Stanley, In re, Cr. 8360
| Decision Date | 29 January 1976 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 8360,8427 |
| Citation | 54 Cal.App.3d 1030,128 Cal.Rptr. 829 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re Robert E. STANLEY, on Habeas Corpus. In re Sammy James REED, on Habeas Corpus. |
As counsel for the Adult Authority, the Attorney General has filed a petition for rehearing contending that our opinion of January 8, 1976, failed to recognize a section of the Chairman's April 1975 directive which, according to the Attorney General, is 'designed to recognize conduct in prison and each individual's potential for reform.'
This court by no means ignored the provision in question. In our opinion we referred to Adult Authority Policy Statement #1, which permitted parole advancement in 'exceptional and unusual cases.' 1 It seemed to us then, that the Adult Authority's policy statement had the same general objective as the provision allegedly ignored. The latter provision declares that after an initial parole date has been set, it 'may be subsequently reviewed if the inmate wishes;' that the review hearing will take place after lapse of two-thirds of the period between sentence-fixing and the initial parole date; that 'it is the responsibility of the inmate to demonstrate unusual rehabilitation.' The provision goes on to declare: 'Any inmate who participates to an unusual degree in rehabilitative programs and can demonstrate his rehabilitation will have the opportunity to do so at this review hearing.'
The Attorney General's argument would stretch a narrow provision beyond its apparent scope. The provision does not inject a routine or required standard into the Adult Authority's parole-fixing decisions. It expressly designates the procedure as a review. It takes place after the lapse of what may be many months. It places upon the inmate the burden of demonstrating Unusual rehabilitation. It falls far short of recognizing in prison behavior and progress toward law-abiding conduct as routine, mandatory criteria.
It is quite apparent that the Adult Authority finds itself in a dichotomous position. According to the Supreme Court, the Authority is obliged to act promptly in fixing sentences of prisoners committed for an indeterminate sentence. (In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 122 Cal.Rptr. 552, 537 P.2d 384, 654, fn. 18.) Conceivably, parole setting calls for comparable promptness. Comparable promptness, on the other hand, is difficult when the Adult Authority is required to include in-prison conduct and observation among the predictive factors. The Supreme Court has made it clear that parole consideration must be guided in large measure on post-conviction history. (Id. 14 Cal.3d at p. 652, 122 Cal.Rptr. 552, 537 P.2d 384.) As the Attorney General puts it: '. . . it is not clear whether it is permissible to adopt any system which would allow an early but tentative decision on parole release.'
The constitutional considerations which impel promptness in sentence-fixing are not present in parole setting. (See In re Rodriguez, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 652--654, 122 Cal.Rptr. 552, 537 P.2d 384.) Within the limitations imposed by statutory parole-eligibility dates, the time period between term commencement and parole hearing is primarily a matter of administrative choice. Readiness for parole varies from one prisoner to another. Among the decisions available to the Adult Authority when an inmate first appears before it are: (a) to fix his parole date, (b) to deny it, and (c) to defer parole setting until the Authority finds itself able to make a responsible, rational and realistic decision. Nothing in the Indeterminate Sentence Law demands a one-stage decisional process or prevents a two-stage procedure, the first stage based upon evaluation of the inmate early in his confinement, the second later in his confinement. The judicially discerned objectives of the...
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Fain, In re
...P.2d 200.) A good summary of the factors to be taken into account in making the parole determination appears in In re Stanley (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1030, 1037, 128 Cal.Rptr. 829: "Thus, early in the history of the parole system, the California Supreme Court emphasized the significance of acc......
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