Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State

• Decision Date: 10 March 1977
• Docket Number: No. 12792--PR,12792--PR
• Parties: STANDAGE VENTURES, INC., et al., Theressa M. Sheffer and Homer G. Phelps, Appellants, v. STATE of Arizona, Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 360

562 P.2d 360

114 Ariz. 480

STANDAGE VENTURES, INC., et al., Theressa M. Sheffer and Homer G. Phelps, Appellants, v. STATE of Arizona, Appellee.

No. 12792--PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

March 10, 1977.

Rehearing Denied April 6, 1977.

Douglas H. Standage, Gove L. Allen, Mesa, for appellants.

Bruce E. Babbitt, Atty. Gen., by Stanley Z. Goodfarb and Paul S. Harter, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

HAYS, Justice.

This matter involves an inverse eminent domain proceeding commenced against the State of Arizona in 1967 by various owners of five-acre parcels of land located in town-ship 1 north, range 8 east, sections 21 and 27, and abutting portions of U.S. Route 60, 70 near Apache Junction, Arizona. The highway, also known as the Mesa-Superior Highway, runs across the plaintiff's land, and this dispute concerns the width of the highway's right-of-way. The state claims a right-of-way of 400 feet in section 21 and 300 feet in section 27, whereas the plaintiff landowners claim that the state's right-of-way is only 100 feet in both sections.

The plaintiffs held title to their land under patents acquired by them or their predecessors from the United States Government in 1954 pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 682a. It is conceded that the patents are subject to at least a 100-foot right-of-way. The state contends that certain state action in the year 1942, hereinafter delineated in greater detail, established a 400-foot right-of-way which, if properly established, would have priority over the plaintiff's patents. See State v. Crawford, 7 Ariz.App. 551, 441 P.2d 586 (1968). Thus, the principal dispute in this litigation was whether the state did, in fact, increase the width of the right-of-way from 100 to 400 feet by the statutory procedures provided in § 59--203 A.C.A. (1939) prior to the time when the plaintiffs or their predecessors took title, via the patents, to the land in question.

The history of this road and the litigation which has evolved from it, in pertinent part, are as follows. The Mesa-Superior Highway was built by Pinal County in 1919--20 over unreserved lands belonging to the United States. The state acquired title to the highway in 1927 and it is undisputed that the right-of-way was then 100 feet.

In October of 1940, in preparation for a road reconstruction and improvement project, the State Highway Engineer prepared a map that depicted a 400-foot right-of-way and which was submitted with an application to the Department of Interior to increase the right-of-way from 100 to 400 feet. The land had previously been withdrawn by order of the Department of Interior from the public domain for use as a stock driveway. The state's application was approved by the Department in 1941, thereby allowing the state to proceed with the project without further action by the federal government. Strict compliance with state statutory procedures was still necessary at this point to establish in the state the increased right-of-way. State v. Crawford, supra.

On March 2, 1942, pursuant to § 59--203 A.C.A. 1939, the State Engineer caused a survey to be made of a portion of the Mesa-Superior Highway as the same is delineated upon a certain map entitled 'State Highway--Mesa-Superior Highway--U.S. Route 80, Scale 1 is equal to 1000 .' In his written report to the highway commission he indicated that the highway To be affected was as indicated on the above-described map, and he proposed to alter a portion of that highway along its surveyed center line.

Subsequently, on March 6, 1942, the Arizona Highway Commission accepted the engineer's recommendation and passed a Resolution adopting the engineer's recommendation and purporting to authorize certain changes in the Mesa-Superior Highway. The Resolution, in pertinent part, reads as follows:

'RESOLUTION:

'WHEREAS, W. R. HUTCHINS, the Arizona State Highway Engineer, has presented to and filed with this Commission his written report and recommendation respecting the location, relocation and alteration of a portion of the Mesa-Superior Highway, U.S. Route 80, In accordance with maps and plats now on file in the office of the State Highway Engineer, which written report is attached to and made a part of this Resolution 'NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the public convenience will be subserved by the location, relocation and alteration of that part of the Mesa-Superior U.S. Route 80, along the located center line thereof, As set forth in the proposal and report;

'That said proposal and report are approved hereby;

'That said part designated as the Mesa-Superior Highway, U.S. Route 80, is hereby designated a state highway upon the line of survey, as delineated in the Said maps and plats on file in the office of the State Engineer. (Emphasis added)

. . ..'

