Stanley v. Dist. Attorney for the 18th Judicial Dist.
| Decision Date | 09 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 16CA0588 |
| Citation | 395 P.3d 1198 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Douglas Roy STANLEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR the 18TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, State of Colorado, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Forrest W. Lewis, P.C., Forrest W. Lewis, Golden, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellant
George H. Brauchler, District Attorney, Richard H. Orman, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Centennial, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE LOEB
¶ 1 Petitioner, Douglas Roy Stanley, is a sex offender convicted in California of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor. He appeals the district court's denial of his petition to discontinue sex offender registration in Colorado based on California's decision to terminate his registration requirement in that state. We affirm the district court's order.
¶ 2 In 2001, Stanley pleaded no contest and was subsequently convicted and sentenced in California of a sexual offense under California Penal Code section 261.5(d) (West 2016), "Unlawful sexual intercourse with [a] person under 18." Stanley, then twenty-nine years old, had sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl.
¶ 3 Stanley successfully completed his California probation, and his conviction was eventually reduced to a misdemeanor.1
¶ 4 In November 2014, the California Department of Justice (DOJ) notified Stanley in a letter that his statutory requirement to register in California as a sex offender under California Penal Code section 290 (West 2016) had been terminated. The California DOJ did not give a reason for the termination of the registration requirement.
¶ 5 In January 2015, Stanley filed a pro se petition in the Arapahoe County District Court to discontinue sex offender registration in Colorado for a non-Colorado conviction under section 16-22-113, C.R.S. 2016.2 The petition filed by Stanley was a form document that tracked the language of section 16-22-113 by listing the various circumstances under which an offender can petition to discontinue registration. See JDF 473, Petition to Discontinue Sex Offender Registration Non-Colorado Conviction or Juvenile Adjudication or Disposition (revised Oct. 2013), https://perma.cc/Y5PA-T7UC. On the form, offenders are required to state that none of the statutory prohibitions regarding ineligibility as set forth in section 16-22-113(3) apply to them, and check the box next to their circumstances of conviction that would allow them to petition for removal from the registry. Id.
¶ 6 In his petition, Stanley checked the following as his conviction circumstances:
The offense for which I was required to register was a class 4, 5, or 6 felony or was a class 1 misdemeanor of unlawful sexual contact or third degree sexual assault and it has been 10 years since my final release from the jurisdiction of the Court or discharge from the Department of Corrections. I have not been subsequently convicted or adjudicated for any offense involving unlawful sexual behavior[.]
Stanley failed to check the box that affirmed "[t]he statutory prohibitions regarding ineligibility to file this Petition as set forth at § 16-22-113(3), C.R.S. do not apply to me."
¶ 7 On the same date the petition was filed, a Colorado attorney representing Stanley filed a supplement to the petition. The supplement stated that, although Stanley currently resided in California, he had family in Arapahoe and Jefferson Counties in Colorado, and he wanted to travel to and stay in Colorado for potentially prolonged periods of time, recognizing that travel would result in him being considered a temporary resident of Colorado for purposes of sex offender registration. The supplement also set forth additional facts regarding Stanley's rehabilitation and attached supporting documentation that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender in the State of California (the California DOJ letter). The supplement also conceded that Stanley's offense, if committed in Colorado, would be a violation of section 18-3-402, C.R.S. 2016, sexual assault, or section 18-3-404(1.5), C.R.S. 2016, unlawful sexual contact.3 The supplement to the petition did not correct Stanley's failure to affirm that none of the prohibitions in section 16-22-113(3) applied to his situation.
¶ 8 In a written order, the district court reviewed the plain language of the relevant sex offender registration statutes and denied Stanley's petition, concluding that, as a matter of law, he was ineligible for relief under section 16-22-113(3) because his crime, if committed in Colorado, would have been a violation of section 18-3-402 and consequently required lifetime sex offender registration.
¶ 9 Stanley now appeals, arguing that the district court erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of section 16-22-113(3).
¶ 10 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. E.g. , Curtiss v. People , 2014 COA 107, ¶ 6, –––P.3d ––––. "As with any statute, our primary task is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent by first examining the statute's plain language." Id. We must read and consider the statute as a whole in order to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. Id. However, a statutory interpretation leading to an illogical or absurd result will not be followed. Id.
¶ 11 To address Stanley's argument on appeal, we must analyze the statutes in California and Colorado regarding his conviction and the relevant portions of the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (CSORA), sections 16-22-101 to -115, C.R.S. 2016.
¶ 12 Stanley was convicted in California under penal code section 261.5(d), which provides: "Any person 21 years of age or older who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is under 16 years of age is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony...." Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(d).
¶ 13 In his petition for discontinuation of registration, Stanley conceded that, if committed in Colorado, his offense would have been a violation of section 18-3-402(1), subsection (1)(e), which provides as follows:
The offense described in subsection (1)(e) is a class 1 misdemeanor and is an extraordinary risk crime subject to the modified sentencing range in section 18-1.3-501(3), C.R.S. 2016. § 18-3-402(3). The General Assembly has found that a violation of section 18-3-402(1)(e)"present[s] an extraordinary risk of harm to society." § 18-1.3-501(3).
¶ 14 The purpose of sex offender registration is not to inflict additional punishment on a person convicted of a sexual offense, but rather to aid law enforcement officials in investigating future sex crimes and to protect the public safety. Curtiss , ¶ 8(citing People v. Brooks , 2012 COA 52, ¶ 9, 296 P.3d 216 ).
¶ 15 As of 1998, several classes of persons have been statutorily required to register as sex offenders pursuant to the provisions of section 16-22-108, C.R.S. 2016. § 16-22-103(1), C.R.S. 2016. Under section 16-22-103(2)(a), persons convicted after July 1, 1994, of "unlawful sexual behavior" are required to register as sex offenders. The definition of "unlawful sexual behavior" for purposes of registration includes sexual assault in violation of section 18-3-402. § 16-22-102(9)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2016.
§ 16-22-103(3). A "temporary resident" means a person who is a resident of another state but is in Colorado temporarily because the person is, as relevant to Stanley's situation, "[p]resent in Colorado for more than fourteen consecutive business days or for an aggregate period of more than thirty days in a calendar year for any purpose, including but not limited to vacation, travel, or retirement." § 16-22-102(8)(c).
¶ 17 CSORA also sets forth procedures and requirements for discontinuing an offender's duty to register in Colorado. Under certain circumstances, an offender with a non-Colorado conviction is expressly allowed to petition a Colorado court for an order to discontinue the requirement for registration in Colorado. § 16-22-113(1.5). The procedure for an out-of-state offender to petition a Colorado court for discontinuation of registration is as follows:
If the conviction that requires a person to register pursuant to the provisions of section 16-22-103 was not obtained from a Colorado court, the person seeking to discontinue registration or internet posting or both may file a civil case with the district court of the judicial district in which the person resides and seek a civil order to discontinue the requirement to register or internet posting or both under the circumstances specified in subsection (1) of this section.
§ 16-22-113(1.5). Subsection (1) provides specific details as to persons eligible for relief under section 16-22-113"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsection (3) " of the statute. § 16-22-113(1) (emphasis added).
¶ 18 Pertinent to Stanley's petition, subsection (3)(b)(I) specifically excludes those persons who were convicted as adults of sexual assault in violation of section 18-3-402. § 16-22-113(3)(b)(I). Instead, those offenders are "subject for the remainder of their natural lives to the...
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