Standard Motor Co. v. Peltzer

• Decision Date: 20 March 1925
• Docket Number: 66.
• Citation: 128 A. 451,147 Md. 509
• Parties: STANDARD MOTOR CO. v. PELTZER.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

128 A. 451

147 Md. 509

STANDARD MOTOR CO. v. PELTZER.

No. 66.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 20, 1925

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; H. Arthur Stump Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Action by Samuel Peltzer against the Standard Motor Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and PATTISON, URNER, ADKINS, and WALSH JJ.

J Purdon Wright, of Baltimore (Wendell D. Allen, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

John L. G. Lee, of Baltimore, for appellee.

BOND C.J.

The plaintiff in this case, now appellee, brought an action of deceit against the appellant, a dealer in automobiles, alleging that the dealer's agents induced him to buy a used truck upon a false representation that it was of a 1920 model, whereas it was later found to be of a 1917 model, and upon other representations of condition and quality, all of which were untrue, and known to the agents to be so, with the result that he received a truck much inferior to that which was described to him, and of less value. The contract is not repudiated. The plaintiff has retained the truck and sued for the difference in values. The record contains 62 exceptions to rulings during the trial, and it is necessary to group them according to the questions raised.

One question raised by many exceptions throughout the case is as to the admissibility of evidence of oral representations in the face of a written contract or memorandum of the transaction. The buyer, after several interviews with the agents of the seller, and after some inspection of the truck by himself and other members of his family, purchased a used Columbia truck and signed a form of contract upon the conclusion of the bargaining. The contract was a simple one, with its terms set out clearly. It contained a clause to the effect that all assertions and promises whatever emanating from the seller's side should be taken as expressions of belief or opinion only, and contained the word "no warranty" inserted in capital letters above a form of warranty clause which had been crossed out. It was signed by the buyer and signed in the name of the seller by its agents. On the trial the buyer testified that he could not read, and therefore signed the paper without knowledge of its contents. That fact does not detract from the effectiveness of the contract, however, as it is not suggested that any advantage was taken of his illiteracy, or, indeed, that the seller's agents had any intimation of it. The members of the buyer's family who were with him could read, and the whole purport of the testimony seems to be that the buyer did not concern himself with the contents of the paper which he was executing. So far as it goes, he must abide by the contract which he joined in executing just as any other man must. Wilson v. Pritchett, 99 Md. 583, 593, 58 A. 360; Spitze v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 75 Md. 162, 23 A. 307; Boyle v. Rider, 136 Md. 286, 291, 110 A. 524; McGrath v. Peterson, 127 Md. 412, 417, 96 A. 551. And the appeliant contends that, this being so, it was improper to admit evidence of oral representations in the preliminary negotiations leading up to the making of the written contract. The objection might be well taken if this were a suit on the contract for breach of warranty (Williston on Sales, § 215; Thomson v. Gortner, 73 Md. 474, 480, 21 A. 371), but in a suit on the ground of fraud and deceit such an express exclusion of representations not set out in the writing does not, according to the weight of authority, prevent proof by parol of representations which amounted to fraud, and which induced the making of the contract. The view taken by the law is that giving effect to such a stipulation would be a furtherance of the objects and results of the fraud. Stouffer v. Alford, 114 Md. 110, 119, 78 A. 387; 1 Williston on Sales, § 215; 2 Williston on Contracts, § 811; Pearson v. Dublin [1907] A. C. 351; General Electric Co. v. O'Connell, 118 Minn. 53, 136 N.W. 404; Tiffany v. Times Sq. Automobile Co., 168 Mo.App. 729, 154 S.W. 865; Pratt v. Darling, 125 Wis. 93, 103 N.W. 229; Bonewell v. Jacobson, 130 Iowa, 170, 106 N.W. 664, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 436. And this is true even though the representations are alleged to have been made by an agent of the party sued. Pearson v. Dublin, supra. It follows that there was no error in the admission here of parol evidence to prove false representations which might mount up to fraud.

There is, next, a question whether the evidence is, after it has been received, legally sufficient to prove actionable fraud and deceit. The preliminary representations alleged to have been made were, more particularly, that this truck was of a 1920 model, used only 28 days, and now as good as new; that it contained a Continental motor; that it had been sold to a Wandell Chocolate Company for $1,400; that it had been sitting in the seller's garage since 1920; and that the seller would be losing money when selling at $1,300. The selling agents flatly deny that any such representations were made, and testify that the buyer and his family examined the truck and the engine for themselves; that the facts were open to them; and that they were given information of the make of the engine by a special sign hung on the truck as well as the clear notice in the contract which the buyer signed that he bought the truck as it was. But the conflict of evidence, of course, does not come up for consideration on appeal. The representations were of fact (Rittenhouse Co. v Kissner, 129 Md. 102, 98 A. 361), or, at least, such expressions as, if falsely made, with the intention and effect of inducing the purchase, would give a right of action for deceit. Cf. 2 Williston on Sales, § 628. The selling agents concede that the facts are contrary to some of the principal representations testified to; that the truck was, for instance, of a 1917 model, and did not have a Continental motor in it; and there is evidence sufficient for a jury that the facts were contrary to the other representations stated, and that the agents must have known what the facts were. In addition to this, the buyer testified that he accepted everything told him without question, and without relying on his own inspection and judgment at all. In the argument, the appellant's counsel contends that, in view of the fact that the truck was exposed to the buyer's inspection, for the exercise of his own judgment, and the notices given that he must buy the truck as it was, he was not in law justified in relying on any such representations as he says were made to him; that he was in this transaction left to make up his own independent judgment; and, if he received what he did not intend to buy, it was a result of his own folly or fault, and he cannot ask the law to relieve him from the consequences. Buschman v. Codd, 52 Md. 202, 208; Lewis v. Clark, 86 Md. 327,...