Standiford v. Standiford

• Citation: 598 A.2d 495,89 Md.App. 326
• Decision Date: 01 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 1960,1960
• Parties: James A. STANDIFORD v. Mary Lee STANDIFORD. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 326

89 Md.App. 326

598 A.2d 495

James A. STANDIFORD v. Mary Lee STANDIFORD.

No. 1960, Sept. Term, 1990.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Nov. 27, 1991.

James A. Standiford, Millersville, for appellant.

Ronald A. Silkworth, Glen Burnie, for appellee.

Argued before GARRITY, DAVIS and HARRELL, JJ.

HARRELL, Judge.

Appellee, Mary Lee Standiford, brought a civil action against her ex-husband, appellant, James A. Standiford, for invasion of privacy and violation of Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 10-401 et seq., Maryland's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act. A jury trial was held in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County (Goudy, J. presiding), and judgment was entered for appellee in the amount of $12,500 in actual damages, $25,000 in punitive damages, and $9,500 in attorney's fees. Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial which was denied on 29 October 1990. This appeal followed. Appellant raises the following issues:

I. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant judgment for appellant on Count I of appellee's Complaint which alleged a violation of Maryland's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act;

II. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider the attorney's fees incurred by appellee;

III. Whether there was sufficient basis for the jury's award of actual damages;

IV. Whether there was sufficient basis for the jury's award of punitive damages V. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to take into the jury room a tape player and the tapes of the recorded telephone conversations that had been received in evidence; and,

VI. Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's Motion for Mistrial.

Facts

The parties were married on 7 November 1964. Two children, Dawn and Jamie, were born to the parties thereafter. The couple began having marital difficulties in February 1984. They were eventually divorced in 1987. Prior to their divorce, the parties resided at 216 Twelfth Street in Pasadena, Maryland. The parties stipulated that during their marriage appellant was the sole subscriber for the telephone service in the marital home and that at all times pertinent to this matter appellant was acting alone. Appellee alleged that from February 1984 through January 1987 appellant listened to and recorded her telephone conversations that occurred in the marital home. Appellee testified that she never gave permission for appellant to place any listening devices on the telephone lines.

Appellee first learned that telephone conversations in the house were being intercepted when she and her daughter Dawn were in the basement watching television. They heard voices coming from somewhere other than the television. They followed the voices until they eventually found a handset hidden on a crate, under a coat. The handset was hooked into the telephone lines making it possible to hear telephone conversations. Appellee confronted appellant, an Anne Arundel County police officer, about the handset and he laughed at her and said "he had his reasons."

On 6 September 1985 appellee, her daughter Dawn, and Dawn's boyfriend Michael Frazier, found a tape recorder, an orange handset, and a timer hidden in the laundry room. This equipment was set up on a freezer under the steps, out of sight, and in a dark place. Appellee confronted appellant and, again, he laughed and said he had his reasons.

On 28 September 1985, appellee found a series of cassette tapes in appellant's police vehicle. One of the tapes was marked "9/8" and "don't tell." Another of the tapes was marked "after tap, Betty, 9/19/85."

Several days later, on 3 October 1985, appellee found hidden in the loft of the garage another set of recording devices consisting of a black handset and a Panasonic recorder. At some point in October 1985 appellee also found a cassette recorder, an orange handset, and another timer in the loft. Appellee testified that she listened to the cassette found in the cassette recorder. It contained some telephone conversations she had had with her Aunt. Appellee confronted appellant again. At the time of this confrontation the parties were estranged. Appellant told appellee that he wanted her to sign certain separation papers, which appellee did not want to sign. Appellant then threatened that if appellee would not sign the papers, he would tell the husband of the Aunt about a conversation appellee had with her Aunt concerning an adulterous relationship that her Aunt had engaged in during her marriage. Appellant told appellee that he would ruin the Aunt with this information. Appellee informed her Aunt about the tape recording and ultimately decided not to sign the separation papers. As a result of the threats made by appellant to reveal her infidelity, appellee's Aunt confessed to her husband. Thereafter, appellee's Aunt was divorced from her husband. Appellee felt responsible for her Aunt's divorce and she became distressed over these events.

