Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. Naramore
| Decision Date | 30 August 1947 |
| Parties | STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY v. NARAMORE (two cases). |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court December 8, 1947.
Appeal in Error from Circuit Court, Marion County; Alan S. Kelly Judge.
Action by Bessie Naramore against Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and others, and action by R. M. Naramore, husband of Bessie Naramore, against the same defendants, for damages resulting from alleged negligence. From adverse judgments, the named defendant appeals in error.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Whitaker, Hall, Haynes & Allison, of Chattanooga, for plaintiff in error.
A. F Sloan, of South Pittsburg, for Padgett, et al.
A. A Kelly, of South Pittsburg, for defendants in error.
Bessie Naramore brought her suit against Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, R. A. Padgett, J. D. Padgett, and Charlie Atnip to recover damages for personal injuries which she alleged she received as a result of the actionable negligence of defendants.
R. M. Naramore, husband of Bessie Naramore, brought his suit against the same defendants to recover the damage which he sustained as a result of his wife's injuries.
Issues were made by the pleadings, and the case went to trial by judge and jury.
The jury returned verdicts in favor of plaintiffs, and judgments were entered thereon.
R. A. Padgett, J. D. Padgett, and Charlie Atnip filed a joint motion for new trial.
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey filed a separate motion for new trial.
Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the motion for new trial which was filed by Standard Oil Company on the ground that it was filed too late.
Standard Oil Company filed a motion to change the filing date of its motion for new trial from July 16, 1946, to July 19, 1946.
The court overruled the motion of Standard Oil Company to change the filing date of its motion for new trial; but sustained the motion of plaintiffs to strike, and the motion for new trial of Standard Oil Company was accordingly stricken.
Thereupon, Standard Oil Company filed a second motion for new trial based upon the grounds: (a) The court erred in overruling its motion to change the filing date of its motion for new trial; (b) the court erred in striking its motion for new trial; and (c) the court erred in refusing to consider its first motion for new trial and to sustain the grounds thereof.
This second motion for new trial of Standard Oil Company was overruled by the court, and that defendant has brought the case to this court to review the judgments against it.
Reference will be made to the parties according to their status in the lower court; that is, Bessie Naramore and R. M. Naramore will be referred to as plaintiffs and Standard Oil Company will be referred to as defendant.
There are two determinative questions presented by defendant's assignments of error:
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to change the filing date of defendant's motion for new trial from July 16, 1946, to July 19, 1946?
2. Did the trial court err in striking the motion for new trial of defendant?
There is no dispute about the facts which relate to these two questions.
The time fixed by statute for holding the regular term of the circuit court of Marion County is: 'First Monday in February, June and October.' Code Section 159. This case was tried at the regular June term of the circuit court of Marion County on June 17, 18, and 19, 1946; and judgments were entered on the verdicts on June 19, 1946. These judgments provide:
'And thereupon came attorneys for all defendants and gave notice of intention to file motion for a new trial on behalf of all defendants in this case and upon motion were allowed by the court thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this order within which to file the same.' This order does not purport to extend the term, but only to grant thirty days from the entry of the judgment within which to file a motion for new trial.
On July 5, 1946, during the trial term, a general adjourning order was entered on the minutes, as follows:
'Whereupon, court adjourned until nine A. M. July 13, 1946.'
On July 13, 1946, a general adjourning order was entered on the minutes, as follows:
'Whereupon, court adjourned until nine A. M. July 19, 1946.'
On July 19, 1946, a general adjourning order was entered on the minutes, as follows:
'Whereupon, court adjourned until nine A. M. July 20, 1946.'
On July 16, 1946, Standard Oil Company filed its motion for new trial.
Grundy County and Marion County are in the same judicial circuit. Code Section 159.
The regular terms of the circuit court of Grundy County are: 'Grundy County--at Altamont--First Mondays in March and November and second Monday in July; at Tracy City--Third Mondays in July and November, second Monday in March.' Code Section 159.
The second Monday in July, 1946, was July 8, 1946; and the third Monday in July, 1946, was July 15, 1946.
