Staley v. Vaughn

• Decision Date: 19 December 1932
• Docket Number: 12759.
• Citation: 17 P.2d 299,92 Colo. 6
• Parties: STALEY et al. v. VAUGHN.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

17 P.2d 299

92 Colo. 6

STALEY et al. v. VAUGHN.

No. 12759.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

December 19, 1932

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Henry Bray Judge.

Suit by Frank M. Vaughn against D. H. Staley and another. To review a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants bring error.

Affirmed.

John P James, of Denver, for plaintiffs in error.

George K. Thomas and Paul P. Prosser, both of Denver, for defendant in error.

MOORE, J.

In an automobile negligence suit in the Denver district court Frank M. Vaughn recovered judgment in the sum of $694.75, covering damages to his automobile, against D. H. Staley and Frank Staley who here seek a reversal contending that section 1950 of the Municipal Code of 1927 authorizing the manager of safety to designate 'through traffic' or 'stop' streets is unconstitutional.

If the district court erred in holding said section constitutional certain instructions concerning the general right of way rule, which were tendered by defendants, and refused by the court, should have been given, otherwise not.

On the night of February 24, 1929, plaintiff's minor son, Franklin C. Vaughn, accompanied by three friends, was driving his father's car eastward on East 14th avenue approaching Frankling street. At that time East 14th avenue from Broadway to Colorado boulevard had been officially designated by the manager of safety as a through street and caused to be marked with 'stop' signs at all street intersections including Franklin street pursuant to the authorization of said ordinance. Frank Staley, driving his father's car and approaching said intersection northward on Franklin street, disregarded the 'stop' sign, failed to stop his car, and crashed into the Vaughn car whose driver, believing that the Staley car would be brought to a stop before entering 14th avenue, was proceeding across the intersection. Plaintiffs in error contend that, if the aforesaid section is unconstitutional, Vaughn's negligence in failing to yield the right of way to them was the proximate cause of the accident and therefore they are not liable.

Section 1950, provides: 'Through Traffic Streets. The manager of safety may designate certain streets and boulevards, at the intersections thereof, to be through traffic streets, and such street intersections shall be so marked with such kind or style of markings as may be determined by the manager of safety and excise, and the driver of every vehicle, on approaching the said street intersections where so marked, shall bring his vehicle to a full stop before entering or crossing upon said streets.'

Undoubtedly under the charter of the city and county of Denver, the city council has the power to reasonably regulate vehicular traffic on Denver's public streets. It could, in the exercise of a reasonable discretion, have designated by ordinance certain through traffic or stop streets. Ex parte Wilchar, 102 Tex. Cr. R. 549, 278 S.W. 850; Taylor v. Roberts, 84 Fla. 654, 94 So. 874. Instead of taking such action, it passed the ordinance in question delegating the power to so designate and regulate to the manager of safety who under the charter is charged with the duty of exercising the police power. It is urged that this power cannot be delegated because legislative, and would result in unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious acts by the manager of safety.

The power to provide for the designation of through streets is legislative, the designation thereof is not legislative but is merely an administrative action presumably based upon the exercise of reasonable discretion. Sapero v. State Board, 90 Colo. 568, 11 P.2d 555; Taylor v. Roberts, supra. In the latter case it is stated at page 658 of 84 Fla. 94 So. 874, 876:

'It is contended, however, that vesting in 'the chief of police with the approval of the mayor' the authority to regulate traffic at the Union Station and at any point within a radius of two blocks thereof, or at any other congested portion of the city, is an unlawful delegation of power to the chief of police. The power vested in the chief of police was an administrative, and not a legislative, power.

'The organization and government of municipalities, particularly with regard to the regulation and control of traffic on streets, necessarily contemplates a certain power and discretion being vested in the police officers in carrying into effect the ordinances of the city, and, if the rules and regulations adopted by the police under the authority vested in them by the ordinances are within the express general purpose of the ordinance, and tend to make them effective, they are not subject to the criticism that they are an unlawful delegation of authority.' (Citing cases.)

We are also impressed with the force of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice St. Paul in the Shreveport Case, infra, he says, page 120 of 159 La. 105 So. 244, 246:

'I respectfully dissent. Designating the streets in which there shall be no parking of vehicles, etc., under penalties provided for by a general ordinance, is no more an exclusively legislative function

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