Standard Jury Instructions (Civil Cases 89-1), In re
| Decision Date | 18 January 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 74904,74904 |
| Citation | 16 Fla. L. Weekly 133,575 So.2d 194 |
| Parties | 16 Fla. L. Weekly 133, 18 Media L. Rep. 1703 In re STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES 89-1). |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Donald H. Partington, Chair, of Clark, Partington, Hart, Larry, Bond, Stackhouse & Stone, Pensacola, for petitioner, Committee of Standard Jury Instructions (Civil).
Talbot D'Alemberte, Donald M. Middlebrooks, Thomas R. Julin, Adalberto Jordan, Jennifer Prior Devin of Steel, Hector & Davis, Samuel A. Terilli, Jr. and Jerold I. Budney, of The Miami Herald Pub. Co., Miami, Patricia F. Anderson of Rahdert & Anderson, St. Petersburg, and George Freeman and Deborah R. Linfield of The New York Times Co., New York City, for respondents, The Miami Herald Pub. Co., Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., Review Publications, Inc., Times Pub. Co., The News-Sun/Avon Park, The News-Leader (Fernandina Beach), The Gainesville Sun, The Lake City Reporter, The Ledger (Lakeland), The Daily Commercial (Leesburg), The Marco Island Eagle, The Ocala Star-Banner, The Palatka Daily News, Sarasota Herald-Tribune, and The News-Sun (Sebring).
The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions (Civil) recommends a comprehensive revision of Part MI 4 Defamation. According to the Committee, the revision "is necessary to bring the charges into conformity with existing law." We approve for publication the Committee's proposed comprehensive revision of Part MI 4 Defamation which follows this opinion.
Members of the media responded to the Committee's Supplemental Report No. 89-1, raising perceived constitutional as well as common law deficiencies in the proposed revised instructions. The constitutional issues and a majority of the common law issues raised in the responses were recognized by the Committee and discussed in the Committee's comments. We accordingly decline the invitation of respondents to remand to the Committee for reconsideration of the arguments raised. We also decline, at this point in time, to make amendments to the proposed revised instructions. As we have previously stated, however, In re Standard Jury Instructions (Civil Cases 88-2), 541 So.2d 90, 90 (Fla.1989).
It is so ordered.
MI 4
DEFAMATION
The 1989 revision of MI 4 DEFAMATION recommends three alternative charges on liability issues, MI 4.1 through 4.3. MI 4.1 is the proper charge if claimant is a public official or a public figure, so by First Amendment standards must prove that defendant made a false defamatory statement with "actual malice." MI 4.2 is the proper charge if claimant is not a public person but defendant is a member of the press or broadcast media publishing on a matter of public concern, who by First Amendment standards cannot be held liable for a false publication without proof of fault. If MI 4.1 or MI 4.2 are not applicable, MI 4.3, which expresses Florida's truth and good motives defense and the qualified privilege to speak falsely but without "express malice," is the proper charge.
These categories and their boundaries are debatable and in flux, due to the unique influence upon them of both federal and Florida constitutional law as well as the common law. To enable assessment of the recommended charges, the Committee explains its recommendations in the Comments following, and calls attention to areas of evident dispute.
The Committee recommends that at the outset of the charge, when practicable, the court identify the alleged defamatory statement and its alleged defamatory meaning.
MI 4.4 recommends charges on causation and compensatory damages, and on punitive damages where appropriate under Florida law and not forbidden by the U.S. Constitution.
PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR PUBLIC FIGURE CLAIMANT
The issues for your determination on the claim of (claimant) against (defendant) are:
a. Issue whether publication concerning claimant was made as claimed:
Whether (defendant) [made] [published] [broadcast] the statement concerning (claimant) as (claimant) contends; and, if so,
b. Issue whether publication was false and defamatory:
Whether (defendant's) statement concerning (claimant) was in some significant respect a false statement of fact and [tended to expose (claimant) to hatred, ridicule, or contempt] [or] [tended to injure (claimant) in his business, reputation, or occupation] [or] [charged that (claimant) committed a crime].
