Standard Oil Company of Indiana v. State of Missouri No 47 Republic Oil Company v. State of Missouri No 48

• Decision Date: 01 April 1912
• Docket Number: Nos. 47 and 48,s. 47 and 48
• Parties: STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF INDIANA, Plff. in Err., v. STATE OF MISSOURI on the Information of Herbert S. Hadley, Attorney General, Succeeded by Elliott W. Major. et al. NO 47. REPUBLIC OIL COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. STATE OF MISSOURI on the Information of Herbert S. Hadley, Attorney General, Succeeded by Elliott W. Major, et al. NO 48
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

224 U.S. 270

32 S.Ct. 406

56 L.Ed. 760

STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF INDIANA, Plff. in Err.,

v STATE OF MISSOURI on the Information of Herbert S.

Hadley, Attorney General, Succeeded by Elliott W.

Major. et al.

NO 47.

REPUBLIC OIL COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v. STATE OF MISSOURI on the Information of Herbert S.

Hadley, Attorney General, Succeeded by Elliott W.

Major, et al.

NO 48.

Nos. 47 and 48.

Argued November 8 and 9, 1911.

Decided April 1, 1912.

[Syllabus from pages 270-272 intentionally omitted] Writ of error to a judgment of ouster and fine against plaintiffs in error in original quo warranto proceedings in the supreme court of Missouri.

The Missouri anti-trust act (Rev. Stat. of 1899, §§ 8968, 8971) provides that any person or corporation which shall form a combination in restraint of trade shall be deemed guilty of a conspiracy to defraud, and on conviction shall be subject to a penalty of not less than $5 nor more than $100 per day for each day the combination continues, and in addition the guilty corporation shall have its franchises forfeited.

In April, 1905, while this act was in force, the attorney general filed an information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto against the Standard Oil Company and the Republic Oil Company, foreign corporations, holding licenses to do business in Missouri, and the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, a domestic company, alleging that between the day of 1901, and March 29, 1905, they had formed and maintained a combination to prevent competition in the buying, selling, and refining oil, to the great damage of the people of Missouri.

The information contained no reference to the anti-trust act further than was involved in the allegation that, 'by reason of the premises, said respondents, . . . grossly offended against the laws of the state, and wilfully and flagrantly abused and misused their . . . franchises . . . and their acts . . . constitute a wilful and malicious perversion of the franchise granted the said corporations. . . . Wherefore, your informant, prosecuting in this behalf for the state of Missouri, prays' that each of the defendants be ousted of their said corporate franchises and license to do business under the laws of the state.

The defendants answered, denying all the allegations of the petition, and moving to dismiss on many grounds not material to be considered here. The case was referred to a commissioner to take testimony and report findings of fact and conclusions of law.

While the case was under consideration, the anti-trust statute was amended in March, 1907, so as to provide that if any corporation should be found guilty of a violation of the provisions of the act, its charter or license should be forfeited, and the court might also forfeit any or all of its property to the state, or cancel its right to do business, or the court might assess a fine. It was provided that the act should not operate to release any penalty, forfeiture, or liability already incurred.

After the passage of this amendment, making new and increased penalties for a violation of the anti-trust statute, the commissioner made his report, finding (May 24, 1907) against the defendants on the law and the fact. On June 22, 1907, the Republic Oil Company filed with the secretary of state, in statutory form, a notice of its withdrawal from the state. On October 23, 1907, the fact of this withdrawal was brought to the attention of the court, and a motion was made that the case be abated so far as the Republic Oil Company was concerned. The motion was overruled, and later the court found that each of the defendants had entered into a combination in restraint of trade, and prevented and destroyed competition. And it was adjudged that the defendants had each forfeited their right to do business, and they were each ousted of any and all right and franchise, and fined $50,000. In view of the capital of the company and the amount of profits that had been made during the period of the combination, some members of the court expressed the opinion that the fine should be $1,000,000.

A motion for rehearing was denied. The Waters-Pierce Oil Company paid the fine and complied with conditions, by virtue of which it was permitted to continue to do business in the state. The other two defendants brought the case here.

