Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Gavin, G--345
| Decision Date | 15 March 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. G--345,G--345 |
| Citation | 184 So.2d 229,24 A.L.R.3d 1359 |
| Parties | STANDARD ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. Judy A. GAVIN, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Marks, Gray, Yates, Conroy & Gibbs, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Barnes & Slater, Jacksonville, for appellee.
Robert Michael Gavin while engaged in the course of his employment was killed in an automobile accident due to the sole negligence of an uninsured motorist. Appellant Standard Accident Insurance Company was the carrier of decedent's automobile liability policy which contained uninsured motorist coverage, and it was also the carrier of decedent's workmen's compensation by virtue of a policy with decedent's employer, Florida Awning Company. Decedent's widow, Judy Gavin, brought this action for a declaratory judgment to settle a controversy over the limits of coverage and the liability of Standard under the uninsured motorist coverage. The insurance company appealed an adverse summary judgment.
The primary point submitted by Standard in this appeal is whether it may set off against the widow's claim under the uninsured motorist coverage the present value of the insurer's liability under the workmen's compensation policy.
In full force and effect at the time of issuing the policy was Section 627.0851(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which provides:
'No automobile liability insurance, covering liability arising out of ownership * * * of any motor vehicle, shall be delivered * * * in this state * * * unless coverage is provided therein * * * in not less than limits described in § 324.021(7) () * * *.'
Decedent's policy limits for uninsured motorist coverage was $20,000 for death or bodily injury sustained by one or more persons in one accident. The policy also provided:
'This coverage shall be reduced by * * * the amount paid and the present value of all amounts payable on account of such bodily injury under any workmen's compensation law. * * *
'This policy does not apply under the Uninsured Motorist Coverage * * * so as to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any workmen's compensation or disability benefits carrier. * * *'
Standard's liability under its workmen's compensation policy is governed by Section 440.16, which applied to the facts here would be:
1. $500.00 funeral expenses.
2. To the widow, 35% Of deceased's average weekly wage for a period not to exceed 350 weeks or until her death or remarriage.
3. On account of one child, 15% Of deceased's average weekly compensation for a period not to exceed 350 weeks, but payments shall cease when child becomes 18 years of age or upon marriage, provided that if widow dies or remarries the child shall receive 25%.
Under this provision Standard had already made payments for 41 weeks totaling $2,037.50 and by anticipating that none of the contingencies set forth in the statute--death or remarriage of the widow, etc.--would occur, it assumed that it would pay in the future $11,587.50 or a total of $13,625.00 on account of the claim of the widow and child under workmen's compensation.
Standard took the position that under her automobile liability policy Mrs. Gavin was entitled to $20,000 less the amount of workmen's compensation benefits already paid and the present value of future payments. It is apparent that such a computation would reduce Mrs. Gavin's uninsured motorist coverage below the minimum amount required by law. In support of its position, Standard relies upon two cases from foreign jurisdictions which construe policy provisions similar to the one here involved. In the Matter of Arbitration between Durant and Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation 1 the Court of Appeals of N.Y. in a brief per curiam opinion allowed reduction in coverage by the amount Actually paid as workmen's compensation benefits without discussing applicable New York statutes, if any. The Illinois case, Niekamp v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2 likewise did not discuss the statutes involved. There Niekamp was injured when struck by an uninsured motorist, Flores, who had just previously collided with an automobile driven by an insured motorist, Fitzgerald. Niekamp sued both and sought to recover against his own uninsured motorist coverage for his claim against Flores. Niekamp had already received in excess of $10,000 under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, and Fitzgerald's insurance carrier had offered to settle for $17,500, out of which plaintiff would have been required by the Illinois law to reimburse the workmen's compensation carrier. It was held that reimbursement of the compensation carrier from the settlement amount would not affect plaintiff's claim under his own policy because that policy entitled him to receive only the difference between the Amount of his damages, not exceeding the policy limits of $10,000, and the amount of compensation benefits paid him. In essence this case appears to hold that an injured person may recover twice for the same damages if there are two tort-feasors, but where one is insured and another is uninsured, reimbursement to the compensation carrier is required from recovery against the insured tort-feasor And in addition the plaintiff's carrier under his uninsured motorist coverage is allowed a credit against its minimum required policy limit of $10,000 for the amount of compensation benefits paid. Judgments for Allstate was affirmed because the credit exceeded its policy coverage of $10,000.
Obviously either the controlling laws in New York and Illinois are different from our Florida Statutes or else a different construction has been placed upon same. This Court is not bound to follow the decisions of a Court of some foreign jurisdiction when on established principles to which this Court and our Supreme Court subscribe, it is unable to agree with the result of the decision of the foreign jurisdiction.
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