Stanford v. Fox Coll.
| Decision Date | 19 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18 C 3703,18 C 3703 |
| Parties | REBECCA STANFORD, an individual, Plaintiff, v. FOX COLLEGE, an Illinois corporation doing business as Fox College, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
From 2015 through 2017, Plaintiff Rebecca Stanford was enrolled in Defendant Fox College, Inc., in a two-year training program for work as a Physical Therapy Assistant. In the final term of the program, participants were placed at a physical therapy clinic for hands-on training. Before her final term began, Plaintiff informed Fox College administrators that she was pregnant, and both parties agreed to a plan in which she would be granted additional time to complete the course. The clinic where she was scheduled for the hands-on course cancelled its participation in the program, however, and Plaintiff found the clinic Fox College assigned her to as an alternative unacceptable. Plaintiff withdrew from the program for one term, but she returned after she gave birth and completed her degree. She soon passed the state licensing exam and found a job as a physical therapy assistant. Plaintiff brought this action against Fox College, alleging that it discriminated against her because of her pregnancy and intentionally inflicted emotional distress. Defendant has moved for summary judgment [42] on all counts, while Plaintiff has filed a motion to strike [49] certain documents supporting Defendant's motion. For the reasons discussed below, the court grants Defendant's motion and denies Plaintiff's.
The facts relevant to this dispute are set forth in the parties' competing Rule 56.1 statements. Before recounting those facts, the court pauses to address Plaintiff's motion to strike three of the affidavits that Defendant has submitted, on the ground that they are not "made on personal knowledge," do not present admissible evidence, or were not submitted by a competent witness. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4). Rule 56(c)(2) permits a party to raise such objections, but motions to strike "are disfavored except when they serve to expedite the work of the court," Maldonado v. Mount Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Chi., No. 08 C 6141, 2010 WL 63986, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2010) (citing RLJCS Enters., Inc. v. Prof'l Ben. Tr., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906-07 (N.D. Ill. 2006)).
Plaintiff's motion attacks portions of Defendant's affidavits as lacking foundation or constituting hearsay. Plaintiff also argues that the affidavits refer to documents attached as exhibits that have not been authenticated, use "we" in a way that Plaintiff finds confusing and interprets to mean that an affiant lacks personal knowledge, and include conclusory statements or legal conclusions. These objections are puzzling at best. For example, some statements that Plaintiff contends lack foundation concern the affiants' job responsibilities, a matter about which they do have personal knowledge. Her authenticity challenge to the messages attached as exhibits to the affidavits has no more traction; the affiants were either the senders or recipients of the messages, enabling them to authenticate the messages. Beyond that, Plaintiff herself authenticated them in her own deposition.1 See Fenje v. Feld, 301 F. Supp. 2d 781, 789 (N.D. Ill. 2003) () Plaintiff also objects to these messages on hearsay grounds, but many (particularly, for example, the messages Plaintiff exchanged with College administrators in February 2017) are statements that Plaintiff alleges reflect adverse actionagainst her and therefore have a non-hearsay purpose. In fact, it is unclear how Plaintiff expects to prove her case if such communications are inadmissible. Finally, at least two of Plaintiff's objections are plainly frivolous: a reference in Carol Fawcett's declaration to "Tinley, Illinois" as opposed to "Tinley Park, Illinois" and a misspelled name in Rachel Kreft's declaration ("Fleming" rather than "Flemings") were obviously non-substantive typographical errors. Plaintiff's objections to them does nothing to "expedite the work of the court."
Tellingly, Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's Rule 56.1 statement [44] relies on these objections (and nothing more) with respect to many of Defendant's statements of material fact. (See Pl.'s Objs. & Resp. to Def.'s Statement of Material Facts [61] ¶¶ 20, 22, 24-27, 34, 36, 42.) To rebut such statements effectively, Plaintiff must do more, specifically "including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting material relied upon" when responding to an opponent's factual statements. Local Rule 56.1(b)(3); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(3) (). The court is not required here to "provide a detailed analysis of why each paragraph or statement is or is not improper legal opinion, or conclusory, or based on hearsay." RLJCS Enters., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 907. Many of the statements to which Plaintiff has objected are not material to the court's ruling or are supported by other evidence—including Plaintiff's own deposition. Defendant also submitted an additional affidavit, to which Plaintiff has not objected, that covers similar ground.2 Any specific objections will be discussed below where relevant.
