Standard Paving Co. v. Lemmon

Decision Date25 October 1927
Docket NumberCase Number: 17681
Citation263 P. 140,129 Okla. 15,1927 OK 383
PartiesSTANDARD PAVING CO. v. LEMMON et al.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court
Syllabus

¶0 1. Master and Servant--Workmen's Compensation Law--Award to Physician Attending Injured Employee at Verbal Request of Employer.

Under section 4, ch. 61, of the Session Laws of 1923, amending the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state of Oklahoma, if no written contract exists between a physician and the employer or insurance carrier, the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to award and enforce charges due to a physician for services performed for an injured employee at the verbal request of the employer.

2. Same--Claim of Physician Subject to General Statutes of Limitation.

Where services are performed by a physician for an injured employee, which the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to award and enforce, the physician is not barred by limitation of one year from the time the injury occurred in which to file his claim with the Industrial Commission; but in filing his claim he is governed by the general statutes of the state concerning limitation of actions.

Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 1.

Error from State Industrial Commission.

From an order of the State Industrial Commission awarding Dr. W. G. Lemmon compensation, to be paid by the Standard Paving Company, paving company appeals. Affirmed.

Allen, Underwood & Smith, for petitioner.

Burford, Miley, Hoffman & Burford, for respondents.

FOSTER, C.

¶1 This is an appeal from an order of the State Industrial Commission made on July 9, 1926, directing the petitioner, plaintiff in error, to pay to W. G. Lemmon, defendant in error, the sum of $ 306. The plaintiff in error will be referred to as respondent, and the defendant in error as claimant.

¶2 One Gus Ward, while employed by the petitioner, was injured on June 28, 1923, and filed his claim for compensation with the State Industrial Commission on August 22, 1923. The Commission, thereafter, and on the 10th day of December, 1923, made a final order of award to the claimant, Gus Ward. The claimant in this case performed medical services for the said Gus Ward at the request of the petitioner, which medical services were last performed by this claimant on the 30th day of November, 1923; that this claimant filed an application for such medical services with the Industrial Commission on July 10, 1925, which was nearly two years after the injury occurred and more than a year after the last services were performed. There is apparently no dispute concerning the facts in the case, nor the reasonableness of the claimant's charges for services.

¶3 The only questions presented to this court for determination are:

(1) Does the Industrial Commission of the state of Oklahoma have jurisdiction to make an award to a physician for his services to an injured employee, performed at a verbal request of employer, where no written contract exists?
(2) Is a physician's claim, under facts here presented, barred by the statute of limitations?

¶4 At the outset it is clear that if the Commission has jurisdiction to make an award to a physician under the facts and circumstances here presented, it must obtain its jurisdiction from the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. This act was originally passed in 1915, and was amended in 1919 and 1923.

¶5 It is admitted by the claimant, defendants in error, that prior to the amendment in 1923 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the said act contained no provision or authority for the Commission to make an award direct to a physician or surgeon for his compensation for medical services rendered in treating an injured employee. Integrity Mutual Casualty Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 87 Okla. 92, 209 P. 653; Associated Employers' Reciprocal v. Industrial Commission, 87 Okla. 16, 208 P. 798.

¶6 These two cases, decided after the passage of the 1919 amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act, clearly hold that at that time (1922) the Industrial Commission had no authority to make an award direct to physicians or surgeons performing medical aid.

¶7 The question of the jurisdiction, therefore, depends upon section 5, ch. 61, p. 122, Session Laws of 1923, a part of which is as follows:

"Whoever renders medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicine, crutches and apparatus, or emergency treatment, shall submit the reasonableness of the charges to the State Industrial Commission for its approval, and such charges shall be limited to such charges as prevail in the same community for similar treatment of like injured persons, and when so approved shall be enforceable by the Commission in the same manner as provided in this act for the enforcement of compensation payments; provided, however, that the foregoing provision relating to approval and enforcement of such charges shall not apply where a written contract exists between the employer or insurance carrier and the person who renders such medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment. * * *" (Emphasis ours.)

¶8 The provision regarding the enforcement by the Industrial Commission was not contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act prior to the passage of the 1923 amendment, and, while the provisions may not be as clear as they could have been, it seems to us that it was the intention of the Legislature to confer upon the Industrial Commission the power to make awards to a physician or surgeon for medical services, and to enforce the same in the same manner as is provided for the enforcement of compensation payments.

¶9 The only exception in the 1923 amendment is in the proviso that "the foregoing provision, * * * relating to appeal and enforcement, * * * shall not apply where a written contract exists" between the employer and the physician. This, to our minds, clearly indicates that it shall apply in all cases where no written contract exists. In the case at bar it is admitted that the respondent orally requested the physician to perform the services.

¶10 The decisions above referred to, holding that, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as it existed prior to the passage of the 1923 amendment, the Commission had no authority to make an award direct to a physician, were decided by this court in the fall of 1922, just prior to the convening of the Legislature of 1923, and the Legislature thereupon immediately passed the 1923 amendment giving the Commission the...

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6 cases
  • Pinnacle Rehabilitation v. Rivera-Villareal
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
    • November 26, 2008
    ...provided reasonable and necessary medical care to the claimant for a work related injury." In this regard, see also Standard Paving Co. v. Lemmon, 1927 OK 383, 263 P. 140; and Speed v. Okla. Slate Indus. Court, 1962 OK 10, 368 P.2d 3. Claimant also submitted a copy of his release of claims ......
  • Swift & Co. v. Walden
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • November 26, 1935
    ...employee, under an oral contract between the employer and the physician, is no longer the law in this jurisdiction. Standard Paving Co. v. Lemmon, 129 Okla. 15, 263 P. 140. That is because those cases were based upon section 7288, C. O. S. 1921, which did not permit such recovery. But immed......
  • Okla. Utilities Co. v. Johnson, Case Number: 27393
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • February 16, 1937
    ...v. State Industrial Commission, 108 Okla. 251, 235 P. 1095; Farley v. H. T. Milling Co., 113 Okla. 112, 239 P. 451; Standard Paving Co. v. Lemmon, 129 Okla. 15, 263 P. 140; Skelly Oil Co. v. Skinner, 162 Okla. 150, 19, P.2d 548; Skelly Oil Co. v. Barker, 132 Okla. 279, 270 P. 566; Ada Brick......
  • Thompson v. JW BUCK CONST.
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
    • March 13, 2001
    ...1993 OK CIV APP 194, 867 P.2d 487, noted that the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Womack cited with approval its opinion in Standard Paving Co. v. Lemmon, 1927 OK 383, 263 P. 140, wherein the court held that the medical services provider "had three years within which to bring his action." That pe......
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