It is alleged that——

(b) 'The court held that this was a civil proceeding, and that it had no criminal jurisdiction. It then, in addition to an ouster, adjudged that this respondent should pay a fine of $50,000. This fine was at least the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in an original proceeding, which was beyond the court's power and jurisdiction. The court thereby takes from the respondent its property without due process of law, discriminates against respondent, and refuses to accord to it the equal protection of the law, all of which is contrary to the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.'

There are various assignments of error challenging the constitutionality of the antitrust statute, on the ground that it deprived defendants of their property without due process of law and interfered with interstate commerce. It was also claimed that the defendants were denied the equal protection of the law, in that, in forfeiting their franchise and imposing a fine of $50,000 without a jury trial, a different procedure had been adopted and a different judgment entered from that which could have been rendered on conviction by a jury for violation of the anti-trust statute.

The defendants (now plaintiffs in error) sought first a reversal of the judgment of the supreme court of Missouri, and, in the alternative, a modification of the judgment.

To this end attention was called to the fact that the plaintiffs in error were parties in the case of Standard Oil Co. v. United States [221 U. S. 1, 55 L. ed. 619, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502]. They pray that the judgment herein be modified so as to provide that it should not be held to conflict with any decree entered in that equity cause so far as concerned property in Missouri belonging to plaintiffs in error.

It was also urged that the statute making it a felony for any person to sell or deal in articles manufactured by a corporation whose license had been forfeited would operate to destroy the value of the plaintiffs' property in Missouri, and would in effect prevent them from engaging in interstate commerce. They moved that the judgment be modified here so as to provide against any such result.

Messrs. Frank Hagerman, Robert W. Stewart, and Alfred D. Eddy for plaintiffs in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 275-280 intentionally omitted]

Page 280

Mr. Elliott W. Major, Attorney General of Missouri, and Charles G. Revelle, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Lamar, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:

The Standard Oil Company and the Republic Oil Company by this writ of error seek to reverse a judgment of ouster and fine of $50,000, entered against each of them in original quo warranto proceedings by the supreme court of Missouri, contending that they are thereby deprived of property without due process of law and denied the equal protection of the law.

The briefs and arguments for the defendants were addressed mainly to the proposition that the fine of $50,000 was a criminal sentence in a civil suit, and void because beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and, for the further reason, that the pleadings and prayer gave no notice which would support such a sentence.

1. It is, of course, essential to the validity of any judgment that the court rendering it should have had jurisdiction, not only of the parties, but of the subject-

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-matter. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 234, 247, 41 L. ed. 983, 988, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581. But it is equally well settled that it is for the supreme court of a state finally to determine its own jurisdiction and that of other local tribunals, since the decision involves a construction of the laws of the state by which the court was organized. In this case the Constitution of Missouri declared that 'the supreme court shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, quo warranto, certiorari, and other remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same.' Its decision and judgment necessarily imply that under that clause of the Constitution it had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and authority to enter judgment of ouster and fine in civil quo warranto proceedings. That ruling is conclusive upon us regardless of whether the judgment is civil or criminal, or both combined. Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U. S. 420, 54 L. ed. 820, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 543.

2. The Federal question is whether, in that court, with such jurisdiction, the defendants were denied due process of law. Under the 14th Amendment they were entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. That necessarily required that the notice and the hearing should correspond, and that the relief granted should be appropriate to that which had been heard and determined on such notice. For even if a court has original general jurisdiction criminal and civil, at law and in equity, it cannot enter a judgment which is beyond the claim asserted, or which, in its essential character, is not responsive to the cause of action on which the proceeding was based.

'Though the court may possess jurisdiction of a cause, of the subject-matter, and of the parties, it is still limited in its modes of procedure, and in the extent and character of its judgments. It must act judicially in all things, and cannot then transcend the power conferred by the law. If, for instance, the action be upon a money demand,

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the court, notwithstanding its complete jurisdiction over the subject and parties, has no power to pass judgment of imprisonment in the penitentiary upon the defendant. If the action be for a libel or personal tort, the court...