On 6 November 1985, and again on 10 November 1985, appellee found a handset and a recording device in a freezer in the home. Appellee did not remove the device she found on 10 November, but rather, on 12 November 1985, she called the police. On 4 November 1986 the parties separated. Appellee testified that on 4 January 1987 she found a voice activated recording device, an orange headset, and a tape in a loft in the home. She took this equipment to her sister's home. Later, appellant confronted appellee and demanded that she return the recording equipment.

Discussion

I.

At trial appellant filed a motion to dismiss the count of the Complaint alleging violation of Maryland's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act, supra, ("the Act"), which the court denied. On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. He contends that he is exempted from the civil sanctions provided because the Act was not intended to apply to spousal wiretaps where the spouse intercepting the conversations acts alone to install and utilize the wiretap and is the sole subscriber for the telephone service in the commonly occupied marital abode. In support of this position appellant offers extensive citations to federal and other state decisions. We disagree with him and these authorities, to the extent not distinguished herein, and explain.

Section 10-402 of the Act provides in part:

(a) Unlawful acts.--Except as otherwise specifically provided in this subtitle it is unlawful for any person to:

(1) Wilfully intercept, endeavor to intercept, or procure any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;

One of the clear purposes of the Act is to prevent, in non-criminal situations, the unauthorized interception of conversations where one of the parties has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Benford v. A.B.C., 554 F.Supp. 145 (D.Md.1982). The Act is an offspring of, and closely parallels, Title III of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 ¹. Mustafa v State, 323 Md. 65, 69, 591 A.2d 481 (1991); Smith v. State, 283 Md. 156, 389 A.2d 858 (1978), aff'd, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979); Adams v. State, 289 Md. 221, 424 A.2d 344 (1981). Consequently, Maryland courts often turn to the federal courts for guidance in construing the Maryland Act. See generally Baldwin v. State, 45 Md.App. 378, 413 A.2d 246 (1980), aff'd 289 Md. 635, 426 A.2d 916, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 852, 102 S.Ct. 295, 70 L.Ed.2d 144 (1981); Wood v. State, 290 Md. 579, 431 A.2d 93 (1981); Petric v. State, 66 Md.App. 470, 504 A.2d 1168, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 860, 107 S.Ct. 206, 93 L.Ed.2d 136 (1986).

While the Maryland Act is modeled upon the federal act, and extensively tracks its provisions, the General Assembly has made some of the provisions of the Act more restrictive than the federal law. Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 69, 591 A.2d 481 (1991); Petric v. State, 66 Md.App. 470, 504 A.2d 1168, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 860, 107 S.Ct. 206, 93 L.Ed.2d 136 (1986). For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) permits an interception when one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent while the Maryland Act requires the prior consent of all the parties to a communication. State v. McGhee, 52 Md.App. 238, 447 A.2d 888 (1982). The alterations that were made by the General Assembly before enacting the Maryland Act were obviously designed to afford the people of this State a greater protection than Congress provided in Title III. Baldwin v. State, 45 Md.App. 378, 413 A.2d 246 (1980), aff'd 289 Md. 635, 426 A.2d 916, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 852, 102 S.Ct. 295, 70 L.Ed.2d 144 (1981). We recognize, however, that in construing the Maryland Act we must ensure that its interpretation does not fall below federal guidelines. Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 69, 591 A.2d 481 (1991); State v. Bailey, 289 Md. 143, 422 A.2d 1021 (1980).

The issue before us has not been addressed previously by appellate courts in this State. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the case sub judice involves nothing more nor less than statutory construction.

The fundamental task, in such a case, is to discern the objective, goal or purpose of the legislation. In our 'efforts to discover the purpose, aim, or policy we look at the words of the statute ... because what the legislature has written in an effort to achieve a goal is a natural ingredient of analysis to determine that goal.' We also may consider 'other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal' so that we may read the language of the legislation in the context within which it was written.

City of College Park v. Cotter, 309 Md. 573, 587-88, 525 A.2d 1059 (1987), quoting Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 525 A.2d 628 (1987).

In the case before us, we find that the statutory language is clear and, therefore, it is unnecessary to examine the...