Standefer v. Standefer
| Decision Date | 24 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 93,785.,93,785. |
| Citation | 2001 OK 37,26 P.3d 104 |
| Parties | Charles STANDEFER, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Cynthia Birdsong STANDEFER, Defendant/Appellee. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Richard A. Shallcross, Shallcross Graves & Associates, Tulsa, OK, for Appellant.
Nancy Nesbitt Blevins and Paul E. Blevins, & Sordahl, Inc., Pryor, OK, for Appellee.
¶ 1 The following issues are presented for this Court's review: (1) Whether the district court properly found a common-law marriage existed as of November 1988; (2) Whether the district court erred by including funds acquired from a settlement in a personal injury suit as part of the marital estate; and (3) Whether the division of property was equitable.
¶ 2 Charles Standefer and Cynthia Birdsong began cohabitating in November of 1988. At the time, Cynthia had two children from a previous marriage. As a result of the death of her husband from the previous marriage, Cynthia and the two children were receiving social security benefits. Charles was a truck driver. Cynthia worked for a time during the cohabitation as a waitress and at another time as a medical care giver. ¶ 3 On September 28, 1996, while on a metal-roofed shed adjacent to the home in Chouteau, Oklahoma, Charles came in contact with a high voltage electrical wire. As a result of the electrocution, Charles was burned over 65% of his body, had numerous operations, had diminished use of his legs, and, for social security purposes, is 100% disabled. At the time of the accident, Cynthia was in the house. When she saw a bluish ball of fire and heard a horrible noise, she went outside. When Cynthia saw flames coming out of both of Charles' legs, she started shaking. Then, Cynthia turned the electricity off, ran in the house, and called 911. The rescue team removed Charles from the shed, and he was air lifted to a medical center in Tulsa.
¶ 4 Charles was in a burn center for three months. During most of this time, Cynthia rented a room and stayed at the hospital. Her parents and friends helped care for her children. Most weekends, she would bring the children to the hospital to visit Charles. When Charles was moved to a rehabilitation center, Cynthia returned to live at home but made daily trips to the hospital. When Charles returned home, Cynthia helped him with daily activities, changed his bandages, provided medical assistance, pushed his wheelchair, and gave other necessary assistance.
¶ 5 On February 5, 1997, Charles and Cynthia and Cynthia on behalf of her two children filed a lawsuit against one of the tortfeasors (Tortfeasor I). Charles sought compensation for his injuries and Cynthia and the children for loss of consortium. The law suit was settled. Even though they were informed that they could seek separate settlements, Charles and Cynthia instructed their attorneys to seek one lump-sum settlement. Charles stated that he wanted Cynthia to be taken care of if anything should happen to him. Charles and Cynthia were insistent that their claims should be joined and that they negotiate for and receive a combined settlement.
¶ 6 On November 12, 1997, Charles, Cynthia, and the children signed a "Memorandum of Agreement by Plaintiffs Regarding Settlement of Their Lawsuit" and directing the disbursement of the funds from the settlement. The parties acknowledged that they had the right to individually consult separate attorneys regarding their rights but elected not to do so. The children acknowledged that their claims were not legally recognized and, therefore, of dubious value. The memorandum stated specifically:
Specifically, Charles R. Standefer and Cynthia Birdsong Standefer understand and acknowledge that their claims against [Tortfeasor I] were different in kind and value and that they freely choose that all payments made under the terms of the settlement be made [jointly] rather than to them individually in separate amounts. Charles R. Standefer and Cynthia Birdsong Standefer further acknowledge that they directed their attorneys not to negotiate separate settlements from [Tortfeasor I], but that their interests in the case be pursued collectively and result in one settlement to be shared jointly by them and their family.
There was no document or other statement which allocated the settlement funds to specific items of loss or injury of Charles and Cynthia.
