Stanislawski v. Upper River Services, Inc., 92-2802

• Decision Date: 01 October 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-2802,92-2802
• Parties: Peter STANISLAWSKI, Appellant, v. UPPER RIVER SERVICES, INC., a Minnesota Corporation, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 537

6 F.3d 537

1994 A.M.C. 2111

Peter STANISLAWSKI, Appellant, v. UPPER RIVER SERVICES, INC., a Minnesota Corporation, Appellee.

No. 92-2802.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted May 11, 1993.

Decided Oct. 1, 1993.

Karl L. Cambronne, Sandra J. McGoldrick-Kendall, Chestnut & Brooks, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

Kerry M. Evensen, Minneapolis, MN, for appellee.

Before BEAM, LOKEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Peter Stanislawski won a jury verdict and judgment from Upper River Services, Inc. (Upper River) under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 688, to compensate him for job-related injuries. The district court later amended the judgment to account for certain payments Upper River made to Stanislawski prior to trial. Stanislawski appeals the reduction of his recovery. We find that the district court did not properly calculate Stanislawski's damages under the peculiar rules of the Jones Act. Therefore, we reverse and remand for reentry of judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Stanislawski brought this action under the Jones Act seeking $626,000 in damages for injuries he sustained while working on a barge operated by Upper River. ¹ The jury returned a general verdict for Stanislawski and awarded damages of $200,000. Pursuant to a special interrogatory, the jury also determined that Stanislawski was seventy-five percent responsible for his own injuries, and that Upper River was only twenty-five percent responsible. Accordingly, the district court reduced the jury's verdict by seventy-five percent and entered judgment in the amount of $50,000.

Upper River moved to reduce the judgment to avoid duplicating $21,811.06 in payments it had already made to Stanislawski as a result of his injuries. Upper River claimed that it had already paid $13,131.06 to cover Stanislawski's medical expenses and $8,680 in wage compensation.

Stanislawski opposed Upper River's motion. He argued that Upper River's previous payments constituted "maintenance and cure" under admiralty law and that "maintenance" was not included in the court's judgment. ² Stanislawski conceded that he erroneously asked the jury for $13,000 in past medical expenses that Upper River had previously paid as "cure," but he claimed that the $8,680 Upper River designated as wage compensation was actually "maintenance," and therefore was not included in the court's judgment. Furthermore, Stanislawski suggested that the court should make any reduction in the jury's verdict from the gross award of $200,000, instead of from the net award of $50,000. Under Stanislawski's formula, assuming that Upper River was entitled to credit for the full amount it requested, the amended judgment would be $44,547.24 ($200,000 - $21,811.06 = $178,188.94 X .25 = $44.547.24).

The district court granted Upper River's motion to reduce the $50,000 judgment by $21,811.06 and entered an amended judgment in favor of Stanislawski for $28,188.94. ³ The court rejected Stanislawski's suggestion that any reduction in the amount of the judgment should be made from the gross jury award, reasoning that "[a]dding [Stanislawski's] proposed amended judgment of $44,547.24 to the $21,811.06 [which Upper River] has already paid would produce damages of $76,358.30 [sic], or 38 percent of $200,000." ⁴ Thus, Upper River would not be credited for the full seventy-five percent of fault the jury attributed to Stanislawski. According to the district court, in order to avoid double recovery by Stanislawski, Upper River's total payments must equal $50,000, which is twenty-five percent of the jury's verdict.

On appeal, Stanislawski argues that the district court erred in offsetting the medical expense payments from his net award instead of from his gross award. Stanislawski also contends that the district court should not have offset Upper River's "wage compensation" payments, since those payments were actually "maintenance" and were not duplicated in his Jones Act recovery.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Supplemental Wage Compensation

The district court found that $8,680 of the payments Upper River made to Stanislawski were "supplemental benefits" which duplicated Stanislawski's request to the jury for past wage loss. Stanislawski v. Upper River Services, Inc., CIV. 3-90-161, Order at 2 (D.Minn. July 10, 1992). Accordingly, the court concluded that this portion of the payments was duplicated in the jury's verdict which presumably included some amount of past wage loss. Stanislawski challenges the court's finding and claims that these payments constituted "maintenance" under admiralty law. Since Stanislawski did not ask the jury for "maintenance," he argues that the district court erred in reducing the judgment by the amount of these payments. ⁵

We review the district court's factual findings for clear error and will not reverse the district court's account of the evidence if it is plausible in light of the record in its entirety. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) ("[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous").

The duty of a shipowner to pay "maintenance and cure" under admiralty law is not related to any finding of damages under the Jones Act. "Maintenance and cure" is a separate duty, arising from the contract of employment. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527, 58 S.Ct. 651, 652, 82 L.Ed. 993 (1938). It does not depend upon the negligence or culpability of the owner, and is not even restricted to those cases where the seaman's employment is the cause of the injury or illness. Id. Thus, a seaman is entitled to "maintenance and cure" payments in addition to any damages for negligence he or she might win under the Jones Act.

For some months after Stanislawski was injured and before trial, Upper River sent him checks which totalled $13,840. Affidavit of Kerry M. Evensen, Joint Appendix at A-21. Upper River alleges that these checks represent payments of $55 per day: $20 for maintenance and $35 in voluntary supplemental wage compensation. Upper River concedes that the $20 maintenance payments were not duplicated by the jury verdict, but contends that the $35 supplemental wage payments, which totalled $8,680, should be deducted from the judgment because Stanislawski included past wage loss in his request for damages.

Stanislawski argues that the entire $55 per day constituted maintenance and was not duplicated by the jury verdict. He points out that some of the checks in question, which he submitted to the district court, are designated either "Maint & Cure" or "Maintenance." He admits, however, having received a letter from Upper River's personnel administrator explaining that the checks represented $20 per day of maintenance and $35 per day of supplemental payments. Stanislawski's Brief at 9-10. The record also contains the affidavit of an Upper River attorney who explained that the "supplemental payments ... were made as a voluntary supplemental payment to Mr. Stanislawski's wage loss." Upper River's Addendum at 2.

We cannot say that the district court clearly erred by crediting Upper River's affidavit and the letter received by Stanislawski over the inferences Stanislawski attempts to draw from notations on the checks. Accordingly, we will not disturb the court's conclusion that $8,680 of the original judgment constituted double payment.

B. Double Recovery Formula

Although we agree with the district court that Stanislawski's right to "maintenance and cure" does not entitle him to double recovery, we find that the district court's formula for reducing the judgment takes away more than the amount of the double payment. Stanislawski created the confusion in the district court by mixing his request for previously paid medical expenses or "cure," a contract claim, with his request for damages on the Jones Act tort claims. In his closing argument, Stanislawski asked the jury for $626,000 in damages, including $13,000 Upper River had previously paid for "cure." ⁶ In effect, he asked the jury to award him $613,000 in tort damages, and $13,000...