Standifer v. Val Gene Management Services, Inc., 46519

• Decision Date: 13 August 1974
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 46519,46519,2
• Citation: 1974 OK CIV APP 41,527 P.2d 28
• Parties: Janell STANDIFER, Appellant, v. VAL GENE MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., a corporation, Appellee
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 28

527 P.2d 28

Janell STANDIFER, Appellant, v. VAL GENE MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., a corporation, Appellee.

No. 46519.

Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 2.

Aug. 13, 1974.

Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Appeals

Sept. 5, 1974.

Philip Holmes, Inc., Oklahoma City, for appellant.

James E. Work, Shirk, Semtner, Work, Robinson & Bennett, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

BRIGHTMIRE, Presiding Judge.

This is a slander action. The trial court disposed of it by granting defendant a summary judgment. Whether he was correct in doing so is the only issue presented for review. We think he was and affirm.

In her petition, plaintiff stated that through the mouth of its agent, 24-year-old redheaded Sharon Gayle Wright, defendant corporation maliciously spoke and published to several people certain slanderous, false and defamatory words about plaintiff, 'to-wit: That the plaintiff was a constant troublemaker; that the plaintiff was not a fit tenant; that the plaintiff was harassing her; that the plaintiff had 'cussed her out'; that the plaintiff was disruptive in nature and was bothering the other tenants; and various and numerous statements tending to degrade the plaintiff . . . and . . . spoken . . . to blacken and injure the honesty, virtue, integrity, morality and reputation of . . . plaintiff and to thereby expose her to public contempt and ridicule.' As a 'direct . . . result' of all this she 'was compelled to move from her residence of many years and incurred (these) actual damages . . . Moving expense--$375.00; Telephone--$15.00; Automobile expense--$20.00; and additional rent--$80.00.' She asked for these amounts plus $5,000 general damages and $25,000 punitive damages.

A demurrer challenging the sufficiency of the petition was overruled. Defendant's short answer did nothing more than deny the allegations regarding slander.

Following the taking of agent Wright's deposition and plaintiff's, defendant filed an amended answer adding that if the alleged statements were made, they 'are true.'

A pretrial conference was held a short time later. And then defendant filed a motion for summary judgment stating in substance that plaintiff's deposition testimony generally supported the factual allegations in her petition and 'assuming that all the statements said to have been made by defendant were in fact made, they are insufficient as a matter of law to be the foundation for recovery.'

A short time later the court agreed and in sustaining the motion said:

'The remarks under consideration, although undeniably vulgar and offensive, do not fall within any of the various categories of publications recognized by the Oklahoma statute to be slanderous Per se . . . Yet, it seems clear beyond argument that the complained of remarks, under the circumstances established by the complaints' allegations, can only be deemed as words of abuse calculated to 'annoy and irk,' and, were not such as imputed to the plaintiffs' general disqualification touching peculiar abilities needed to follow their occupations.'

The first question to be resolved is whether under District Court Rule 13, 12 O.S.1971, Ch. 2, App., the pleadings and depositions on file in this case require a finding that no substantial controversy as to any material fact exists and if not whether under the admitted facts defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

This question involves consideration of one or two more basic issues: (1) is the alleged publication slanderous per se: or if not, (2) has special resulting damage been adequately alleged?

To start our probe of these points we quote the statute defining slander--12 O.S.1971 § 1442:

'Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, other than libel, which:

'1. Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted or punished for crime.

'2. Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious or loathsome disease.

'3. Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profit.

'4. Imputes to him impotence or want of chastity; or,

'5. Which, by natural consequences, causes actual damage.'

We can dismiss from consideration those paragraphs numbered one through four as being irrelevant because not alleged by plaintiff.

Slander is one of the two torts comprising the law of defamation. In general it is an oral publication while its mate, libel, is generally a written one. The distinction between the two developed haphazardly in old English courts from as far back as Runnymede. Their decisional expendiencies were influenced considerably by the rise and fall in popularity of the actions at various points in time and--during the 14th and 15th centuries--by the ecclesiastical courts' punishment of defamation as a 'sin.' A jurisdictional dispute between church and common law courts was temporarily resolved by allowing the latter tribunals to act if 'temporal' damage could be proved and if not then the defamation was deemed a 'spiritual' matter for the church to handle. In its early development slander was thought to be within the province of ecclesiastical law prompting secular courts to hold the action would not lie without proof of 'temporal' damages. Eventually proof of actual damage became an essential element of slander. Then in deference to reality courts began to recognize various exceptions such as imputations of a crime, of a loathsome disease, and those adversely affecting plaintiff's trade, business, or profession--exceptions which required no proof of damages. ¹ This historical distinction between libel and slander eventually found its way into the statutory law of this area while Oklahoma was still Indian Territory, ² along with--as can be seen above--the addition of a fourth category regarding imputation of unchastity or impotency to one.

To compare our libel statute with the one defining slander is to dramatize the distinction and underscore the former's much larger 'temporal' base. It is 12 O.S.1971 § 1441 and reads:

'Libel is a false or malicious unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, or effigy or other fixed representation to the eye, Which exposes any person to public hatred, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, Or which tends to deprive him of...