Stalcup v. Garner

• Decision Date: 31 October 1857
• Citation: 26 Mo. 72
• Parties: STALCUP, Plaintiff in Error, v. GARNER, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

26 Mo. 72

STALCUP, Plaintiff in Error,

v.GARNER, Defendant in Error.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1857.

1. Where, in a suit against A. and B., a cause of action against A. alone is joined with a cause of action against B., the petition is multifarious. A demurrer will lie to such petition.

2. Where, in a suit instituted by C. against A. and B., the petition sets forth that A. conveyed a certain tract of land to B. and by mistake misdescribed the same; that B. conveyed the same tract to C. and also by mistake misdescribed the same, and there is a prayer for the reformation of both deeds; held, that the petition is multifarious.

Error to Monroe Circuit Court.

This was a suit instituted by John Stalcup against William Garner, John M. Garner and others. The petition sets forth substantially that William Garner, being seized of the S. E. 1/4 of the N. W. 1/4 and the W. 1/2 of the S. W. 1/4 of section 32, in township 56, &c., conveyed the same to one Duncan in trust for his (Garner's) children, of whom John M. Garner was one; that the deed by mistake misdescribed the said tracts intended to be conveyed, locating them in section 35--in which the said Wm. Garner owned no land--and not in section 32; that said John M. Garner, being of age, conveyed to the plaintiff, Stalcup, his undivided interest in said tracts, but by mistake the description contained in the deed failed to embrace a portion of the land intended to be conveyed; that Duncan abandoned the trust, &c. The petition prayed a reformation of both deeds, and a decree of title in plaintiff.

A demurrer to this petition was sustained.

Carr, for plaintiff in error.

I. John M. Garner could have instituted a suit previous to his conveyance to plaintiff for the correction of the mistake in the deed of Wm. Garner. By the conveyance of John M. Garner this right passed to plaintiff. The petition is not multifarious. (Farrar v. Patton, 20 Mo. 81; Temple v. Price, 24 Mo. 288; Brinkerhoff v. Brown, 6 Johns. Chan. 133; Dix v. Briggs, 9 Paige, 595; Watson v. Cox, 1 Ired. Eq. 389; Robertson v. Stephens, 1 Ired. 249; 2 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 31.)

RICHARDSON, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

In many cases the transactions mentioned in a bill are so interwoven, and the settlement of one is so dependent on the closing or adjustment of another, that justice can not be administered without uniting in one suit all the parties interested in the principal matter of controversy; and as was observed in Campbell v. Mackay, 1 Myl. & Cr. 603, Gaines v. Relf, 2 How. 642, and Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 412, it is impracticable to lay down any general rule as to what constitutes multifariousness as an abstract proposition, but each case must be determined by its own circumstances. There are however, in equity pleading, certain general rules which are well defined, though sometimes it may be difficult to apply them on account of the intricacy of the facts.

There are two kinds of multifariousness; first, where several distinct claims against the same defendant are combined in one suit, which is called a misjoinder of claims; secondly, “where different matters, having no connection with each other, are joined in a bill against several defendants, a part of whom have no interest in or connection with some of the distinct matters for which the suit is brought; so that such defendants are put to the unnecessary trouble and expense of answering and litigating matters, stated in the bill, in which they are not interested and with which they have no connection.” (Adams' Eq. 310; Newland v. Rogers, 3 Barb. Ch. R. 434.)

The rules of pleading either in proceedings in equity or in actions at law do not now, as such, prevail in this state, but they serve to illustrate the proper construction of the present code; and it is worthy of observation that the legislature, in presenting the new system of practice, has justly regarded many of the provisions of the old, and has incorporated many of its rules, which are founded on principle, into the new code. It is not now an objection that several causes of action against the same defendant are united in one suit, provided they are of the character indicated in section 2, article 6, of the practice act of 1855; but...