Standard Furniture Co. v. Van Alstine

• Decision Date: 25 July 1900
• Citation: 62 P. 145,22 Wash. 670
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STANDARD FURNITURE CO. v. VAN ALSTINE.

62 P. 145

22 Wash. 670

STANDARD FURNITURE CO. v. VAN ALSTINE.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 25, 1900

Appeal from superior court, King county; E. D. Benson, Judge.

Action by the Standard Furniture Company against Con Van Alstine. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Geo. F. Aust and Osborn & Steele, for appellant.

Ballinger Ronald & Battle and R. Winsor, for respondent.

FULLERTON J.

This is an action brought by the appellant, a domestic corporation for the recovery of certain furniture and house-furnishing goods. The complaint was, in form, that commonly used in this state for the recovery of personal property in specie. The respondent, who was defendant below after denying the allegations of ownership and right of possession of the property in appellant contained in the complaint, pleaded affirmatively that the appellant claimed title to the property by virtue of a certain agreement in writing by which two certain women purchased the property and agreed to pay appellant therefor, but without further description as to the character of the agreement. He then pleaded the recovery of a judgment by himself against the purchasers named in the agreement, the issuance of an execution thereon, the seizure and sale of the property under the writ of execution, and his purchase of the property and its delivery to him at the execution sale. He pleaded further that the vendees were, at the time of the execution of the written agreement and the delivery of the property by the appellant to them, the keepers of a house of ill fame in the city of Seattle; that the appellant had knowledge at the time the agreement was entered into, and at the time the goods were delivered, that the vendees were the keepers of a house of ill fame, 'and that the said goods so delivered, and said written agreement aforesaid, were to aid and enable the said' vendees 'to carry on and conduct a house of prostitution; * * * and that any sum remaining unpaid on account of said goods, if any did remain, was to be paid by said' vendees to the appellant 'out of the earnings of said house of prostitution.' The appellant, in reply admitted the judgment, levy, and sale, and that it claimed title by virtue of a conditional contract of sale, but denied the other allegations of the affirmative answer. It then pleaded affirmatively the conditions of the contract under which the sale of the property was made, showing it to be a conditional sale, with 'title, ownership, and possession of the property' reserved in itself until the purchase price should be paid, and with the right, also, to 'take possession of the aforesaid personal property whenever it may deem itself insecure, even before maturity' of the deferred payments; that the purchase price was to be paid in monthly installments of $150 each, and that title should pass to the vendees when the last installment should be paid. It alleged a breach on the part of the vendees of the conditions of the contract, and that the respondent had refused to perform the same, and its election to declare the contract forfeited. It then alleged, by way of estoppel, that the notice given of the execution sale at which the respondent purchased expressly recited that the property was to be sold subject to the contract of sale between the appellant and its vendees, that the officer conducting the sale orally proclaimed that fact at the time he offered the property for sale, and that the sale was actually so made. At the trial, after the appellant had introduced its evidence and rested its case, the respondent called the president of the appellant, and proceeded to examine him touching the affirmative matter alleged in his answer not admitted by the reply. Before the examination of the witness was concluded, the court announced that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the court in holding that the contract was void as against public policy. He thereupon refused to permit the appellant to offer proofs on the matter alleged in the reply as an estoppel, took the case from the jury, and entered judgment in favor of the respondent.

It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the evidence before the trial court upon which it based its judgment showed, at most nothing more than that the appellant, at the time it entered into the contract of conditional sale and delivered the property to the vendees named therein, had knowledge that the vendees intended to put the property to an unlawful use; and that this fact is not sufficient to justify the trial court in its holding that the contract was void as against public policy. It is true that it is held in many well-considered cases, and it is perhaps the weight of authority, that mere knowledge on the part of a vendor of goods that the vendee designs to and will put them to an immoral or illegal use is not of itself sufficient to bar an action brought to recover the purchase price of the goods sold. But in all of the cases announcing this rule which have been brought to our attention the transaction was one in which the owner of the goods at the time of their delivery to the vendee parted with his title and right of possession, so that thereafter the relation between the vendor and vendee was that of debtor and creditor merely, or that of debtor and creditor with a mortgage over to secure the deferred payments of the purchase price. The sale and delivery of the property were complete, and no element of participation or aid in the immoral or illegal design of the vendee could be imputed to the vendor. On the other hand, it is held by all of the cases--even those which announce the rule contended for by the appellant--that if the vendor has knowledge of the immoral or illegal design of the vendee, and in any way aids or participates in that design, or if the contract of sale is so...