If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the claim of (claimant) on the issues I have just mentioned, then your verdict should be for (defendant). "Greater weight of the evidence" means the more persuasive force and effect of the entire evidence in the case. However, if the greater weight of the evidence does support the claim of (claimant) on those issues, then:
c. Issue whether defendant acted with actual malice:
You must next determine whether clear and convincing evidence shows that at the time the statement was made (defendant) knew the statement was false or had serious doubts as to its truth.
"Clear and convincing evidence" differs from the "greater weight of the evidence" in that it is more compelling and persuasive. "Clear and convincing evidence" is evidence that is precise, explicit, lacking in confusion, and of such weight that it produces a firm belief or conviction, without hesitation, about the matter in issue.
If clear and convincing evidence does not show that (defendant) knew when the statement was made that it was false, or that he had serious doubts then as to its truth, your verdict should be for (defendant).
However, if clear and convincing evidence does support (claimant's) claim on this issue, and the greater weight of the evidence supports (claimant's) claim on the other issues on which I have instructed you, then your verdict should be for (claimant).
Proceed to MI 4.4, Defamation: Causation and Damages.
PRIVATE CLAIMANT, MEDIA DEFENDANT
The issues for your determination on the claim of (claimant) against (defendant) are:
a. Issue whether publication concerning claimant was made as claimed:
Whether (defendant) [published] [broadcast] the statement concerning (claimant) as (claimant) contends; and, if so,
b. Issue whether publication was false and defamatory:
Whether (defendant's) statement concerning (claimant) was in some significant respect a false statement of fact and [tended to expose (claimant) to hatred, ridicule, or contempt] [or] [tended to injure (claimant) in his business, reputation, or occupation] [or] [charged that (claimant) committed a crime]; and, if so,
c. Issue whether defendant was negligent:
Whether (defendant) was negligent in making that statement. Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is that degree of care which a reasonably careful person would use under like circumstances. Negligence may consist either in doing something that a reasonably careful person would not do under like circumstances or failing to do something that a reasonably careful person would do under like circumstances.
If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the claim of (claimant) on these issues, then your verdict should be for (defendant). However, if the greater weight of the evidence does support the claim of (claimant) on these issues, then your verdict should be for (claimant) and against (defendant).
"Greater weight of the evidence" means the more persuasive and convincing force and effect of the entire evidence in the case.
Proceed to MI 4.4, Defamation: Causation and Damages.
The issues for your determination on the claim of (claimant) against (defendant) are:
a. Issue whether a defamatory publication concerning claimant was made as claimed:
Whether (defendant) made the statement concerning (claimant) as (claimant) contends; and, if so, whether the statement [tended to expose (claimant) to hatred, ridicule, or contempt] [or] [tended to injure (claimant) in his business, reputation, or occupation] [or] [charged that (claimant) committed a crime].
If the greater weight of the evidence does not support the claim of (claimant) on these issues, then your verdict should be for (defendant). However, if the greater weight of the evidence does support the claim of (claimant) on these issues, then [your verdict should be for (claimant) in the total amount of his damages] [you shall consider [the defense of truth and good motives] [and] [the defense of privilege] raised by (defendant) ].
b. Defense issues of truth and good motives:
On the [first] defense, the issue for your determination is whether the statement made by (defendant) was substantially true and was made by (defendant) with good motives.
If the greater weight of the evidence supports this defense, your verdict should be for (defendant).
If the greater weight of the evidence does not support this defense, [and the greater weight of the evidence does support the claim of (claimant) on the issues I previously mentioned, then your verdict should be for (claimant) in the total amount of his damages.] [then you shall consider the defense of privilege raised by (defendant).]
c. Defense issue whether defendant had qualified privilege:
If defendant has a qualified privilege as a matter of law, skip to 4.3d.
On the defense of privilege, I instruct you that provided one does not speak with improper motives, which I shall explain in a moment, a person such as (defendant) is...
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