Stanislaus v. Parmalee Industries, Inc.
Decision Date | 24 March 1987 |
Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
Citation | 729 S.W.2d 543 |
Parties | Marlin A. STANISLAUS, Appellant, v. PARMALEE INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., Respondents. 38569. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
William D. Adkins and Steven L. Hobson of counsel, Liberty, for appellant.
Lyman Field, of counsel; Field, Gentry, Benjamin and Robertson, Kansas City, for respondents.
Before PRITCHARD, P.J., and MANFORD and BERREY, JJ.
Appellant was working on the assembly line for Allis-Chalmers Corporation when, on June 27, 1979, a flying object struck his safety glasses, which shattered, and a shard lodged in his left eye, causing injury and permanent vision impairment. The original suit for negligence by appellant included Allis-Chalmers, but the trial court sustained a motion for summary judgment for it upon the ground that appellant's exclusive remedy was under Chapter 287, RSMo 1978, the Workers' Compensation Act. That judgment was not appealed.
Then appellant filed his first amended petition against Parmalee Industries, Inc., the manufacturer of his safety glasses, and its chief engineer; U.S. Safety Services Company, the seller of the glasses; and Leo J. Rush, Allis-Chalmers' Safety Service Manager and also appellant's co-employee. Settlement was effected by all defendants except Rush. He filed a verified motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, which was sustained by the trial court.
Appellant's amended petition first makes "Allegations Common to All Counts", and as relevant to Rush: 3. Defendant LEO RUSH, at all relevant times herein, was an individual residing in Blue Springs, Jackson County, Missouri and was employed as Safety Service Manager by the plaintiff's employer, Allis Chalmers Corp. and was in control of furnishing and procuring safety glasses for plaintiff and co-employees for their use while working on the Allis Chalmers Corp. assembly line. * * * 6. * * * While working on the Allis Chalmers Corp. assembly line, the left safety glass lense worn by plaintiff, as aforementioned, was struck by an object which caused the safety glass to shatter sending sharp fragments of glass into plaintiff's left eye, causing severe and permanent injury and blindness, as hereinafter more fully set forth. The breakage was caused and permitted by flaws and inadequacies in the glasses."
Specific allegations as to Rush are set out in Count IV:
The question here is whether the pleadings allege any negligent act of misfeasance, i.e., an affirmative act above and beyond mere nonfeasance, i.e., a failure to act, of Rush arising out of his duties and obligations owed by him as Safety Service Manager to his employer, Allis-Chalmers.
In the prohibition case of State ex rel. Badami and Lang v. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d 175 (Mo.App.1982), the question was first considered in this state. In the underlying case there, Lott sought to sue the corporate president and the production manager of Lott's employer, Mid-America Fiber Company, for injuries to his hand when it was drawn into a shredding machine. It was alleged that Mid-America had delegated to each defendant the duty to provide fellow employees with a reasonably safe place to work, and that each of the defendants were thereby responsible for the detection, correction and prevention of work practices and working conditions which would render the plant not reasonably safe for workmen. It was also alleged that defendants knew or could have known of the danger of the shredding machine and the absence of adequate safety devices thereon. The Badami court traced the history of the development of the "misfeasance-nonfeasance" concepts of co-employee negligence, and noted the holding in Sylcox v. National Lead Co., 225 Mo.App. 543, 38 S.W.2d 497 (1931), recognizing the liability of a co-employee to a fellow employee as a "third person" under the workmen's compensation law; that at common law one servant is liable to another for his own misfeasance, there being nothing in the Compensation Act which disturbs that common law relationship--an employee becomes liable to a fellow employee when he breaches a common law duty owed to the fellow employee independent of any master-servant or agent-principal relation. The court reviewed cases from other states rejecting those which hold that the immunity granted to the employer under the workmen's compensation law also applies to employees whose negligence caused the injury regardless of the nature of that negligence. At page 179, the court cited the Wisconsin decisions which hold that a corporate officer or supervisory employee performs in a dual capacity, having ...
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...at 177 (observing that at common law, nonfeasance results in agent's liability only to his principal); Stanislaus v. Parmalee Indus., Inc., 729 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Mo.App. W.D.1987) (holding duties alleged in petition were “all acts of omission of duties owed” by co-employee to his employer). ......
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