Stanley v. Fiber Transport, Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. A96A0005,A96A0005 |
| Citation | 470 S.E.2d 767,221 Ga.App. 171 |
| Parties | STANLEY et al. v. FIBER TRANSPORT, INC. et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Johnson & Ward, John C. Dabney, Jr., Debbie C. Pelerose, Atlanta, for appellants.
Fulcher, Hagler, Reed, Hanks & Harper, Ronald C. Griffeth, Augusta, Allgood, Childs, Mehrhof & Millians, Richard R. Mehrhof, Jr., Augusta, for appellees.
HAROLD R. BANKE, Senior Appellate Judge.
William F. Stanley and Brenda W. Smith, widow of Herbert E. Smith ("Stanley"), sued Fiber Transport, Inc. ("Fiber"), Wood Chip Transport, Inc. ("Wood Chip"), and Delbert Davis, a truck driver, for personal injuries and wrongful death resulting from a trucking accident. Citing both federal and Georgia law, Stanley alleged that Fiber and Wood Chip were Davis' statutory employers and that both trucking companies were responsible for Davis' negligence. Stanley appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Fiber and Wood Chip.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movants, Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991), the evidence was as follows: Fiber had a contract with Stone Container Corporation, its only customer, to transport pine bark. When Fiber was unable to fulfill part of its contractual obligation to deliver pine bark to Florence, South Carolina, Wood Chip agreed to transport the material for a stipulated sum.
Wood Chip, however, did not transport the material. An employee of Wood Chip called a scale operator at a local mill and left word that any available trucker could pick up the bark. In response to this offer, three trailers belonging to D & D Trucking, owned by Davis, were loaded. While on route and at night, near Columbia, South Carolina, one of the D & D Trucking tractor trailers being driven by Davis, was involved in a fatal accident when William F. Stanley, the driver of an unrelated truck, collided at high speed with the allegedly poorly illuminated rear of Davis' truck. Stanley was seriously injured and his co-driver, Herbert E. Smith, was killed.
After the wreck, Davis submitted the weight ticket for the material delivered to Wood Chip who in turn billed Fiber. Wood Chip paid Davis $18.00 per ton less five percent and a workers' compensation deduction.
In support of summary judgment, Fiber presented evidence that Fiber understood that Wood Chip would haul the bark using its own personnel and equipment and that Fiber did not discover D & D Trucking's involvement until after the accident. The officer testified that Fiber was unfamiliar with D & D Trucking and had never utilized D & D Trucking or Davis or leased a vehicle from either. Similarly, Wood Chip presented evidence that it did not learn that Davis was hauling the load until after the accident.
Determining that there was no legal theory on which to attribute any liability for the alleged negligence of Davis to either Fiber or Wood Chip, the trial court granted summary judgment to both Fiber and Wood Chip. Although Stanley enumerates seven errors, the key inquiry is whether either Fiber or Wood Chip was Davis' statutory employer under any legal theory, and if Davis was operating as an independent contractor, whether either trucking company could be held liable for Davis' alleged negligence. Held:
1. Federal motor carrier rules and regulations had no application under these facts, and Stanley cannot rely on them to impose liability on Fiber or Wood Chip. The Interstate Commerce Commission has general jurisdiction over interstate transportation of property by a motor carrier but lacks jurisdiction over the transport of certain exempt commodities including bark. 49 USC § 10521(a)(1); 49 USC § 10526(a)(6)(C). It is undisputed that at the time of the accident Davis was hauling bark. Because bark is an exempt commodity, the parties were not required by ICC regulations to enter into a lease agreement.
Stanley also claims that Fiber and Wood Chip were Davis' "employer" within the meaning of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. However, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations define an employer as "any person engaged in a business affecting interstate commerce who owns or leases a commercial motor vehicle in connection with that business, or assigns employees to operate it...." 49 CFR § 390.5. Davis, not Fiber or Wood Chip, owned the truck involved in the accident and neither Fiber nor Wood Chip entered into any lease with Davis or had any knowledge of Davis' or D & D Trucking's involvement in the transport until after the collision. Nor did Fiber or Wood Chip assign any employee to operate the vehicle. Thus, neither Fiber nor Wood Chip were Davis' "employer" within the meaning of this statute. Nor was a "lease" created within the meaning of 49 CFR § 1057.11.
Federal safety rules, unlike the ICC rules, were applicable to the operation of Davis' truck because even exempt carriers are subject to federal safety rules. However, federal safety rules do not, as a matter of law, create a lease or make Fiber or Wood Chip responsible for the safe operation of Davis' truck.
2. Relying on the ICC's broad definition of a lease under 49 USC § 11107, Stanley contends that the trial court erred in determining that neither Fiber nor Wood Chip entered into a lease with Davis for the use of his truck. We disagree. As we determined in Division 1, ICC rules have no application since the load involved was an exempt commodity under ICC rules.
Nor do we find Georgia authority creating a lease. It is undisputed that there was no written lease for the use of Davis' truck. Wood Chip agreed to haul the material for Fiber then extended an open offer for any available trucker to haul the material at a stipulated rate per ton and D & D Trucking accepted. Stanley has offered no Georgia authority and we have found none for the proposition that this informal arrangement created an oral lease. Compare Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Holbrooks, 187 Ga.App. 706, 371 S.E.2d 252 (1988) ().
3. No employer/employee relationship between Davis and Fiber or Davis and Wood Chip existed under...
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...registration under the Surface Transportation Board regulations." Kenworthy, supra at § 13.01[2]. See also Stanley v. Fiber Transport, Inc., 221 Ga.App. 171, 470 S.E.2d 767, (1996)(holding that former TCC leasing regulations not applicable to hauling bark because bark an exempt commodity). ......
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...this exception to the general rule does not apply. Toys `R' Us, 195 Ga.App. 195, 393 S.E.2d 44 See also Stanley v. Fiber Transp., 221 Ga.App. 171, 174(5), 470 S.E.2d 767 (1996). Cf. Southern Mills v. Newton, 91 Ga.App. 738, 742(2)(a), 87 S.E.2d 109 (b) The Widners also cite OCGA § 51-2-5(6)......
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