Stampf v. Long Island R.R. Co.

• Citation: 761 F.3d 192
• Decision Date: 30 July 2014
• Docket Number: Docket No. 11–3225–cv.
• Parties: Melissa STAMPF, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. The LONG ISLAND RAILROAD COMPANY, Metropolitan Transportation Authority and James Sokira, Defendants, Angela Trigg, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

761 F.3d 192

Melissa STAMPF, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v. The LONG ISLAND RAILROAD COMPANY, Metropolitan Transportation Authority and James Sokira, Defendants,Angela Trigg, Defendant–Appellant.

Docket No. 11–3225–cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: Sept. 19, 2012.

Decided: July 30, 2014.

Philip J. Dinhofer, Philip J. Dinhofer, LLC, Rockville Centre, N.Y., for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Brian Kenneth Saltz, for Catherine A. Rinaldi, Vice President/General Counsel & Secretary, The Long Island Rail Road Company, Jamaica, N.Y., for Defendant–Appellant.

Before KATZMANN, Chief Judge, LEVAL, and LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.

LEVAL, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Angela Trigg appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Gold, M.J.) awarding Plaintiff Melissa Stampf damages on her claim of malicious prosecution. Trigg contends that the district court erred in denying her motions (1) for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) and 50(b), (2) for a new trial on all issues pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, and (3) for a new trial on damages unless Stampf accepts a remittitur reducing the amount of the judgment.

Stampf brought this suit in federal court against her coworker Trigg, their employer The Long Island Rail Road (“LIRR”) and other defendants asserting violations of the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; state law claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress; and violations of state and city human rights laws. With the exception of Stampf's New York state law claim for malicious prosecution against Trigg (the only claim that concerns us on this appeal) and her discrimination claims against the LIRR, the district court granted summary judgment dismissing all of Stampf's claims. Upon trial, the jury found Trigg liable for malicious prosecution and awarded Stampf damages of $200,000 for past mental and emotional suffering, $100,000 for future mental and emotional suffering, $30,000 as compensation for out-of-pocket losses, and $150,000 as punitive damages, totaling $480,000.

We affirm the district court's denial of Trigg's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial on liability. However, we conclude that the jury's award of damages exceeded limits reasonably allowable in the district court's discretion. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's denial of Trigg's motion seeking a new trial on damages unless Stampf accepts a remittitur reducing the amount of the judgment.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff Stampf and defendant Trigg were both employed for over ten years as locomotive engineers by the LIRR at the time of the relevant incident. On July 10, 2006, Trigg complained to a supervisor (and filed an internal report) of an assault on her by Stampf. Trigg asserted that, on the previous day, while she was sitting in her car in the workplace parking lot with another LIRR employee, Stampf “reache[d] in[to the car] and grab[bed Trigg's] breast and jiggle[d it].” Joint App'x (“JA”) at 1245, Stampf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 11–3225 (2d Cir. November 2, 2011). Stampf has maintained that she squeezed Trigg's shoulder, not her breast.

Three weeks later (on August 1, 2006), Trigg repeated the allegation in a voluntary statement to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority police (the “MTA” police). She stated that, on July 9, 2006, Stampf “reached her hand in my car window and grabbed my left breast and shook it.” JA at 1221. On August 2, Trigg informed MTA Police Officer James Sokira that she had filed a report against Stampf with the police. Officer Sokira reported this to his supervisor, who directed him to arrest Stampf. That night, Officer Sokira arrested Stampf while she was at work. In front of Trigg and other co-workers, Stampf was handcuffed and placed in a police car.

Shortly after the arrest, Trigg filed a second report with the MTA police stating that Stampf “reache[d] in the window and grab[bed] my left breast and [j]iggle[d]” and then, after a brief argument about the incident, Stampf “reache[d] in the window again across my chest.... JA at 1240–41.” Describing the night of Stampf's arrest, Trigg's second statement to the police said that, “on August 2 ... when [Stampf] showed up [at work,] I flagged down the MTA police and made them aware of the case and asked them [to] arrest [Stampf] for the incident that happened on July 9, 2006.” ¹ JA at 1242. Trigg's statement added, “I have decided to press charges against Melissa Stampf.” JA at 1242.