The Resolution also authorizes the engineer to acquire the lands necessary to accomplish the highway improvement project. It is not disputed that this Resolution and the report and survey incorporated therein did, in fact, establish a right-of-way.

In 1964, the state, pursuant to its claim that it had a 400-foot right-of-way, began construction on a second strip of highway parallel to the original road in order to widen it to a four-lane highway. The plaintiffs thereafter instituted this suit in the Pinal County Superior Court to establish title in themselves beyond the conceded 100-foot right-of-way and to obtain damages for the state's unlawful encroachment on their land.

The case was removed to the federal district court. It was eventually remanded, however, to the state court by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals due to the lack of a substantial federal question. Standage Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1974).

Trial was finally commenced in May of 1975 in the Superior Court of Pinal County to ascertain the width of the right-of-way. The determination of that question revolved around the Resolution and the Report and Survey incorporated therein which together acted to establish the right-of-way in the state. More precisely, however, the pivotal issue was to ascertain what 'maps and plats,' were incorporated by reference into the Resolution. The Resolution itself was devoid of a specific description of the highway and, thus, it was only through a determination of the maps referred to in the Resolution and Report, and incorporated therein, that the width of the right-of-way could finally be determined.

During the course of the trial, certain parol evidence was offered by the state and admitted by the trial court into evidence without objection by the plaintiffs. Based upon this parol evidence, the trial court made a specific finding of fact that the map referred to in the engineer's Resolution actually consisted of two maps, Exhibits 20 and 22, both of which depict a 400-foot right-of-way. As a result of that finding naturally sprung the court's judgment in favor of the state and against the plaintiff landowners.

The landowners thereupon took an appeal to Division Two of the Court of Appeals which reversed and remanded. The state filed a motion for rehearing which was denied. A petition for review was then filed by the state with this court pursuant to 17A A.R.S. Supreme Court Rules, rule 47(b). The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated.

The first question we address concerns the application of the parol evidence rule. That rule prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to add to, subtract from, vary or contradict the terms of a complete and unambiguous written agreement. Richards Development Co. v. Sligh, 89 Ariz. 100, 358 329 (1961). Where, however, an ambiguity exists on the face of the document or the language admits of differing interpretations, parol evidence is admissible to clarify and explain the document. Bickart v. Greater Arizona Savings & Loan Ass'n, 103 Ariz. 166, 438 P.2d 403 (1968).

Though the parol evidence rule is most often encountered in the context of bilateral contracts, the rule applies with equal force to official records and documents that are required to be kept in writing and that evidence certain unilateral acts. City of Glendale v. Skok, 6 Ariz.App. 342, 432 P.2d 597 (1967); Childress v. Peterson 18 Cal.2d 636, 117 P.2d 336 (1941); 9 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed § 2427. Thus, the records of the state highway commission and the state engineer that establish state highways and their rights-of-way are proper subjects for the application of the parol evidence rule. Barrett v. Hand, 158 Neb. 273, 63 N.W.2d 185 (1954); Western Sand & Gravel v. Town of Cornwall, 2 Ill.2d 560, 119 N.E.2d 261 (1954); 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 882.

The Commission's Resolution did not describe the 'maps and plats on file in the office of the State Engineer.' Therefore, parol evidence was admissible to determine which maps and plats the Resolution refers to. Richards Development, supra, and Bickart, supra.

We hold that the findings of the trial court are supported by the evidence, and that parol evidence was properly admitted.

The appellants Standage have presented a number of issues in their brief which in the main are answered by the foregoing holding.

Issue No. I is: Whether a proceeding to establish a public highway is null and void if the record thereof fails to describe the highway. The trial court's findings which we have concurred in indicate that the record does not fail to describe the highway.

Issue No. II is: Whether the presumption of regularity can be used to supply the description of the highway in an otherwise defective proceeding. Having approved the finding of the trial court that the proceeding was not defective, the presumption never came into play.

Issue No. III concerning parol evidence is answered as previously indicated.

Issue No. IV concerns the interjection of another case, denominated the Crawford case into our subject case. Appellants contend that the issues of that case are the same as the issues here and that the doctrines of...