Stanford v. United States

• Decision Date: 31 May 2013
• Docket Number: Civil No. 12–93–ART.
• Citation: 948 F.Supp.2d 729
• Parties: Matthew STANFORD, Plaintiff, and Kentucky Association of Counties Workers' Compensation Fund, Intervenor Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant and Intervenor Defendant. United States of America, Third–Party Plaintiff, v. United States Army Cadet Corps, Inc., et al., Third–Party Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

948 F.Supp.2d 729

Matthew STANFORD, Plaintiff,

and

Kentucky Association of Counties Workers' Compensation Fund, Intervenor Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES of America, Defendant and Intervenor Defendant.

United States of America, Third–Party Plaintiff,

v.United States Army Cadet Corps, Inc., et al., Third–Party Defendants.

Civil No. 12–93–ART.

United States District Court,

E.D. Kentucky,

Southern Division,

London.

May 31, 2013.

Christopher P. Evensen, Evensen Law Office, William J. Driscoll, Driscoll & Associates, P.S.C., Louisville, KY, for Plaintiff.

Scott M.B. Brown, Fogle, Keller, Purdy, PLLC, Tighe Alexander Estes, Ferreri & Fogle, Lexington, KY, for Intervenor Plaintiff.

Anna R. Gwinn, Callie R. Owen, U.S. Attorney's Office, Lexington, KY, for Third–Party Plaintiff, Defendant, Intervenor Defendant.

Erwin Roberts, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Louisville, KY, Darrell L. Saunders, Darrell L. Saunders, PSC, Corbin, KY, John G. Irvin, Jr., Robert Coleman Stilz, III, Shelby C. Kinkead, Jr., Kinkead & Stilz, PLLC, Lexington, KY, Benjamin Adam Long, Attorney General's Office, Frankfort, KY, for Third–Party Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMUL R. THAPAR, District Judge.

The Bluegrass Area Development District (“BADD”) is one of fifteen area development districts in the state of Kentucky. Area development districts are inter-county bodies, created by state law, that work with the local governments in their respective regions on a broad range of policy goals. BADD has filed a motion asserting sovereign immunity under Kentucky law and moving for summary judgment on the third-party complaint and crossclaims brought against it. In the alternative, BADD argues for a judgment on the pleadings because neither the third-party complaint nor the crossclaims assert cognizable indemnity or apportionment claims against BADD.

The Court will deny the motion in part and grant it in part. BADD's motion for summary judgment on state sovereign immunity grounds fails because BADD does not perform a function integral to state government. But BADD's alternative argument has some merit. Both the United States and the crossclaimants fail to allege the kind of facts necessary to make out an indemnity claim under Kentucky law. But the United States and the crossclaimants do bring claims for contribution, which is a separate cause of action in Kentucky and also supports their claims for apportionment. The Court will therefore grant judgment for BADD on the indemnity claims, but not the apportionment claims.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a terrible accident at the Harold L. Disney Training Center (“Training Center”), a federal military training ground in Knox County, Kentucky. R. 1 at 2 ¶¶ 10–11. Matthew Stanford, the plaintiff in this case, visited the training center as part of his summer job working as an instructor for the U.S. Army Cadet Corps, Inc. (“Cadet Corps”). Id. at 3 ¶¶ 13–18. The Cadet Corps is a private corporation with no official ties to the military. R. 23 at 7, 9 ¶¶ 22, 30–32. Stanford worked as an instructor in the summer program, leading youths between ages twelve and eighteen through training exercises and other activities. R. 1 at 3 ¶¶ 15–16. As part of the summer program, the Cadet Corps visited the Training Center for three days. Id. at 3 ¶ 17. On the final day of the visit, July 23, 2009, Stanford and other instructors led a group of youths through the Training Center's obstacle course. Id. at 4 ¶ 23. The fifteenth obstacle required participants to slide down a long zip line, suspended eighteen feet above the ground with no safety net. Id. at 4 ¶¶ 27–30. Unbeknownst to Stanford, the zip line was not ready for use. Id. at 5 ¶ 42. While several youths successfully completed the zip line before Stanford, he did not. Id. at 4 ¶¶ 32–34. Stanford fell to the rocky ground below,¹ fracturing his hip and his cervical spine. Id. at 4 ¶¶ 29, 34–35. Stanford is now a quadriplegic and requires daily nursing assistance to get out of bed, bathe, dress, and use the bathroom. Id. at 4–5.