Stampf was held in a locked cell for approximately four hours. She was then issued a desk appearance ticket (“DAT”), which listed Forcible Touching as the offensecharged, and released. Stampf hired an attorney to handle the potential criminal charges. She testified that she paid the attorney a $25,000 fee, which was financed by her father taking out a second mortgage, on which she makes the payments.

No criminal complaint was ever filed against Stampf. On December 27, 2006, the New York County District Attorney's Office issued a declination of prosecution, explaining, “Following a review of the evidence and interviews with several witnesses, including the complaining witness, the People conclude that the case [cannot] be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” JA at 1061.

Meanwhile, in response to Trigg's complaint to her supervisor, the LIRR conducted an investigation in July and August 2006 and found that Stampf had violated its Anti–Harassment Policy. Stampf provided a statement of facts to the LIRR in advance of its investigation and was given the opportunity to testify in her defense. Following the advice of her attorney, she declined to testify because she might face criminal charges in which her statement could be used against her. Stampf was assessed a twenty-day suspension without pay. On September 12, 2008, an arbitration panel convened pursuant to the Railway Labor Act and affirmed the employer's determination that Stampf violated the Anti–Harassment Policy, but reduced the suspension to ten days and awarded Stampf compensation for lost time.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Trigg contends the malicious prosecution judgment against her was flawed in numerous respects. First, she asserts that she cannot be liable for malicious prosecution as a matter of law because (1) she did not initiate a criminal proceeding against Stampf; (2) even if the issuance of a DAT constitutes the initiation of a criminal proceeding, the proceeding did not terminate in Stampf's favor; and (3) Stampf was collaterally estopped from claiming malicious prosecution by the LIRR's arbitration decision. Second, Trigg argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the district court improperly (1) admitted evidence of her prior sexual behavior in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 412; (2) denied her request to admit evidence of an arbitration award; and (3) refused to admit the testimony of the assistant district attorney as to whether a declination of prosecution indicates that a defendant is innocent. Third, she contends she was entitled to an order of remittitur because of the excessiveness of the jury's award.

I. The District Court Did Not Err in Denying Trigg's Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law

We review the denial of motions for judgment as a matter of law de novo. Highland Capital Mgmt. LP v. Schneider, 607 F.3d 322, 326 (2d Cir.2010). Under Rule 50, a court may grant judgment as a matter of law against a party if “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for [that] party on that issue.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a); Highland Capital Mgmt. LP, 607 F.3d at 326. A court may set aside a jury's verdict “only where there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against him.” Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free Sch. Dist., 691 F.3d 119, 127–28 (2d Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In reviewing a Rule 50 motion, we “give deference to all credibility determinations and reasonable inferences of the jury, and may not weigh the credibility of witnesses or otherwise consider the weight of the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“To establish a malicious prosecution claim under New York law, a plaintiff must prove (1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in plaintiff's favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual malice as a motivation for defendant's actions.” Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted); see Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 457, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 (1975). Trigg contends that Stampf failed to prove the first two elements.

a. Trigg Initiated a Criminal Proceeding Against Stampf

i. The Issuance of a DAT Initiates a Criminal Proceeding for the Purposes of a Malicious Prosecution Claim

Trigg first argues Stampf failed to satisfy the essential elements of malicious prosecution because the issuance of a DAT does not initiate a criminal proceeding, as required for such a claim. While recognizing that the answer is not clearly established in New York law, we disagree.

In Rosario v. Amalgamated Ladies' Garment Cutters' Union, Local 10, 605 F.2d 1228, 1249–50 (2d Cir.1979), in the absence of controlling New York precedent, this court concluded that a New York court “would rule that the issuance of [a Desk] Appearance Ticket commences a prosecution for purposes of determining whether an action for malicious prosecution lies.” Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1250. The Rosario cour...