Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety for the Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 13 January 1931 |
| Citation | 274 Mass. 155,174 N.E. 213 |
| Parties | STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW YORK v. COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY FOR THE COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Nelson P. Brown, Judge.
Suit by the Standard Oil Company of New York against Alfred F. Foote, Commissioner of Public Safety. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
F. J. Carney, Herbert Parker and J. A. Canavan, all of Boston, for appellant.
Jos. E. Warner, Atty. Gen., and Charles F. Lovejoy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
This is an appeal from a decree of the superior court dismissing a bill in equity brought by the plaintiff to annul orders of the commissioner of public safety and the fire marshal. On June 20, 1927, the street commissioners of the city of Boston (to whom authority to grant and issue the license and permit hereinafter referred to had been duly delegated by the fire marshal) granted a license and permit to the plaintiff to store two million fifty-six thousand three hundred and twenty gallons of petroleumproducts, exclusive of gasoline and naptha, in a vertical steel tank in East Boston. Thomas A. Niland, an owner of property in East Boston, distant one thousand four hundred twenty-four and five tenths feet from the proposed tank, appealed to the fire marshal under G. tank, appealed to the fire marshal under G. fire marshal issued an order revoking the license. The plaintiff appealed to the commissioner of public safety under G. L. c. 147, § 5, who approved the order of the fire marshal and revoked the license. It was agreed that the property of Niland consists of land and the building thereon; that between this property and the proposed location of the tank several streets and the location of the Boston and Albany Railroad intervened.
The fire marshal in the metropolitan district has the power to grant both licenses and permits. G. L. c. 148, § 30. See Rawding v. Commissioner of Public Safety (Rawding v. State Fire Marshal) (Mass.) 172 N. E. 255, where the authority of the marshal in the metropolitan district and in towns outside the district is discussed and the distinction between a permit and license pointed out. The fire marshal can delegate this power. G. L. c. 148, § 31. By G. L. c. 148, § 45, the marshal shall hear and determine all appeals from acts and decisions of those acting under his authority and make all necessary and proper orders thereon. ‘Any person aggrieved by any such action of the head of a fire department or other person may appeal to the marshal.’
The plaintiff contends that Niland is not a ‘person aggrieved’ within the meaning of the statute. As the fire marshal acted on Niland's appeal and ordered the revocation of the license, his action ‘imports a finding of all facts necessary to sustain it which could be found by him from the evidence and from these other sources of information.’ St. James Building Corp. v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 260 Mass. 548, 551, 157 N. E. 629, 630. The fire marshal is presumed to have acted honestly and fairly. See Davis v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 251 Mass. 283, 146 N. E. 708. His order, therefore, revoking the license granted by the street commissioners was proper unless, as matter of law, a tank capable of holding over two million gallons of petroleum products could not adversely affect property situated at a distance of one thousand four hundred twenty-four and five tenths feet. There is no evidence before us to show that the property would not be adversely affected. The marshal found that the site of the tank is ‘at the end of a row of several large oil tanks' on Chelsea street, opposite the large oil plant of the Standard Oil Company. The tank ‘will be about two hundred (200) feet from a row of two and three-family dwelling houses' and ‘is next to’ a large rubber cement plant; that ‘there is always a fire hazard about any...
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