Stangle v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co.

Decision Date14 December 1961
Docket NumberNo. 13269.,13269.
Citation295 F.2d 789
PartiesEdna STANGLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

James A. Dooley, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

O. L. Houts, Joseph P. Carr, Chicago, Ill., Ware Adams, Chicago, Ill., of counsel, for appellee.

Before KNOCH and CASTLE, Circuit Judges, and MERCER, District Judge.

CASTLE, Circuit Judge.

This appeal involves a diversity action in which Edna Stangle, plaintiff-appellant, seeks to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been occasioned by negligence of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company, defendant-appellee. The action arises out of a collision between an automobile plaintiff was driving and a passenger train of the defendant. Defendant's answer denied negligence constituting proximate cause and asserted that plaintiff's injuries were caused or contributed to by plaintiff's own negligent and careless acts. The District Court, on defendant's motion, entered summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that a previous finding and adjudication in a state court action between the administrator of plaintiff's passenger, as plaintiff, and the instant plaintiff and defendant, as defendants, estops plaintiff from maintaining the present action. Plaintiff appealed.

Plaintiff's contention that the District Court erred is predicated on the assertion that estoppel may not be invoked because the parties were not adversaries in the prior state court proceeding and the issue of plaintiff's conduct not the subject of formal pleadings between them in which one sought relief against the other.

In the state court action Lillian Zank a guest-passenger in the automobile involved in the collision brought suit against Edna Stangle and the defendant railroad charging both with wilful and wanton conduct and the railroad with ordinary negligence. Each defendant denied the respective allegations and the railroad asserted that its co-defendant Edna Stangle was guilty of wilful and wanton conduct which was the proximate cause of the collision. During pendency of the proceeding Lillian Zank died and her administrator filed an amended complaint and the suit proceeded to judgment against both defendants.

In the state court action the following special interrogatory was submitted to the jury by Edna Stangle:

"Was the defendant, Edna Stangle, guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct, as defined in these instructions, in the operation of her automobile at the time of or just before the occurrence of January 3, 1952? Answer `Yes\' or `No\'."

The jury returned an answer of "Yes" to the interrogatory. The finding was sustained on appeal and a general judgment against both defendants, entered on the jury's verdict, affirmed. Zank v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R. R. Co., 19 Ill.App.2d 278, 153 N.E.2d 482; 17 Ill. 2d 473, 161 N.E.2d 848 and 26 Ill.App.2d 389, 168 N.E.2d 472.

This is a diversity action and Illinois law governs. To support her contentions plaintiff relies upon cases from other jurisdictions. Whatever the rule may be elsewhere, in Illinois parties need not be arrayed on opposite sides in the prior litigation nor formal issues there drawn between them by cross pleadings for collateral estoppel to apply. In Rose v. Dolejs, 7 Ill.App.2d 267, 275, 129 N.E.2d 281, 285 the Illinois doctrine was stated as follows:

"When some specific fact or question has been actually and directly in issue and has been adjudicated and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a former suit, and the same fact or question is again put in issue in a subsequent suit between parties or their privities who were parties in
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13 cases
  • Creighton v. Ruark, 83
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • December 6, 1962
    ...and 101 A.L.R. 104. In fact, the only jurisdiction holding to the contrary would appear to be Illinois. See Stangle v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 295 F.2d 789 (C.A. 7th) (applying Illinois law). The Pennsylvania law is not to the contrary. See Greer v. Stanislau, 118 F.Supp. 494 (E.D.Pa......
  • Wilson v. City of Chicago
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • February 24, 1989
    ...but the cases which Wilson cites all are in keeping with this court's reading of Illinois law. See Stangle v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co., 295 F.2d 789 (7th Cir.1961) (court prevented co-defendant in prior proceeding from raising issue found against other defendant in that......
  • Smith v. Wood, 42603
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 17, 1967
    ...(2d Cir.), cert. den. 340 U.S. 932, 71 S.Ct. 495, 95 L.Ed. 673; Moran v. Lehman, 7 Misc.2d 994, 157 N.Y.S.2d 684; Stangle v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. Co., 295 F.2d 789 (7th Cir.); Little v. Blue Goose Motor Coach Co., 346 Ill. 266, 178 N.E. 496; Franciscy v. Jordan, 43 Ill.App.2d 344, 193 N.E......
  • Factor v. Pennington Press, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • December 30, 1963
    ...v. Harrison, 26 Ill.App.2d 9, 167 N.E.2d 428 (1960); McVeigh v. McGurren, 117 F.2d 672 (7 Cir. 1940); Stangle v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R. R. Co., 295 F.2d 789 (7 Cir. 1961); Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n., 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Gammel v. Ernst & Ern......
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