Standard Sewing Machine Company v. Frame
| Decision Date | 13 February 1900 |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
| Parties | THE STANDARD SEWING MACHINE COMPANY v. ROXYE FRAME |
Superior Court, New Castle County, February Term, 1900.
REPLEVIN.
See facts in opinion of Court.
Verdict for plaintiff.
Herbert H. Ward for plaintiff.
Franklin Brockson for defendant.
OPINION
PENNEWILL, J., charging the jury:
Gentlemen of the jury:--On May 6, 1899, The Standard Sewing Machine Company, the plaintiff in this case, caused to be issued out of this Court a writ of replevin, under which the sewing machine which is the subject of this suit was seized by the sheriff and delivered to the said company. The plaintiff alleges that said machine had been delivered to Roxye Frame the defendant, under a lease or agreement signed and sealed by her and dated April 10, 1895, wherein she agreed to pay as rent for the machine three dollars per month for the period of seventeen months. The plaintiff further alleges that under the terms of a paper signed by said company and delivered to the defendant, an option was given to the defendant, to buy the sewing machine at the expiration of the rental period mentioned, and that the defendant having failed to make the payments of rent, and exercise her option to buy, as agreed upon, the plaintiff had the right under the law to repossess itself of the property at the time and in the manner in which it did. The alleged lease, as well as the paper granting the option to purchase, have been admitted in evidence and are before you.
The defendant admits that she signed the paper claimed by the plaintiff to be a lease, but insists that she was unable on account of her ignorance, to tell what the paper meant. She also contends that such paper was in fact not a lease, but rather constituted a sale, absolute or conditional, of the property from the plaintiff to the defendant; and we have been asked by the defendant to so charge you. We will say to you that the paper referred to, is in law just what it purports on its face, to be, viz., a lease, and it does not by its terms constitute a sale either absolute or conditional. We instruct you that if a person who is able to read signs his or her name to a paper, the presumption is that such person understood the meaning of the instrument, or by the exercise of reasonable care might have done so. In order to avoid the contract the burden is placed on the defendant to show that she was so ignorant that she did not, and could not, understand what she signed. If she was able to understand it, had an opportunity to understand it, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence might have understood it, the contract is valid and binding on her.
We have also been asked by the defendant to charge you that it was incumbent on the plaintiff to show that it was authorized by its charter to do the business it transacted with the defendant, and having failed to show that, it cannot recover in this action. We cannot so charge you for the reason that the defendant having contracted with the company, is estopped from denying that the corporation was not authorized by its charter to make the contract.
Neither can we charge you that the plaintiff cannot recover because of the statute passed May 12, 1897, entitled, "An act in relation to foreign corporations," being Chapter 513, Volume 20, Laws of Delaware. This statute provides that "no corporation shall engage in, prosecute or transact any business of any kind within the limits of this State on and after June 1, 1897, without first filing a charter," etc. But this act was passed subsequent to the making of the contract involved in this case, and we say to you that it has nothing whatever to do with the case before you.
It is true that the statute of limitations restricts the entry of suits of this character to...
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