Stanley v. Ayers

• Decision Date: 22 May 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 07-cv-04727-EMC
• Parties: DARREN CORNELIUS STANLEY, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT AYERS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

DARREN CORNELIUS STANLEY, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT AYERS, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 07-cv-04727-EMC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

May 22, 2017

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER RE EXHAUSTION; PROPOSITION 66 STAY; MOTION FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF; ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SURREPLY; MOTION FOR SANCTIONS; AND REQUEST FOR HEARING RE EXCUSING EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT

Docket Nos. 226, 228, 260, 262, 274

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Darren Cornelius Stanley filed a finalized Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on October 12, 2016. Docket No. 252. On December 12, 2016, Respondent Ron Davis filed a Joint Statement Regarding Exhaustion ("Joint Statement") and a Motion to Dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust all claims ("Motion to Dismiss"). Docket Nos. 259-60. The Joint Statement informed the Court that the parties agreed Claims 5, 6, 16, 17A, 17B, 17C, 17F, 17G, and 17H were exhausted but disagreed as to the exhaustion status of all other claims. Docket No. 259 at 2-3.

On January 17, 2017, Petitioner filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. Docket No. 261. Petitioner requested a stay until California's Proposition 66 is certified and no longer stayed by the California Supreme Court, renewed his Motions for Equitable Relief and for Sanctions (Docket Nos. 226, 228), and requested that the Court grant a hearing on excusing the exhaustion requirement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) & (b)(1)(B) ("section 2254"). Docket No. 261. Briefing on the various motions ensued. See Docket Nos. 263, 266, 267, and 269. A hearing was held on March 9, 2017. Petitioner subsequently filed an Administrative Motion for leave to file a surreply ("Administrative Motion") in relation to his Motion for Sanctions. See Docket No. 274. Respondent filed an opposition. See Docket No. 275.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Claims 1, 2, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 19 are fully unexhausted and Claims 3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 15, 17 (including 17D and 17E), 18, and 20 are partially unexhausted. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Respondent may renew the motion for the Court's consideration following the filing of Petitioner's motion to dismiss unexhausted claims or request for a stay pursuant to Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). Petitioner's Administrative Motion for leave to file a surreply related to his Motion for Sanctions is GRANTED. Petitioner's request for a stay until Proposition 66 is certified and no longer stayed, request for a hearing on excusing the exhaustion requirement, and Motion for Equitable Relief (Docket No. 226) are DENIED. Petitioner's Motion for Sanctions (Docket No. 228) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

II. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was sentenced to death by the Superior Court of California in the County of Alameda in 1991. The California Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's convictions and death judgment on direct appeal in 2006, People v. Stanley, 39 Cal. 4th 913 (2006), and summarily denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2009, In re Stanley on Habeas Corpus, S106165. While his state habeas case was still being litigated, Petitioner initiated the present habeas action by asking the Court to appoint counsel and to stay his execution on September 13, 2007. Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a protective petition on July 8, 2010.

On November 28, 2011, the Court issued a stay of this matter in order to examine issues related to Petitioner's competency under Rohan v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 817 (9th Cir. 2003). Docket No. 39. On July 16, 2013, the stay was partially lifted in order to examine issues related to Petitioner's competency under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and to refer the case forsettlement. Docket No. 106. After disposing of three previous motions¹ for equitable tolling, on March 10, 2016, the Court lifted its stay and granted Petitioner's fourth Motion for Equitable Tolling. Docket No. 214.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

1. Exhaustion

A federal court may not grant habeas relief until the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies with respect to each claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971). The exhaustion doctrine rests on principles of comity and federalism. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982). Exhaustion is required to: (1) protect the state court's role in the enforcement of federal law; (2) prevent disruption of state court proceedings; and (3) reduce piecemeal litigation. Id. at 518-20.

A federal constitutional claim is exhausted when it has been "fairly presented" to the highest state court and that court has had a meaningful opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts underlying the claim. Picard, 404 U.S. at 276-77; Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 (1982); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). A claim has been "fairly presented" if the petitioner described in state court both the legal theories and the operative facts on which he bases the claim. Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78.

To fairly present the legal theory of a claim, a petitioner must alert the state court that he is asserting a federal constitutional claim, either by citing the constitutional provision on which he relies or otherwise advising the court of the claim's federal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (petitioner failed to fairly present Fourteenth Amendment due process claim when he alleged only that prejudice outweighed probative value of admitted evidence); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner did not fairly present Fourteenth Amendment due process claim by asserting that admission of prior act evidence "infringed on his right topresent a defense and receive a fair trial"); Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78 (petitioner must present state courts with same claim he urges upon the federal courts); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004) (petitioner did not fairly present ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim when he did not explicitly include those words, cite the relevant federal constitutional provisions, or otherwise cite to cases showing he was making a federal claim); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1002 (9th Cir. 2004) (petitioner did not give state appellate court fair opportunity to rule on federal due process claim by concluding his brief with "scattershot citation of federal constitutional provisions" with no articulated federal legal theory).

The factual basis of a claim has been fairly presented as long as the facts subsequently alleged in federal court do not fundamentally alter the nature of the claim presented to the state court, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986); Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d 1459, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994)), place the claim in a "significantly different and stronger evidentiary posture" than it was when the state courts considered it, or "substantially improve[] the evidentiary basis" of the claim. Aiken v. Spalding, 841 F.2d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 1988).

Generally, a petitioner may add factual materials supportive of those already in the record without fundamentally altering his claim and rendering it unexhausted. See Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 260 (statistical analyses of facts already in record do not render claim unexhausted); see also Chacon, 36 F.3d at 1468 (factual basis of claim that interpreter mistranslated guilty plea proceedings was fairly presented where the state court understood accuracy of translation to be at issue). However, where the new facts substantially improve the claim by contradicting evidence the state court already considered, the new factual materials must be presented to the state court. See Aiken, 841 F.2d at 883-84 & n.3 (new evidence consisting of decibel level studies of tape of petitioner's confession, which conflicted with evidence state court had considered, substantially improved evidentiary posture of claim and required exhaustion); Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1317 (9th Cir. 2014) (new allegations regarding petitioner's fetal alcohol syndrome and organic brain damage in ineffective assistance of counsel claim substantially improved evidentiary posture of claim and require exhaustion).

Exhaustion may be excused where it would be futile. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1);Edelbacher v. Calderon, 160 F.3d 582, 585 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring "extremely unusual circumstances"); Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1981) (exhaustion requirement may be avoided by showing that it would be futile in light of prevailing decisions of highest state court). Section 2254 provides two ways around the exhaustion requirement: "an absence of available State corrective process" or when "circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

2. Analysis

As a threshold issue, Petitioner argues Respondent has the burden of proving nonexhaustion.² See Docket No. 161 at 3. Respondent disagrees, arguing Petitioner has the burden of showing exhaustion once Respondent raises the issue. Docket No. 263 at 1-2.

Although neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit have explicitly ruled on the issue, federal habeas rules, such as Local Rule 2254-28, suggest that Petitioner is responsible for showing his claims are exhausted. H.R.L.R. 2254-28(b)(4) (petitioner's finalized petition must identify where in the record each claim was exhausted). The circuits which have considered the issue have held a petitioner bears the burden of showing exhaustion after the state raises the issue in habeas corpus. Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir.1997), as amended (1998) (habeas petitioner carries burden of proving exhaustion of all available state remedies) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 919, 121 S.Ct. 1353 (2001); Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir.) (burden of proving that claim has been exhausted lies with petitioner) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 833 (1...