Standard Oil Co. v. City of Warrensville Heights

• Citation: 48 Ohio App.2d 1,355 N.E.2d 495,2 O.O.3d 4
• Parties: , 2 O.O.3d 4 The STANDARD OIL COMPANY, Appellee, v. The CITY OF WARRENSVILLE HEIGHTS et al., Appellants.
• Decision Date: 08 April 1976
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)

Page 1

48 Ohio App.2d 1

355 N.E.2d 495, 2 O.O.3d 4

The STANDARD OIL COMPANY, Appellee, v. The CITY OF WARRENSVILLE HEIGHTS et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

April 8, 1976.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A property owner may attack the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance either in a declaratory judgment action under R.C. Chapter 2721, or in an appeal to the common Pleas court from an administrative agency under R. C. Chapter 2506, the Appellate Procedure Act. It is not necessary to seek legislative rezoning as a condition precedent to maintaining a declaratory judgment action attacking the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance, nor is it necessary to attempt to exhaust administrative remedies and take an appeal under R.C. Chapter 2506, prior to initiating such declaratory judgment action if the administrative remedies are not equally as serviceable as a declaratory judgment action, are unusually expensive or onerous, seeking such remedies would constitute vain acts, or if the administrative agency does not have authority to grant the relief sought.

2. In order for enabling legislation authorizing the granting or a variance to be valid, and action taken thereunder to be valid, the enabling authority must set forth standards and guidelines to be applied by the administrative agency in determining whether or not to allow a variance. If there are no guidelines or standards, or if the guidelines or standards are too broad and general in nature, an improper delegation of legislative authority to an administrative agency results and any action based solely on these standards is an improper exercise of legislative power by an administrative agency. With valid standards, however, no improper delegation of legislative authority results and the action of the agency pursuant to the enabling legislation is administrative and not legislative in nature.

3. Standards in enabling legislation which provide that a variance may be granted by a board of zoning appeals if there 'are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the way of carrying out the strict interpretation of zoning ordinance and so long as the granting of such exception or variance will be in harmony with general purpose and intent of said ordinance,' or some similar language, are valid standards. However, such standards do not authorize the board of zoning appeals to grant a non-conforming use variance for a use not provided for in the zoning ordinance affecting the property and for a use not in harmony with the zoning affecting the property. An administrative agency cannot exceed the authority given to it by the standards in its enabling legislation in granting a variance. Further, an administrative agency cannot rezone property under the guise of a variance. Granting a variance for a U-4, local retail use, such as a service station, for property zoned U-1, single-family, would exceed the authority of the above standards and would constitute rezoning by an administrative agency.

Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, James A. Smith and James P. Murphy, Cleveland, for appellee.

Mandanici, Domiano, Nuccio & Simon, Cleveland, for appellants.

KRENZLER, Chief Justice.

