Standard Oil Co. v. Nickerson

• Decision Date: 24 November 1931
• Parties: STANDARD OIL CO. v. NICKERSON.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

138 So. 55

103 Fla. 701

STANDARD OIL CO. v. NICKERSON.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

November 24, 1931

Error to Circuit Court, Orange County; Frank A. Smith, Judge.

Action by Jack Nickerson against the Standard Oil Company. Judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant brings error.

Affirmed.

BROWN J., dissenting.

COUNSEL

Knight, Thompson & Turner, of Tampa, for plaintiff in error.

C. E Lemire and Fred S. Scott, both of Orlando, for defendant in error.

OPINION

DAVIS J.

In this case a recovery was had against Standard Oil Company by Jack Nickerson for damages for an alleged breach of a contract of employment. The amount of the verdict was $3,000. Motions for directed verdict and for new trial were denied, and defendant took writ of error.

The declaration alleges: That Nickerson, being an employee of Standard Oil Company, suffered personal injuries for which he conceived he had a right of recovery against his employer that the employer, in consideration of a release for his damages, promised, undertook, and agreed to continue Nickerson in its employ for and during his lifetime, and pay him therefor an amount per week for his services equal to the amount he was earning and receiving at the time of his injuries; namely, $15 per week, for the remainder of his lifetime, regardless of any disabling effects resulting from said injuries, if the plaintiff would abandon, relinquish, and forebear any claim or right he might have against the Standard Oil Company; that Nickerson accepted such promise and undertaking in full satisfaction and settlement of his damages for his personal injuries, and abandoned, relinquished, and forebore his claims therefor; that plaintiff continued in the service of the company, and was kept and retained by it for over three years, when, without any reasonably just cause or fault on plaintiff's part, the defendant wrongfully and arbitrarily discharged him, whereby plaintiff lost the fruits of his contract.

There were two pleas: First, the general issues; and second, that defendant had paid plaintiff for his said injuries, and thereby discharged and satisfied plaintiff's claim. This second plea was apparently not responsive to the declaration, but was not demurred to or stricken. It has been argued in the brief as being almost the equivalent of the first plea in effect. It is not contended that it was a plea of payment of the claim sued on which was on the contract of employment, nor that it was a plea of release of damages for breach of such contract.

One controlling point of law is relied on for reversal. This point is that no such contract as that sued on was ever made or proved. The plaintiff testified that such an agreement was made with him by one L. G. Rogers, the Standard Oil Company's agent, who settled the personal injury claim and took from plaintiff written releases thereof. Rogers denied the making of any such agreement, and the defendant contends that, even if he did make such an agreement in fact, it was unauthorized by the Standard Oil Company, and not binding on it in law.

The court submitted the issue to the jury under instructions, many of which were requested by the defendant, and there was a verdict for plaintiff for the full amount sued for.

It is conceded in briefs of plaintiff in error that Rogers was its agent at Orlando to attend to the usual business of the Standard Oil Company there, and that he came under the classification of a general agent. It was established beyond question that Rogers was made the mediary through which the company sought a release from Nickerson of his claim for personal injuries, and that he did obtain from Nickerson a written release of such claim while Nickerson was still in the hospital. It further appears that the company paid Nickerson's hospital bills and continued him in its employ for a long time afterward, something more than three years, before he was finally discharged.

In a recent case decided by this court, it was stated by Mr. Justice Terrell in Meyer v. Nator Holding Co., 102 Fla. 689, 136 So. 636, 638, that:

'The law is settled in this jurisdiction that when one person acts for another who accepts the fruits of his efforts, the latter is deemed to have accepted the methods employed, and he may not, even though innocent, receive such benefits and at the same time disclaim responsibility for the means by which they were acquired. Intertype Corp. v. Pulver (Fla.) 132 So. 830; Chase v. Sullivan, 99 Fla. 202, 126 So. 359; Love v. Brown Development Co., 100 Fla. 1373, 131 So. 144; Branford State Bank v. Howell, 88 Fla. 493, 102 So. 649; 21 R. C. L. 932.'

See, also, AEtna Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 59 Fla. 116, 52 So. 801.

In this case, it affirmatively appears that Rogers was the agent of the Standard Oil Company for the purpose of securing releases from Jack Nickerson for the injuries he had sustained; it further appears that Rogers was also the agent who had authority to hire and discharge Nickerson from any employment he had with the company both before and after his injury; there was nothing to show that Nickerson was ever in any way apprised of any limitation on Rogers' authority to act for the company in any respect by doing what he might deem advisable in order to procure the release he was delegated to obtain; and on the faith of the appearance of things, and the conduct of the company in procuring and retaining the releases through the agency of Rogers, after which it apparently engaged in carrying out the contract of employment Rogers is alleged to have made orally with Nickerson at the time he signed the first release, it is evident that the case falls within the further rule laid down by this court in such matters, to the effect that under such circumstances the question of agency, with regard to the particular matter in issue, is properly submitted to the jury.

Thus it was said in Watkins v. Sims, 81 Fla. 730, 88 So. 764, 765:

'Whatever evidence has a tendency to prove an agency is admissible even though it be not full and satisfactory, and it is the province of the jury to pass upon it. Direct...