Standard Salt & Cement Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 01 April 1927 |
| Docket Number | 25,820 |
| Citation | 213 N.W. 543,171 Minn. 39 |
| Parties | STANDARD SALT & CEMENT COMPANY v. COMMERCIAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for St. Louis county to recover upon a contractor's bond. Plaintiff appealed from a judgment Fesler, J., entered in its favor for $1,000 less than the amount it sought to recover. Affirmed.
Reasons given by trial judge for his decision will be considered on appeal.
1. The rule that a memorandum of the trial judge, not expressly made a part of the decision, cannot be considered by this court no longer obtains in its original extent. A decision brought here for review will always be read in the light of the trial judge's statement of his reasons for the ruling.
Specific direction of debtor controlled application of a certain payment.
2. It appears from the record that the trial court found that a certain payment should be applied in accordance with the debtor's specific instead of his general directions. Under these circumstances it was correctly held that the specific direction controlled.
Inconsistency in findings cleared by memorandum of trial judge.
3. Reading the findings in the light cast upon them by the trial judge's memorandum accompanying an order denying a motion to amend, it is held that an inconsistency in the findings is cleared up and that they support the conclusions of law and the order for judgment.
Appeal and Error, 4 C.J. p. 105 n. 55.
Municipal Corporations, 28 Cyc. p. 1043 n. 75 New.
Payment 30 Cyc. p. 1228 n. 54; p. 1231 n. 67 New.
Trial, 38 Cyc. p. 1986 n. 84, 85.
See note in 41 A.L.R. 1297; 21 R.C.L. 88; 3 R.C.L. Supp. 1134; 4 R.C.L. Supp. 1404; 5 R.C.L. Supp. 1143; 6 R.C.L. Supp. 1253.
Alford & Hunt, for appellant.
Archer & Rosemeier, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $1,000 less than the amount it sought to recover.
The complaint alleges that Evenson & Utterberg were contractors engaged in erecting a unit of the city hall at Virginia; that the respondent insurance company was surety on their bond, conditioned as required by G.S. 1923, § 9700, relating to bonds of public contractors; that appellant furnished materials to the contractors for use in the construction of the building; that the materials were of the value of $5,743.53, and that only $3,296.49 had been paid.
The answer admitted all of these allegations except the one as to payment, alleging that the full amount of appellant's claim had been paid except $194.44, for which amount judgment was tendered.
The court found:
That appellant had sold and delivered to the contractors "certain materials for use in the construction of said city hall unit" and that
The appellant moved to amend the findings so as to read that $2,446.94, instead of $1,446.94, was due and owing for materials furnished for the construction of the city hall. The motion was denied, the court saying that the findings was not contradictory; that the respondent was the only defendant who answered; that the only issues tried were those between it and the appellant; that only $1,446.94 was due on the city hall contract from the respondent; and that judgment against the other defendants for $2,446.94 might be taken by default.
The first question presented is whether the order for judgment for $1,446.94, instead of $2,446.94, is warranted by the findings. Appellant contends that it is not, because the facts as found compel the conclusion that the contractors still owe $2,446.94 on the city hall job. If this is so, the respondent, as their surety, is responsible for the payment of that amount, and the order for judgment is wrong.
Respondent contends that the refusal to amend the findings, read in the light of the accompanying memorandum, shows clearly enough that the court intended to find that the contractors owed appellant $2,446.94 on general account; that, of that amount, $1,446.94 represented the balance due on the city hall job, and the remainder, the balance due on other jobs for which respondent is not responsible.
The rule that a memorandum of the trial judge, not expressly made a part of a decision, cannot be considered by this court no longer obtains; it has been departed from materially in recent decisions. Kipp v. Clinger, 97 Minn. 135, 106 N.W. 108; Baker v. Polydisky, 144 Minn. 72, 174 N.W. 526.
A statement of the court's reasons for its decision gives the appellate court the benefit of the point of view of the trial court, throws light on the decision and helps to clear up doubts and uncertainties, if any there be. It also informs the parties and their counsel why the decision was rendered. This is an important consideration, for a defeated party ought to know the grounds upon which the court decided against him.
Aided by the memorandum, we have no difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of the findings. Of course the court did not intend to hold...
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