Plaintiff Rebecca Stanford was a student of Defendant Fox College, Inc., an Illinois corporation that offers courses in different business and healthcare fields. (Def.'s Statement ofMaterial Facts [44] ¶¶ 1, 2, 5.) Plaintiff enrolled in Defendant's Physical Therapy Assistance ("PTA") program in August 2015. (Id. ¶ 6.) The PTA program at Fox College comprises eight terms of eight weeks each. (Id. ¶ 9.) Two of those terms—one at the program's midpoint and one at the very end—are clinical courses (id.) in which students are placed at a clinic or other medical facility where they practice working with patients under the supervision and instruction of a clinical instructor (Pl.'s Dep. at 16:6-17:21). During their clinical placement, students are required to work five days or forty hours per week. (Id. at 16:22-24.) The PTA program handbook, which Plaintiff received and signed, warns students that working as a PTA requires, among other capabilities, "the ability to safely bend, twist, and lift" patients; "coordination, balance and strength"; and "the agility to move quickly to ensure patient safety." (Fox Coll. Physical Therapist Assistant Program Student Handbook, Ex. A to Decl. of Rachel Kreft, Ex. 4 to Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Summ. J., [44-4] at 14.)3
Plaintiff completed her first clinical placement at Manor Care, an inpatient skilled nursing facility. (Pl.'s Dep. at 12:23-13:8.) Her final clinical class was scheduled to take place in January and February of 2017. (Id. at 15:7-10.) In September 2016, Plaintiff informed Carol Fawcett, the director of the PTA program, and Monique Flemings, the director of clinical education for the PTA program, that she was pregnant and that her due date (February 7, 2017) fell during this final clinical placement. (Id. at 14:2-14.) She wanted to make sure that her pregnancy would not cause any issues with her ability to finish the program. (Id. at 14:16-18.) Plaintiff intended to begin her clinical work for a few weeks in January, and then, after childbirth and recovery, complete the remaining hours of clinical work she needed. (Id. at 15:17, 18:5-21.) Plaintifftestified that her pregnancy would not have prevented her from completing such a schedule at a clinic.4 (Id. at 32:22-33:13.)
Defendant initially informed Plaintiff in November 2016 that she would be placed at a facility in Tinley Park, Illinois for her second clinical course. (Pl.'s Dep. at 19:19-20:16.) Flemings and Fawcett were both aware of Plaintiff's pregnancy when they assigned her to the Tinley Park location (Def.'s Statement of Material Facts [44] ¶ 23), and Plaintiff herself had no concerns about that placement. (Pl.'s Dep. at 20:5-7.) Unfortunately, however, the Tinley Park facility cancelled her placement for her clinical course. (Decl. of Carol Fawcett, Ex. 3 to Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Summ. J., [43-3] ¶ 4 ().) Both Fawcett and Flemings stated in their declarations that they do not recall why it cancelled. (Id.; Decl. of Monique Flemings ¶ 3.) Such cancellations are not unusual, according to Flemings, because the clinics are not paid by Defendant or otherwise obligated to accept any students. (Decl. of Monique Flemings ¶ 3.) Plaintiff, however, testified at her deposition that she was given two different reasons for the cancellation. (Pl.'s Dep. at 21:8-12.) Although she could not recall the order in which she received the two explanations, it appears that she was initially told that the placement had been cancelled because the clinic was not going to be available for the January term.5 (Id. at 21:9-10; see Engrade Message from Rebecca Stanford to Monique Flemings (Nov. 16, 2016, 4:15 P.M.),Ex. 2 to Def.'s Statement of Material Facts, [44-2] at RS25.)6 Plaintiff testified that Flemings subsequently told her that the Tinley Park facility cancelled because they could not accommodate her pregnancy (Pl.'s Dep. at 21:10-12), though Defendant appears to dispute this (see Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Concise Statement of Material Facts [63] ¶ 6). The record shows that Flemings advised Plaintiff that Defendant had to "negotiate[ ]" with sites "due to your pregnancy" and that it had to disclose her pregnancy to any clinic because "[t]he site must...
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