Stanfield v. Glynn County, No. S06A0452.
| Citation | 280 Ga. 785,631 S.E.2d 374 |
| Decision Date | 12 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. S06X0453.,No. S06A0452. |
| Parties | STANFIELD et al. v. GLYNN COUNTY et al. Waste Management of Georgia, Inc. v. Stanfield et al. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Thomas A. Withers, Gillen, Parker & Withers, L.L.C., Savannah, GA, Hal Wright, Bridges & Wright, L.L.C., Atlanta, GA, for Appellants in No. S06A0452 and Appellees in No. S06X0453.
Erin Brownfield Raley, Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., Savannah, Terry L. Readdick, Whelchel, Brown, Readdick & Bumgartner, Gary Moore, Brunswick, for Appellees in No. S06A0452 and Appellants in No. S06X0453.
Pursuant to building permits issued from 1992 to 1997, Waste Management of Georgia, Inc. (Waste Management) operates a solid waste transfer facility on property in Glynn County which is zoned "General Industrial" (GI) and is adjacent to property on which Marc and Jennie Stanfield (Plaintiffs) reside. Plaintiffs brought suit against the County, the Board of Commissioners, and each commissioner and the County Building Officer in their official capacities (County Defendants) and against Waste Management for mandamus, declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages allegedly arising out of nuisance, trespass, and inverse condemnation. Each party filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the County Defendants' motion, holding that their actions did not rise to the level of an inverse condemnation, which is necessary for any recovery of damages, because the County does not own or have any connection with or control over the waste transfer facility, and ruling that the facility is a permissible use under the GI zoning classification. The trial court denied Waste Management's motion, holding that the evidence created a jury issue on the nuisance claim as to whether operation of the facility was conducted in an illegal manner, and finding that neither the nuisance nor the zoning ordinance is unconstitutional. The trial court also denied Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal in Case Number S06A0452, and Waste Management cross-appeals in Case Number S06X0453.
1. Plaintiffs contend that the trial erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the County Defendants on the claims for inverse condemnation, nuisance, and trespass.
Counties, unlike municipalities, can be liable for conditions created on private property only under the constitutional eminent domain provisions against taking or damaging such property for public purposes without just and adequate compensation, which provisions function as a waiver of sovereign immunity. City of Thomasville v. Shank, 263 Ga. 624(1), 437 S.E.2d 306 (1993) (); DeKalb County v. Orwig, 261 Ga. 137, 138(1), 402 S.E.2d 513 (1991); Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432, 434-435(2), 249 S.E.2d 235 (1978) ( ).
"[A] county may be liable for damages ... if it creates a condition on private property, such as a nuisance, that amounts to inverse condemnation or a taking without compensation." [Cits.].... Regardless of how the various claims are denominated, therefore, the plaintiffs may recover if and only if the [trespass or nuisance] amounted to the taking of property without just compensation....
Shealy v. Unified Govt. of Athens-Clarke County, 244 Ga.App. 853, 858-859, 537 S.E.2d 105 (2000). See also Morris v. Douglas County Bd. of Health, 274 Ga. 898(1), 561 S.E.2d 393 (2002). Thus, the trespass and nuisance claims are duplicative of the inverse condemnation claim. Shealy v. Unified Govt. of Athens-Clarke County, supra at 859, 537 S.E.2d 105.
The County neither owns nor is charged with the ongoing maintenance of Waste Management's facility. Morris v. Douglas County Bd. of Health, supra at 900(1), 561 S.E.2d 393. The County's approval of the construction of the waste transfer facility and its issuance of building permits does not subject it to any liability for inverse condemnation or for any claim rising to that level. Morris v. Douglas County Bd. of Health, supra at 898-899(1), 561 S.E.2d 393. Likewise, the County's issuance of citations for violation of the nuisance ordinance does not show that it was responsible for maintaining a nuisance, but rather that it was enforcing that ordinance. See Morris v. Douglas County Bd. of Health, supra at 899-900(1), 561 S.E.2d 393. Compare Fielder v. Rice Constr. Co., 239 Ga.App. 362, 364-367(1), 522 S.E.2d 13 (1999). Under these circumstances, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the County Defendants on the Plaintiffs' claims for damages.
2. Plaintiffs make several contentions regarding what uses are permitted under the zoning ordinance as properly construed. Both the County Defendants and Plaintiffs correctly recognize that the construction of a zoning ordinance is a question of law for the courts. Ervin Co. v. Brown, 228 Ga. 14, 15, 183 S.E.2d 743 (1971).
Zoning ordinances are to be strictly construed in favor of the property owner. [Cit.].... " [Cit.].... Any ambiguities in the language employed in zoning statutes should be resolved in favor of the free use of property. [Cit.]
The County's zoning ordinance initially permits in any GI district "[a]ny industrial use which involves manufacturing, processing, or assembly operations, or the storage and sale of heavy materials, products or equipment...." Glynn County Zoning Ordinance § 720.2(1). Waste transfer facilities come within the broad language therein permitting industrial uses involving processing operations. See Riddle v. Waller, 127 Ga. App. 399, 401(3), 193 S.E.2d 895 (1972) ().
Further language of the ordinance purports to except certain uses having a specified external impact, "including junk or salvage yards or uses which may cause injurious or obnoxious noise, vibration, smoke, gas, fume, odor, dust, fire hazard, dangerous radiation or conditions objectionable to adjacent or nearby areas." Glynn County Zoning Ordinance § 720.2(1). Such a specification of "performance standards," as they are often called, is valid if they are "tied to enforcement rather than prevention." Brent Assoc. v. Pelligrino, 72 Misc.2d 977, 340 N.Y.S.2d 21, 24 (Sup.Ct.1972). Since the zoning ordinance here does not contain any requirement for a determination of compliance with performance standards prior to construction of an industrial facility, the language setting forth those standards is properly construed as relating to subsequent enforcement. Compare Lithonia Asphalt Co. v. Hall County Planning Comm., 258 Ga. 8, 364 S.E.2d 860 (1988); Brent Assoc. v. Pelligrino, supra. The trial court astutely explained as follows:
With respect to the condition in the ordinance that ... industrial uses not include uses which may cause obnoxious noise, vibration, or odor, such condition cannot be construed to require a county in advance to guess or speculate as to whether a given use might cause such conditions. Obviously, some similar facilities might cause such conditions and some might effectively control such conditions in such a way as to cause no problem. This provision can only be construed as placing an owner on notice that such noxious results will not be allowed, and will be subject to regulation by the police power of the County. However, such a provision does not render a waste transfer facility an unlawful use, nor does it preclude the County from permitting construction for an industrial processing use allowed by the ordinance.
Therefore, the trial court correctly held that a waste transfer facility is a permissible use in a GI district. Likewise, to the extent that Waste Management has operated a junk or salvage yard, such use is permissible, but is subject to enforcement of the performance standards set forth in the zoning ordinance.
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