwartz and J. Edward Gragg, both of St. Louis, for appellant.

Fred Berthold, of St. Louis, for respondent.

BENNICK, C.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries, sustained by plaintiff in a collision between two automobiles, the one, in which she was riding as a guest, being owned and operated by Mathies Neff, the appellant herein, and the other, owned by Toney Foley, who was seated therein at the time, but driven by a chauffeur in his employ. The accident occurred on June 9, 1926, in the city of St. Louis, at the intersection of Jefferson and Lucas avenues, the former running north and south, and the latter, east and west.

Originally, both Neff and Foley were named as parties defendant; but subsequently plaintiff dismissed as to Foley, and filed an amended petition as to Neff alone, who will hereafter be referred to as defendant. A trial was had to a jury, resulting in the return of a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and against defendant, in the sum of $2,500; and, from the judgment duly rendered, the latter has perfected his appeal.

In her petition, and in the submission of the case to the jury, plaintiff counted upon negligence of defendant in operating his automobile at a rate of speed which was not careful and prudent, and which endangered her life and limb; in failing to keep his automobile as nearly as practicable to the right side of the street, in violation of a city ordinance; in failing to stop, diminish the speed of, or change the course of, his automobile upon the approach of the other car; and in failing to observe the requirements of the humanitarian doctrine as to stopping, diminishing the speed of, or swerving, his car, or giving timely warning to the occupants of the other car.

The answer filed by defendant was a general denial.

The record discloses that Lucas avenue, at its intersection with Jefferson avenue, does not extend directly across the latter, but that the south curb line of Lucas avenue west of Jefferson avenue is approximately a prolongation of the north curb line to the east.

Plaintiff's own testimony tended to show that defendant was driving his automobile northwardly on Jefferson avenue, in the north-bound street car tracks, at a speed of 15 or 20 miles an hour; that when the front of defendant's automobile was at a point even with the south building line of Lucas avenue to the east, she first saw Foley's car as it emerged out of Lucas avenue to the west, and turned southeastwardly as if to continue across Jefferson avenue and into Lucas avenue to the east; and that defendant, without diminishing the speed of his automobile, and without changing its course, drove directly onward until the collision occurred.

The deposition of Foley was introduced in evidence as a part of plaintiff's case, from which it appeared that Foley's car was driven into Jefferson avenue at a speed of 4 or 5 miles an hour; that when the front end of his automobile was midway between the north-bound and south-bound car tracks, defendant's car was from 25 to 40 feet south of the south curb line of Lucas avenue to the east; that it was being operated at a speed of 30 or 35 miles an hour; and that the collision occurred in the center of Lucas avenue to the east, after Foley's car had crossed the north-bound track, the front of defendant's car striking Foley's car at the point of connection between the right front fender and the running board.

Plaintiff also offered certain excerpts from defendant's deposition to the effect that, at a speed of 15 miles an hour, defendant, under the existing circumstances, could have safely brought his car to a stop within a space of 4 or 5 feet.

Defendant's own evidence purported to show that he was traveling northwardly on the right side of Jefferson avenue, at a speed of 15 miles an hour; that Foley's car emerged directly from behind a south-bound car when he was only 4 to 10 feet from the point of collision; that he immediately turned his own car to the side; but that the bumper on Foley's car caught his machine, and dragged it over into Lucas avenue, 3 or 4 feet east of the Jefferson avenue line.

The sufficiency of the evidence to have made a case for the jury is not attacked on this appeal; but, rather, defendant contents itself with questioning the correctness of certain given instructions, including plaintiff's instruction No. 3, reading as follows: "The Court instructs the jury that if you believe and find from the evidence that on June 9,...

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44 cases
  • Myers v. Buchanan
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • March 14, 1960
    ...which to base a finding that the plaintiff should have known that the defendant intended to turn left into a driveway. Stakelback v. Neff, Mo.App., 13 S.W.2d 575, 577, held that the law does not impose a duty upon the driver of an automobile to stop or change the course of his car merely be......
  • Moore v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • November 12, 1959
    ...degree of care, if so, directly caused the collision * * *.' In support of the foregoing contention defendants rely upon Stakelback v. Neff, Mo.App., 13 S.W.2d 575, and other similar cases, including Nydegger v. Mason, Mo.Sup., 315 S.W.2d 816; Rosenkoetter v. Fleer, Mo.Sup., 155 S.W.2d 157;......
  • Wolfe v. Harms
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • March 13, 1967
    ...would lead him to believe a collision would occur. Greenwood v. Bridgeways, Inc., Mo.App., 243 S.W.2d 111, 114(4--7); Stakelback v. Neff, Mo.App., 13 S.W.2d 575, 577(2); Nydegger v. Mason, Mo., 315 S.W.2d 816, 820(3). The evidence is such that a jury could reasonably find Mehls aware of the......
  • Boehm v. St. Louis Public Service Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • May 13, 1963
    ...apparent danger of a collision, which basic fact the jury was not required to find. In support of this theory Company cites Stakelback v. Neff, Mo.App., 13 S.W.2d 575; Nydegger v. Mason, Mo.Sup., 315 S.W.2d 816; Burke v. Renick, Mo.App., 249 S.W.2d 513; Greenwood v. Bridgeways Inc., Mo.App.......
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