Stanford sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. R. 1; R. 3.² He claims that the United States failed to warn him that the zip line was not ready for use, either by marking the zip line as “Out of Order” or telling the Cadet Corps instructors directly. R. 1 at 5–7 ¶¶ 39–57. Stanford also alleges that the United States failed to take reasonable steps to guard against an accident on the zip line, negligently designed the zip line, and breached their general duty of reasonably maintaining the premises of the Training Center. Id. at 8–9 ¶¶ 71–87. Finally, he claims that the United States' employees violated various safety standards in the Training Center's operating procedure and Army regulations. R. 81 at 2 ¶¶ 2–5.

The United States was quick to disavow any fault in Stanford's accident. See R. 11. It also sought to shift whatever blame there was onto Stanford's supervisors. The United States filed a third-party complaint seeking indemnity, apportionment, and contribution against several parties who were involved with Stanford's work as an instructor.³ R. 23 at 13–14 ¶ ¶ 51–52. First, it named the Cadet Corps and its director, Joseph Land. Id. at 2–3, 13–14, 10 ¶¶ 2–3, 49–52. Second, it named five members of the Cadet Corps involved in the visit to the Training Center: Jimmy Macon, William Nordan, Richard Wyland, Joseph Gorman, and David Parker. Id. at 3–4, 13–14 ¶¶ 4–8, 49–52. Finally, it named the Bluegrass Area Development District (“BADD”). Id. at 4, 13–14 ¶¶ 9, 49–52.

What role did BADD play in the accident? After Stanford volunteered to be a Cadet Corps instructor, he applied to BADD's “By Learning U Earn” Program (“BLUE Program”). See R. 23 at 8 ¶ 24; R. 70–1 at 3. The BLUE Program is a summer job program that provides “work experience for low-income and disadvantaged individuals ages sixteen through twenty-four.” Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Stanford, 399 S.W.3d 26, 29–29 (Ky. Mar. 21, 2013); see also R. 23 at 8 ¶ 24 (alleging same).⁴ The BLUE Program pays participants minimum wage for thirty hours of work per week at participating employers, dubbed BLUE worksites. See Stanford, 399 S.W.3d at 28–29. The Cadet Corps had successfully applied to be a BLUE worksite. See Stanford, 399 S.W.3d at 28–29;see also R. 23 at ¶ 24 (same). However, the Cadet Corps' application indicated that BLUE program participants like Stanford would perform relatively innocuous duties such as cleaning and ground maintenance, clerical work, food preparation, and community relation activities. See R. 23 at 8 ¶ 24; R. 70–1 at 3. There was no mention of leading field trips, conducting training exercises, or participating in any potentially dangerous activities. See R. 23 at 8 ¶ 24; R. 70–1 at 3.

Shortly after the United States filed its third-party complaint, the third-party defendants responded. The Cadet Corps and two of its members (collectively “Crossclaimants”) filed counterclaims against the United States and crossclaims against BADD. See R. 43 (Cadet Corps); R. 44 (Land); R. 45 (Gorman).⁵ Similarly, BADD filed counterclaims against the United States and crossclaims against the Cadet Corps and its six individual members named in the third-party complaint. See R. 35.

BADD now moves for judgment on those claims against it on state-law sovereign immunity grounds. R. 70 at 4–10. In the alternative, BADD argues that the United States and the Crossclaimants fail to state a valid claim for indemnity or apportionment. Id. at 11–15.

DISCUSSION

I. BADD's Motion for Summary Judgment Based on State Sovereign Immunity

Since the original action was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), BADD's motion turns on state law and Kentucky's doctrine of sovereign immunity. Under that doctrine, BADD is totally immune from suit if it performs a function that is integral to state government. But BADD cannot establish two necessary prerequisites for sovereign immunity: (1) that the balance of BADD's activities serve state-level government interests; and (2) that BADD is integral to state government functions. The motion will therefore be denied.

A. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Since BADD brought the motion, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the United States and the Crossclaimants, drawing all justifiable inferences in their favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). That presumption does not mean, however, that the United States and the Crossclaimants have no burden. To survive summary judgment, they must identify sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for them on their claims. Id. The Court assesses the legal sufficiency of the evidence, not its credibility or weight. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (collecting cases applying Rule 56(c) and Rule 50).

B. The FTCA and State Sovereign Immunity

Stanford sued the United States under the FTCA, so his claims are analyzed under Kentucky law. See R. 3. Under the FTCA, individuals may sue the United States in federal district court for negligent or wrongful acts or omissions. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA simply applies the state law of the jurisdiction. Id.; see also Premo v. United States, 599 F.3d 540, 545 (6th Cir.2010) (“First the district court applies local law to determine liability and to assess damages.” (quotation omitted)). In that way, the FTCA puts the United States in the position of a private person by allowing plaintiffs to bring the same state-law tort claims they would bring against a private defendant. Id. So Stanford's suit against the...