Stanfield v. Hursey
| Decision Date | 14 February 1927 |
| Docket Number | 17222. |
| Parties | STANFIELD v. HURSEY. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
Under Civ. Code 1910, § 5858, subd. 1, insanity of debtor after incurring liability does not prevent creditor from bringing suit, and hence will not affect operation of statute of limitations.
Under Civ. Code 1910, § 4378, removal of debtor from state, to suspend operation of statute of limitations, must be accompanied by intention to change legal residence or domicile.
Under Civ. Code 1910, §§ 2185-2187, change in domicile of person sui juris involves exercise of volition and choice.
Under Civ. Code 1910, §§ 2185-2187, person who has been adjudged insane cannot by his own act or volition effect change of domicile.
Under Civ. Code 1910, § 5740, insanity, once shown to have existed is presumed to continue, in absence of proof to the contrary.
Resident of state, adjudged insane by courts of state, was prima facie incapable thereafter of making change of his domicile.
Evidence that resident of state, after being adjudged insane by courts of state, went to another state to stay with his people, and was placed in insane asylum in such other state, is insufficient to show termination of residence in this state or that removal from state suspended operation of statute of limitations.
Under Civ. Code 1910, § 4362, evidence that plaintiff's account matured during or before 1911 showed account to be barred prior to appointment of defendant in 1917 as guardian of property of debtor adjudged insane.
Error from City Court of Reidsville; C. L. Cowart, Judge.
Action by E. S. Hursey against D. L. Stanfield, guardian. Judgment for plaintiff, defendant's motion for new trial was overruled, and he brings error. Reversed.
M. W Eason, of Reidsville, and P. M. Anderson, of Claxton, for plaintiff in error.
A. S. Way, H. H. Elders, and H. C. Beasley, all of Reidsville, for defendant in error.
Syllabus OPINION.
1. Where, after incurring liability, the debtor becomes insane, this fact will not prevent the creditor from bringing suit, and therefore will not affect the operation of the statute of limitations against the debt. Scott, Guardian, v. Winningham, 79 Ga. 492, 4 S.E. 390; Foster v. Jones, 23 Ga. 168(1); Civil Code 1910, § 5858(1); Elliott v. Keith, 102 Ga. 119(1), 29 S.E. 155; 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d Ed.) 241; 37 C.J. 1026.
2. In order for the removal of a debtor from this state to suspend the operation of the statute of limitations, it must be accompanied by an intention to change his legal residence or domicile. Sedgwick v. Gerding, 55 Ga. 265(2); Civil Code 1910, § 4378.
3. As to a person sui juris, the matter of making a change in domicile is one involving the exercise of volition and choice. A person who has been adjudged insane cannot, by his own act or volition, effect a change in his domicile. Civil Code 1910, §§ 2185, 2186, 2187. Insanity once shown to have existed is, in the absence of proof to the contrary, presumed to continue. Weeks v. Reliance Co., 20 Ga.App. 498(2), 93 S.E. 152; Civil Code 1910, § 5740.
4. Where a resident of this state was adjudged insane by the courts of this state in the year 1910, he was at least prima facie incapable thereafter of making a change of his domicile. Proof that, after such adjudication, he "went over to stay with his people in North Carolina," and was placed in a public institution of that state for insane persons, is insufficient to show that such person ceased to be a resident of the state of Georgia, or that his removal from this state was such as to suspend the operation of the statute of limitations as to a debt against him. Compare Jackson v. Southern Flour...
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