Stamm v. Stamm, 2030321.
Decision Date | 10 December 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 2030321.,2030321. |
Citation | 922 So.2d 920 |
Parties | James E. STAMM v. Jane McCammack STAMM. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Claude D. Boone, Mobile, for appellant.
Ian F. Gaston of Gaston & Gaston, Mobile, for appellee.
James E. Stamm ("the ex-husband") and Jane McCammack Stamm ("the ex-wife") were divorced in 1978. Pursuant to their divorce judgment, the ex-husband was ordered to pay the ex-wife alimony. Since the entry of the divorce judgment, the ex-husband's alimony obligation has been modified; he is now required to pay $1,600 per month in alimony. The ex-husband has not paid alimony since August 2002. Although the ex-husband sought the termination of his alimony obligation, the trial court, in January 2003, denied his petition. The ex-husband appealed that determination; we affirmed the trial court's judgment, without an opinion. Stamm v. Stamm, (No. 2020468, October 3, 2003) 898 So.2d 926 (Ala.Civ.App.2003)(table). The ex-husband did not resume paying alimony, and, after instituting an unsuccessful garnishment proceeding, the ex-wife brought an action seeking to have the ex-husband held in contempt and seeking the institution of a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO") directing the ex-husband's brokerage firm to pay her the alimony arrearage due and all future monthly alimony payments out of the ex-husband's three individual retirement accounts ("IRAs"), which have an aggregate total value of approximately $375,000.
The ex-husband appeals the trial court's entry of an order holding him in contempt and directing his brokerage firm to pay the ex-wife $19,200 in a lump sum to pay off the ex-husband's alimony arrearage and a monthly payment in the amount of $1,600 for the ex-husband's future alimony obligation. He argues that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the order because, he argues, the entry of such an order is essentially a modification of the property-settlement provisions of the 1978 divorce judgment,1 the trial court's order does not qualify as a QDRO, and the trial court did not have sufficient evidence to find him in contempt. The ex-wife argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the order to enforce payment of the ex-husband's alimony obligation and that the trial court's order qualifies as a QDRO under federal and state law. She also argues that the trial court had sufficient evidence from which it could have determined that the ex-husband had the ability to pay his alimony obligation, and, thus, it had sufficient evidence to find the ex-husband in contempt.
A QDRO is defined in both the Internal Revenue Code, see 26 U.S.C. § 414(p), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), see 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i). As the ex-husband notes, his IRAs are not covered by ERISA. However, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 19-3-1(d)(3), an IRA is a qualified trust under Alabama law. In an exception to the anti-assignment provisions relating to qualified trusts under Alabama law, Ala. Code 1975, § 19-3-1(b)(3), refers to 26 U.S.C. § 414(p). Pursuant to § 19-3-1(b)(3), an IRA is protected from assignment unless the order assigning the benefits to an alternate payee qualifies as a QDRO under 26 U.S.C. § 414(p).
A QDRO is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 414(p) as follows:
The parties both discuss cases from other jurisdictions at length in their briefs to this court. As noted, the ex-husband's IRAs are not covered under ERISA. Accordingly, although tangentially supportive of both parties' positions, the cases from other jurisdictions addressing QDROs under ERISA or under another state's laws are not germane to the decision facing this court—namely, whether an Alabama court may use a QDRO to assign benefits from the ex-husband's IRAs to the ex-wife to satisfy an alimony arrearage and to maintain current alimony payments.
The heart of the ex-husband's argument is that the trial court's order is not a QDRO because, he alleges, it fails to comply with Alabama's domestic-relations laws in that it creates in the ex-wife an interest in the ex-husband's retirement account that did not exist under the property-division provisions of the original divorce judgment. The ex-husband is correct when he states that Alabama law limits a trial court's ability to modify a property settlement to 30 days after entry of the judgment. See, generally, Ex parte Littlepage, 796 So.2d 298, 301 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Hamilton v. Hamilton, 647 So.2d 756, 759 (Ala.Civ.App.1994)) ("`A court cannot modify property provisions [in divorce judgments], except to correct clerical errors, after 30 days from the final judgment.'"); see also McGuire v. Horton, 586 So.2d 9, 10 (Ala.Civ.App.1991). However, a trial court has the inherent power to enforce its judgments "and to make such orders and issue such process as may be necessary to render [the judgments] effective." Dial v. Morgan, 515 So.2d 14, 15 (Ala.Civ.App.1987)(citing Monroe v. Monroe, 356 So.2d 196, 200 (Ala.Civ.App.1978), rev'd on other grounds, Ex parte Stutts, 418 So.2d 115 (Ala.1982)); see also King v. King, 636 So.2d 1249, 1254 (Ala.Civ.App.1994). In addition, this court has held that a party's retirement benefits, once they are part of the party's current income, may be considered as income from which to pay periodic alimony. Yohey v. Yohey, 890 So.2d 160, 167-68 (Ala. Civ.App.2004).
The ex-husband in the present case argues that he is not regularly drawing money regularly from his IRAs and that, therefore, they are not providing him with income. He argues that this court's opinion in Smith v. Smith, 866 So.2d 588, 592 (Ala.Civ.App.2003), held that retirement benefits that are not yet being drawn cannot be considered as a source of income for the payment of periodic alimony, thus preventing his IRAs from being considered as a source from which he can pay alimony. Although Smith did indeed hold that retirement accounts may not be considered as a resource from which a party may be ordered to pay alimony when the party is not retired and is not drawing benefits from those accounts, we have more recently held that a trial court may consider retirement accounts as a source from which a party may be required to pay alimony if the trial court has evidence from which it can determine that those retirement accounts are being used as a source of current income to the party. Yohey, 890 So.2d at 168.
The husband in Yohey also argued that he was not currently drawing money from his IRA to contribute to his living expenses but that, instead, he drew money only for "emergency needs." 890 So.2d at 168. After considering the evidence presented to the trial court, we held that the trial court could have determined that the husband in Yohey was using funds from his IRA to at least partially fund his sizeable living expenses based on a comparison of those expenses with the meager income he had from other sources. 890 So.2d at 168. Like the husband in Yohey, the ex-husband in the present case admitted that he had withdrawn $30,000 from his IRAs in February 2003; the ex-husband's testimony does not indicate for what purpose he withdrew the $30,000. Thus, based on Yohey, the trial court was free to determine that the ex-husband used the $30,000 for regular living expenses and, therefore, was free consider the ex-husband's IRAs as a source of income from which the ex-husband could be required to pay alimony. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court's order is "made pursuant to a State domestic relations law." 26 U.S.C. § 414(p)(1)(B)(ii).
The ex-husband's other argument in support of his contention that the trial court's order does not qualify as a QDRO is that the order...
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