Standard Oil Co. v. Doyle

• Decision Date: 28 September 1904
• Citation: 82 S.W. 271,118 Ky. 662
• Parties: STANDARD OIL CO. et al. v. DOYLE.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

82 S.W. 271

118 Ky. 662

STANDARD OIL CO. et al. v. DOYLE.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

September 28, 1904

Appeal from Circuit Court, Fayette County.

"To be officially reported."

Action by James E. Doyle against the Standard Oil Company and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed. and During Pendency of Conspiracy.

The acts and declarations of a conspirator after the completion of the purpose for which the conspiracy was formed are competent evidence only against that particular conspirator.

Breckinridge & Shelby and E. L. Hutchison, for appellants.

Morton Webb & Wilson, for appellee.

NUNN J.

This appeal is prosecuted from a judgment of the Fayette circuit court awarding appellee $2,300 in damages against the Standard Oil Company and $300 against C. B. Gilman, and involves some interesting questions. The appellants claim that a cause of action was not stated in the petition, and the court erred in overruling their demurrer thereto. It was in substance, alleged in the petition that in the spring of the year 1901 in the city of Lexington, Ky. the appellants C B. Gilman and M. F. Griffith, composing the firm known as the Brilliant Light Oil Company, and the Standard Oil Company, a corporation, did maliciously, unlawfully, and wickedly conspire, combine, confederate and agree together between and among themselves to estrange and alienate the acquaintances, customers, and patrons of the appellee, to ruin, oppress, and impoverish the appellee, and drive him out of the business of selling and contracting for the sale of oils, gasolines, etc., and to deprive him of all benefit and profit under his said contract with the Wilburine Oil Works Company. After setting out the series of wrongful acts, which we will hereafter refer to, it continued as follows: That each and all of the wrongful acts were done in pursuance of the conspiracy alleged as existing between and among the several defendants, and that by reason of such conspiracy, and of the commission of the named wrongful acts in furtherance and execution thereof, appellee had been forced to give up and quit the business of buying, selling, and dealing in illuminating oil, gasolines, etc., in the city of Lexington and vicinity, and had been forced to cancel his contract with the Wilburine Oil Works Company, and had been thereby deprived of all benefit and profit arising therefrom, and had been deprived of the opportunity to earn a livelihood for himself and family, and had been wrongfully prevented from engaging at his own home in the business and vocation of his life, which he had been pursuing for many years, and for which, from his long experience therewith and his extensive and favorable acquaintance in Lexington and vicinity, he was thoroughly fitted. It is contended that the acts of appellants, and each of them, as alleged, were legitimate for the purpose of building up their own business, and as against the appellee as a competitor, and if the appellee suffered any damages it was damnum absque injuria; and cite the following cases as sustaining their position; Bourlier v. Macauley, 91 Ky. 136, 15 S.W. 60, 11 L.R.A. 550, 34 Am.St.Rep. 171; Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121, 15 S.W. 57, 11 L.R.A. 545, 34 Am.St.Rep. 165; Brewster v. Miller Sons & Co., 101 Ky. 368, 41 S.W. 301, 38 L.R.A. 505; Baker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 64 S.W. 913, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1174, 52 L.R.A. 271; West Va. Transportation Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 50 W.Va. 611, 40 S.E. 591, 56 L.R.A. 804, 88 Am.St.Rep. 895; and Continental Ins. Co. v. Board of Underwriters (C. C.) 67 F. 310. These cases are easily distinguished from the case at bar. The first two cases cited in effect decide that a third party cannot be made responsible in damages for causing a party to a contract to break it unless force or fraud is used in accomplishing the result. In such cases, without an allegation and proof of force and fraud, the party breaking the contract must be regarded as having broken it of his own will, and for his own benefit, and is alone responsible to the other party to the contract in damages. The third case cited in substance decides that no cause of action arises in favor of a person who is refused the right to purchase articles from a dealer; the merchant or dealer having the lawful right to sell or refuse to sell to whom he pleases. In the case of Baker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. it was sought to recover damages from the company, and charge it with maliciously combining and confederating with other companies to prevent him (Baker) from receiving employment as an insurance agent at Lexington, for the term of two years, and in pursuance of such conspiracy the Metropolitan Company discharged him from its employment, without any fault on his part, and by reason thereof he had been deprived of earning his livelihood. The court decided the case against Baker for the reason that he alleged in his petition that his employment was for an indefinite length of time, and he had, therefore, the right to quit whenever he saw proper, and the company had also the right to terminate the employment at pleasure; and the court also approved the principles announced in the case of Brewster v. Miller Sons & Co. to the effect that it is lawful in one to decline to enter into a business undertaking with any one. The other two cases referred to do not support appellants' contention. In the petition a malicious conspiracy and confederation on the part of appellants to injure appellee in his business was charged; also the means employed by them to effectuate their purpose, and the injury and damage resulting to appellee by reason of the alleged wrongs. The charge of malicious conspiracy, confederation, etc., against appellants, even if true, did not give appellee a cause of action, unless the means used by them to carry out their purpose were unlawful, and that by such means they succeeded in injuring appellee's business. Malice and bad motive alone do not constitute a cause of action, but where one exists they only make it worse for the defendants. Undoubtedly one man may by fair methods compete with a rival until by sheer force of competition, by underselling or outbidding him, his own business is built up to the detriment and ruin of his rival. The damage in such case is in the eye of the law damnum absque injuria. But a different case is presented where one seeks not only to build up his own business at the expense of a rival's, but to impair, and if possible, destroy, that rival's business by the use of unlawful means by saying and doing that which he has no lawful right to say and do, in so far as it works loss and damage to his rival. It is also true whether a conspiracy formed for the purpose of injuring or driving one out of business be lawful or unlawful, so far as the purpose is concerned, yet, where unlawful means are used in effectuating that purpose, the conspiracy becomes actionable, and any loss or damage suffered in consequence may be recovered.