On December 14, 1972 the plaintiff-appellee, The Standard Oil Company, hereinafter referred to as the appellee, filed an action entitled a 'Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief' in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court against the defendants-appellants, the city of Warrensville Heights and its building commissioner, Michael J. Patrick, hereinafter referred to as the appellants. In its complaint the appellee alleged that it was an Ohio corporation; that Warrensville Heights was an Ohio municipal corporation; that Michael J. Patrick was the duly employed and acting building commissioner of Warrensville Heights; that it was the owner of a parcel of real estate located at the southwest corner of the intersection of Sumpter and Warrensville Center Roads in the city; and that it was the purchaser, subject to the issuance of all necessary building and occupancy permits, of certain parcels of realty known as 4936 Warrensville Center Road, 4940 Warrensville Center Road, and 4916 Warrensville Center Road in the city of Warrensville Heights. The appellee further alleged that in the vicinity of the above four parcels Warrensville Center Road was a major north-south thoroughfare accommodating heavy traffic; that currently under construction immediately to the south of the four parcels was Interstate Highway 480, a limited access interstate highway traversing the city from east to west; that the four parcels were situated adjacent to the west bound entrance ramp to the highway and constituted all realty fronting on the west side of Warrensville Center Road from the highway property north to Sumpter Road; and that in the immediate vicinity of the four parcels, both north and south along Warrensville Center Road, were all manner of retail, commercial and business uses attracting or servicing a high volume of vehicular traffic, including a Sun Oil Company automotive service station and Heinen's warehouse on the east side of Warrensville Center Road Within close proximity of the premises. The appellee then alleged that under the city of Warrensville Heights' Planning and Zoning Code the four parcels were designated 'Class U-1' or 'Single-Family Use District;' that it sought to construct and operate an automotive service station on the parcels; that it had applied to the city for a rezoning of the four parcels from a class U-1 use district to a class U-4 use district (Local Retail Store), but that such request was refused; that on July 24, 1972 it filed an application with the building commissioner for all necessary permits for the construction, use and occupancy on the fourt parcels of an automotive service station, but that to date the appellants had not acted upon the application; that it had exhausted all legislative and administrative remedies available to it and had no adequate remedy at law; that by reason of the heavy volume of commercial traffic on Warrensville Center Road past the parcels, the dirt, dust and noise generated by said traffic, the close proximity to the parcels of retail, commercial and business uses attracting or servicing vehicular traffic, and in view of the construction of a major east-west interstate highway and entrance ramp thereto immediately south of the parcels, the four parcels were not useful or marketable for single-family residence purposes; and that to prevent if from using the parcels for the construction and use of an automotive service station denied it equal protection of law and deprived it of property rights without due process of law, in violation of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.

The appellee concluded its complaint by praying that the Common Pleas Court adjudge and declare that the single-family use only restriction imposed by the Warrensville Heights Planning and Zoning Code on the parcels was unconstitutional and void; adjudge and declare that it was entitled to construct, use and occupy an automotive service station on the parcels; issue a mandatory injunction against the city of Warrensville Heights and its building commissioner to forthwith issue to it the necessary permits for construction, use and occupancy of an automotive service station on the parcels; and grant such other relief as would be just and equitable.

On January 22, 1973 the appellants filed a joint answer to the appellee's complaint for declaratory judgment. In their answer the appellants admitted some of the appellee's allegations, including the allegations that the parcels were zoned for single-family use only and that the appellee wanted to build a gasoline station upon them, but denied all the appellee's assertions that would have entitled it to the relief it had requested.

The case came on for trial in the Common Pleas Court on October 2, 1974. At the outset the parties caused a number of stipulations to be entered into the record. Key among these stipulations were the parties' agreements that the appellee had applied to the city for a rezoning of the four parcels from a single-family to a retail use but that the Warrensville Heights City Council had rejected a proposed rezoning ordinance; that on August 28, 1972 the appellee had filed an application with the appellant building commissioner for permits for construction, use and occupancy of the parcels as a service station, but that the building commissioner had not formally responded to that application; and that the appellee had not appealed to the Warrensville Heights Board of Zoning Appeals from the failure of the building commissioner to act on the application, nor had the appellee appealed to said board for exceptions to or for variances from the present single-family zoning ordinance with respect to the proposed service station use.

After the stipulations were entered into the record, the appellants made an oral motion to dismiss the action on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain it because the appellee had not first exhausted its administrative remedies. The court heard arguments from both sides and then reserved ruling upon the motion until after the parties had submitted briefs on the issue. The court then proceeded to hear the evidence in the case.

The appellee presented five witnesses in support of its position that the parcels were unconstitutionally zoned for single-family use only purposes. A summary of the testimony of four of the witnesses is as follows. Witness Wendell Phillips, Jr. testified that he was president of Phillips Planning Associates, Inc., a planning consulting firm; that he made a map indicating the various land uses existing in the Warrensville Center Road-I-480 vicinity; and that the map indicated that commercial and industrial uses existed generally in the area. Mr. Phillips further testified that...