Stanley v. Commonwealth

• Citation: 6 S.W. 155,86 Ky. 440
• Parties: Stanley et al. v. Commonwealth.
• Decision Date: 17 December 1887
• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky

6 S.W. 155

86 Ky. 440

Stanley et al. v. Commonwealth.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

December 17, 1887

Appeal from circuit court, Christian county.

John Feland & Son, R. W. Henry, and D. L Johnson, for appellants.

P W. Hardin, for appellee.

HOLT J.

The appellants, Renzy and Harmon Stanley, seek to excuse the killing of Rufus Ebling upon the ground that it was done by them to save the life of William Stanley, who is the brother of the one, and the uncle of the other. It is a general rule that whatever a person may lawfully do in his own defense another may do for him. Mr. Bishop, in speaking of the right to assist others in defense of person and property, says: "The doctrine here is that whatever one may do for himself he may do for another; *** and, on the whole, though distinctions have been taken and doubts expressed, the better view plainly is that one may do for another whatever the other may do for himself." 1 Bish. Crim. Law, § 877. Another writer uses this language: "A well-grounded belief that felony is about to be committed will extenuate homicide committed in prevention, but not in pursuit, by a volunteer. *** A bona fide belief that a felony is in process of commission, which can only be arrested by the death of the supposed felon, makes the killing excusable; but the belief must be honestly entertained, and without negligence, and, if non-negligent, it will excuse the homicide. *** A person has a right to repel a felony threatened to be perpetrated either on himself or others. *** The intentional infliction of death is justifiable when it is inflicted by any person in order to defend himself or any other person from immediate and obvious danger of instant death or grievous bodily harm, if he, in good faith, and on reasonable grounds, believes it to be necessary when he inflicts it. *** Self-defense will justify a person in defending those with whom he is associated, and in killing, if he believes life is in danger; and the right may be exercised by the servants and friends of the party assaulted, or any one present, in repelling an attempted felony." Desty, Crim. Law, §§ 125 d, 126, 126 a. The courts were slow to adopt this doctrine in its full extent, doubtless, for fear that it might be abused, and sometimes serve as a shelter to those who, under the plea of protecting the lives of others, merely executed their own guilty purposes. It was, however, declared by this court in the unpublished opinions in the cases of Roberts v. Com., (1876,) and Smith v. Same, (1877,) and is not open to this objection when properly applied.

The right of self-defense rests upon necessity; and apparent reasonable necessity is the whole law and reason of it. It was not derived from society. It is a natural right instinctive in the person. Man, when he came into society, brought it with him in all its freedom and proudest sense. It has been restricted by law in its exercise to cases of necessity, but cannot be denied. If it were possible, it should not be, because as now restricted it serves to protect right against wrong in emergencies where the law would not avail. It is the duty of a man who sees a felony attempted by violence to prevent it if possible. This is an active duty, and hence he has a legal right to use the means necessary to make the resistance effectual. If A. be unlawfully assaulted by B., and his life thereby endangered, he may, by reason of not being in fault, defend it, even to the extent of taking the life of the person who is in fault; and, as the right is a natural one, rules of law restricting it must, in order that it may still be effective, be adapted to...