Stanfield v. Grove
| Decision Date | 28 June 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 68305,68305 |
| Citation | 924 S.W.2d 611 |
| Parties | 32 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 423 Bernard W. STANFIELD, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Glenn GROVE, Defendant/Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
James F. McMullin, St. Louis, for Appellant.
Martin & Malec, James M. Martin, St. Louis, for Respondent.
Appellant Glenn Grove contests the trial court's order awarding respondent Bernard Stanfield, Sr. $ 8,000 in damages for conversion. We reverse the trial court and vacate the judgment for respondent.
Appellant and respondent entered into an arrangement in July, 1986, wherein appellant was to receive a 1936 Pontiac from respondent in exchange for the performance of re-upholstery work on respondent's 1953 Cadillac. Upon formation of this agreement, appellant took possession of the '36 Pontiac, though he did not receive the title to the car. However, respondent never reupholstered the '53 Cadillac, apparently because appellant failed to complete some wood work on that machine which was a necessary predicate to appellant's performance. In 1991, some five years after appellant had taken delivery of the Pontiac, appellant paid respondent $1,000 and respondent assigned the certificate of title to appellant. Although the title document provided space for the transferor to list any liens it wished to place on the automobile, respondent left this space blank. The title certificate, duly notarized and signed by respondent, recited that the Pontiac was thereby sold to appellant for $1,000. No other terms of sale are mentioned in the title document, nor are any incorporated by reference.
In 1994, respondent filed a petition featuring legal claims of conversion and breach of contract and an equitable claim for replevin. The petition alleged that the parties had entered a contract for sale of the Pontiac for $9,000, that the $1,000 which appellant had paid respondent in 1991, was merely for the title to the car and not for the car itself, and that, therefore, appellant was indebted to respondent for the balance. The cause was called and heard in the Associate Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis, and after a one day bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of respondent for $8,000; no findings of fact or conclusions of law were prepared by the trial court. Appellant timely filed a motion for new trial, which was denied, and thereafter appealed to this court.
Where a trial court enters judgment without preparing findings of fact or conclusions of law, this court will credit the facts favorable to the judgment and will affirm such judgment if it is supportable under any legal theory. Braeshire Condominium Board of Managers v. Brinkmeyer, 841 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Mo.App. E.D.1992). We examine both the evidence and the trial court's order with this precept in mind.
In light of comments made by the trial judge during the trial of this case, it appears that he regarded an oral agreement (as enunciated in respondent's trial testimony) as the controlling legal arrangement between the parties. It was undisputed at trial that the original agreement contemplated the exchange of the Pontiac for re-upholstery services. Likewise, neither party challenged the proposition that at some point they agreed that appellant would pay a cash sum for the vehicle rather than provide his services. The amount which appellant was to pay respondent for the Pontiac thus became the central trial issue, and, crediting the testimony of respondent and his witnesses, the trial court found that this oral contractual novation called for a purchase price of $9,000.00.
We find that any such oral contract violated the Statute of Frauds provision of § 400.2-201 (RSMo.1994), and thus, that the trial court's judgment was erroneous to the extent it was premised on such a contract. Section 400.2-201(1) renders unenforceable any oral contract for the sale of goods for more than five hundred dollars. While the parties take wildly different views as to the value of the Pontiac at the time appellant took possession of it, they at least agree the car was worth more than $500.00.
It is true, as respondent might have mentioned had he thought of it, that where one party to an oral contract within § 400.2-201 has fully performed under the contract, the contract is rescued from the statute and becomes enforceable. Section 400.2-201(3)(c); Ellis Gray Milling Co. v. Sheppard, 215 S.W.2d 57 (Mo.App.1948); Alonzo v. Laubert, 418 S.W.2d 94 (Mo.1967); Koman v....
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Manard v. Williams
...and none were entered, this Court will affirm the trial court's judgment if it is supported under any legal theory. Stanfield v. Grove, 924 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo.App.1996). We examine both the evidence and the trial court's judgment with these precepts in As proponent of a quiet title action,......
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J.R. Waymire Co. v. Antares Corp.
...accident, mistake, duress, or mental incapacity, evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements may be admissible. Stanfield v. Grove, 924 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo.App.1996); W.E. Koehler Constr. Co., Inc. v. Medical Ctr. of Blue Springs, 670 S.W.2d 558, 561-562 (Mo.App.1984). Another example o......
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Klinckman v. Pharris
...more than five hundred dollars, as here, are required to be in writing to be enforceable. § 400.2-201(1), RSMo 1994; Stanfield v. Grove, 924 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo.App.1996). Sellers concede that they agreed on two separate occasions to extend the closing date beyond the original date of June ......