The petition in apt words alleged the conspiracy, the means used to effectuate the purpose and the resulting loss to appellee. The remaining matter to be determined is whether the alleged means used to injure or drive appellee out of business were lawful or unlawful. If lawful, the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; if unlawful it did and the lower court did not err in overruling appellants' demurrer. That part of the petition which describes the means used to effectuate their purpose is as follows: "By wanton and malicious interference with plaintiff's business and the conduct thereof in obstructing, harassing, and annoying plaintiff's servants and employés while engaged in the discharge of their respective duties in selling and distributing oils, etc., to plaintiff's customers and patrons, and by willfully enticing, persuading, and otherwise influencing such servants and employés to leave plaintiff's employ, against the will and consent of plaintiff; by threatening certain wholesale customers of plaintiff to shut them up in their business if they continued to purchase and deal in plaintiff's oils, etc.; and by threatening both wholesale and retail customers of plaintiff, that it (the Standard Oil Company, aforesaid) would refuse to sell them oil, gasolines and other commodities dealt in by said defendant as long as they continued to purchase such articles, or any of them, from plaintiff; by causing and procuring false and injurious reports concerning plaintiff and his business to be circulated in and about the city of Lexington, and published in certain of the daily newspapers of the city; by causing and procuring plaintiff to be arrested on various charges of violating the ordinances of said city, and the criminal and penal laws of the city of Lexington and commonwealth of Kentucky, and to be prosecuted therefor; and by divers and sundry wrongful acts to estrange and alienate the acquaintances, customers, and patrons of the plaintiff, to ruin, oppress, and impoverish the plaintiff, and drive him out of the business of contracting for the sale of oils, gasoline," etc. It was most assuredly unlawful to obstruct, harass, and annoy appellee's employés when engaged in the discharge of their duties in selling and distributing oils to appellee's customers; to threaten customers of appellee to shut them up in their business if they continued to deal in appellee's oils; to cause and procure false and injurious reports concerning appellee and his business to be circulated in Lexington and vicinity; and to procure appellee's arrest and prosecution on false charges in connection with his business in the sale of oils for the purpose of estranging and alienating the acquaintances, customers, and patrons of appellee....