The circuit judge of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit convened and held his regular terms of court in Grundy County on July 8, 1946, at Altamont and on July 15, 1946, at Tracy City.
1. Defendant assigns as error that the trial court refused to change the filing date of its motion for new trial from July 16, 1946, to July 19, 1946, upon its motion so to do.
The motion for new trial was actually received by the clerk of the court on July 16, 1946, and marked filed by him the same day. The minutes of the court were not opened on July 16, 1946, as there was no business of the court to transact on that day; but, as stated, the court was adjourned from July 13, 1946, to July 19, 1946.
The court properly refused to change the filing date of defendant's motion for new trial. If a motion for new trial is otherwise properly and timely filed, the movant is not prejudiced by the fact that it was not filed on a day when the court was transacting its business in open session. Timely filing of the motion by the clerk on a day when the court is not in open session is sufficient. The motion for a new trial is a pleading in the case and can be filed by the clerk at any time it is presented to him just like a declaration or any other pleading; that is, when the court is in open session, or on a day when court is not in open session. Dickson v. Stephens, 20 Tenn.App. 195, 96 S.W.2d 201; Overton v. State, 165 Tenn. 575, 56 S.W.2d 740. As the law now stands, a minute entry of the filing of the motion is not necessary. Chapter 20, Public Acts of Tennessee 1945.
The correctness of the foregoing conclusion is conceded by plaintiffs in their brief in this court. They state:
.
2. Did the trial judge commit error when he struck defendant's motion for new trial?
Unless some step is taken to arrest or suspend it, a trial court loses control over its judgment at the expiration of thirty days from its entry, or at the end of the term if the term ends before the thirty days expire. Code Section 9047, 9048; McCanless v. State, 181 Tenn. 308, 181 S.W.2d 154, 153 A.L.R. 832; Shipley v. Barnett, 161 Tenn. 437, 32 S.W.2d 1022.
A motion for new trial, which is seasonably filed, suspends the judgment until the court disposes of the motion. Payne v. Insurance Company, 173 Tenn. 659, 122 S.W.2d 431; Cochran v. Insurance Company, 167 Tenn. 95, 66 S.W.2d 996; Life and Casualty Insurance Company v. Baber, 166 Tenn. 10, 57 S.W.2d 791.
A motion for new trial must be filed within the term or a duly authorized extension thereof and within thirty days from the entry of the judgment if the term runs more than thirty days after the judgment is entered. Liner v. Jenkins, 170 Tenn. 1, 91 S.W.2d 289; Mitchell v. Porter, 26 Tenn.App. 498, 173 S.W.2d 443.
The trial judge may prescribe, by reasonable rule of court, the time within which a motion for new trial must be filed; but he has no authority to extend the time for filing such motion beyond the term or the duly authorized extension thereof. Thompson v. Hawes, 25 Tenn.App. 581, 162 S.W.2d 71.
A term of court ends when the trial judge enters an adjournment order to court in course. The term ends by operation of law: (a) When court convenes in regular session in another county of the same circuit pursuant to statute; or, (b) when the same court convenes in regular session in the same county (succeeding term) pursuant to statute. State ex rel. v. Mayo, 157 Tenn. 339, 8 S.W.2d 477, a chancery case; Buchannon v. State, 177 Tenn. 140, 146 S.W.2d 952, a law case which cites the Meyo case and holds same rule applies in law as in chancery.
There are statutory provisions for extending a term of court when a case on trial is undetermined:
Code Section 10311: 'Trial commenced.--But in no case, after the trial of a cause is commenced, shall the judge adjourn the court until the cause is tried, except in cases where the jury cannot agree, or, from some other cause, a mistrial is ordered.'
Code Section 10312: ...
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Savage v Hildenbrandt, 99-00630
...have triggered a remand with directions to the trial court to consider the grounds raised in the motion. Standard Oil Co. v. Naramore, 30 Tenn. App. 430, 448, 207 S.W.2d 7, 15 (1947). The remand would have been required because the filing and consideration of a motion for new trial are nece......