¶ 7 The Standefers received slightly over half of the settlement funds in cash.1 Most of the cash was used for attorney fees, medical bills, and other bills which were incurred during the time after Charles' accident. With the remaining amount of settlement funds, Tortfeasor I purchased three annuities, one each from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, from Berkshire Hathaway Life Insurance Company of American, and from United of Omaha Life Insurance Company. Charles and Cynthia dictated many of the terms of the annuities such as how they were to be paid and that the payments be made into a joint account. The Metropolitan Life annuity represented about 22.52% of the total value of the annuities, the Berkshire Hathaway annuity represented about 38.22%, and the Omaha Life annuity represented about 39.26%. The monthly payments for the Metropolitan Life and Berkshire Hathaway annuities were to be paid for the life of Charles but no less than thirty years. The Omaha Life annuity was to be paid until the death of the last surviving of Charles or Cynthia but no less than twenty years. The Berkshire Hathaway annuity contract specifically stated that the interests of the payees, in this case Charles and Cynthia, were several and equal. The Omaha Life annuity policy listed Charles and Cynthia as the annuitants. The payments under each of these annuities were to be made monthly into an account held jointly by Charles and Cynthia. Charles and Cynthia were the payees for all the annuities. Charles wrote a check for $5,000.00 each month from the joint account and gave it to Cynthia to put in her separate checking account.
¶ 8 On December 24, 1997, Charles and Cynthia were married in a ceremony. In an attempt to show that they were not common-law spouses before the accident, Charles presented evidence that in January of 1995, Cynthia purchased a house (the Chouteau property, the place where Charles' injuries occurred) as a single person and that Charles and Cynthia had filed separate tax returns. In contrast, during the time after they started cohabiting, Charles gave Cynthia cards which stated they were for "his wife" or other indications that he considered Cynthia to be his wife. On March 30, 1992, Charles changed his insurance enrollment listing Cynthia as his wife and her two children as his stepson and stepdaughter. More importantly, Charles testified he considered that he and Cynthia were common-law married on Thanksgiving Day of 1988.
¶ 9 On July 26, 1998, Charles and Cynthia separated. However, before their separation Charles and Cynthia brought suit against the second tortfeasor (Tortfeasor II). In August of 1999, Charles settled this claim. However, Cynthia's claim remains pending.
¶ 10 The district court found the following facts. Charles and Cynthia were common-law married as of Thanksgiving Day of 1988. Using the analytical method of division, the Tortfeasor II settlement funds were Charles' separate property, and Cynthia's claim against Tortfeasor II was her separate property. Certain vehicles were gifts to Cynthia's children and parents. The proceeds from the settlement with Tortfeasor I were marital property and that the analytical method of division of property was inapplicable based on Charles' and Cynthia's actions. The parties had equitably divided the proceeds of the annuities by their practice of Cynthia receiving a fixed monthly amount of $5,000.00 from the annuity payments. An IRS debt was Charles' separate property, and the other debts totaling $15,100 were marital debts. The court awarded approximately 62% of the marital assets to Charles and approximately 38% to Cynthia. The district court ordered that Cynthia should receive approximately one-third of the monthly payments from the annuities.
¶ 11 On appellate review, a trial court's determination of the existence of a common-law marriage will not be disturbed if it is not clearly against the weight of the evidence. Mueggenborg v. Walling, 1992 OK 121, ¶ 5, 836 P.2d 112, 113. A common law marriage is formed when "the minds of the parties meet in consent at the same time." Reaves v. Reaves, 1905 OK 32, 82 P. 490. Some evidence of consent to enter into a common-law marriage are cohabitation, actions consistent with the relationship of spouses, recognition by the community of the marital relationship, and declarations by the parties. See Reaves v. Reaves, 1905 OK 32, 82 P. 490. The person seeking to establish a common-law espousal relationship has the burden to show by clear and convincing the existence of the marriage. See Maxfield v. Maxfield, 1953 OK 390, ¶ 24, 258 P.2d 915, 921.
¶ 12 In the present case, Charles testified that "as far as [he] was concerned, [he and Cynthia] had been married since Thanksgiving of 1988." Cynthia likewise believed that they were common-law spouses beginning in 1988. Other evidence of the common-law marriage is Charles listing Cynthia as his wife and her children as his step-children on his insurance and giving her cards to her as his wife, Charles and Cynthia celebrating their anniversary every year, her children giving them anniversary gifts, and Charles and Cynthia holding themselves out to others as spouses. The evidence is clear and convincing that both parties assented to a marriage on Thanksgiving Day of 1988. According to the record, the trial court's finding that a common-law marriage existed as of Thanksgiving of 1988 was not against the weight of the evidence.
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