Stanley v. Israel

• Decision Date: 14 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15-13961,15-13961
• Citation: 843 F.3d 920
• Parties: Jeffrey Stanley, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Broward County Sheriff, Scott Israel, in his official capacity, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

843 F.3d 920

Jeffrey Stanley, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Broward County Sheriff, Scott Israel, in his official capacity, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 15-13961

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Date Filed: December 14, 2016

William Robert Amlong, Jennifer Daley, Karen Coolman Amlong, Alison Leigh Churly, Amlong & Amlong, PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Jonathan M. Streisfeld, David L. Ferguson, Seth David Haimovitch, Kopelowitz Ostrow, PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before MARCUS and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG,^* Judge.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

Florida law requires the counties of the state to designate a chief correctional officer (CCO), but it gives counties broad discretion to decide who that officer may be. Thus, for example, a county may (but need not) choose to designate its sheriff as its CCO, so long as it selects someone for that position. The sheriff as CCO may then hire and fire deputies to assist him with his responsibilities, and he may therefore face liability for personnel decisions that violate an employee's constitutional rights. However, if the sheriff was acting as an arm of the state, he will be immune from suit in federal court on account of the Eleventh Amendment. Whether a sheriff acts as an arm of the state is a function-specific determination that is based heavily on a detailed analysis of state law, and is often a difficult question, as it is here.

This case arises from the Broward County Sheriff's potential liability under § 1983 for failing to rehire a former deputy allegedly due to his political loyalties and in violation of his First Amendment rights. Broward County has expressly designated its sheriff as its CCO; thus, at issue in this case is the basic question whether a Florida county sheriff, acting in his capacity as chief correctional officer in the hiring and firing of his deputies, is an arm of the state entitled to the benefit of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. After careful review, and having the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that a Florida sheriff is not an arm of the state when acting in this capacity. We, therefore, reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Sheriff and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The plaintiff, Jeffrey Stanley, worked for the Broward County Sheriff's Office (BSO) as a cross-certified detention deputy—a deputy sheriff who is also certified to partake in specific law enforcement duties such as maintaining perimeter posts and transporting certain prisoners. Stanley worked for the BSO for six years before voluntarily resigning in December 2007 to take a position as director of security at a new hospital in Miami Beach. The hospital was scheduled to open in January 2008, but it failed to open as planned, and, in May 2008, Stanley applied to be rehired at his same position with the BSO.

When a former employee is rehired, BSO policy sets his pay grade lower than it was at the time he left. This policy was apparently designed to deter law enforcement officers from moving to other law enforcement agencies and then returning if they failed their training or certification requirements. Stanley found out about this policy upon reapplication, but he believed that the policy should not have applied to him since he did not leave BSO for a different law enforcement agency. He expressed his dissatisfaction with the policy and contacted union representatives, BSO Human Resources, and then-Sheriff Al Lamberti himself to voice his concerns. Nonetheless, Stanley was extended and then accepted a conditional offer of employment as a detention deputy at the lower pay grade on September 25, 2008. This offer was contingent on successful mental and physical evaluations and a final review of his file.

At the time of Stanley's application for rehire, Sheriff Lamberti was running for reelection against his political adversary, Scott Israel. The Federation of Public and Private Employees, Stanley's union, chose to endorse Israel. Stanley openly supported Israel's campaign, allegedly due in part to his disappointment with the rehire pay policy. Stanley attended an informal union picket in front of the BSO with approximately five hundred union members while wearing a "Cops for Israel" t-shirt. Later that evening, he attended a televised debate between Lamberti and Israel while wearing a different "Cops for Israel" t-shirt. At both events, BSO photographers took pictures of the attendees; Stanley appeared in some of these photographs. Stanley also volunteered for the Israel campaign in the weeks leading up to the election.

Lamberti was reelected on November 4, 2008. On December 4, 2008, Stanley spoke with his former supervisor to inform her that he had satisfied his end of the conditions of his employment offer. Later that day, Stanley received a phone call from then-Lieutenant David Benjamin, Lamberti's executive officer, informing him that BSO was not going to rehire him because they had seen photographs of Stanley wearing a t-shirt in support of Israel. Stanley testified that during this conversation, Benjamin told him "that the sheriff stated that since [Stanley] didn't support him, he was not going to support [Stanley] in rehiring him." The decision was made final in a letter from BSO dated December 8, 2008, which rescinded Stanley's employment offer because "areas of concern arose during the selection process."

Stanley filed a formal complaint against BSO with the Public Employees Relations Commission on May 7, 2009; the hearing officer found for Stanley. That decision was later reversed by Florida's First District Court of Appeals. SeeSheriff of Broward Cty. v. Stanley, 50 So.3d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). Stanley then commenced this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Lamberti in his official capacity, alleging violations of his First Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Meanwhile, Israel again challenged Lamberti at the ballot box in 2012, and this time he won; he took office in January 2013. In August 2013, Stanley's complaint survived a motion to dismiss. On September 9, 2013, Stanley substituted Sheriff Israel as the defendant because Lamberti had been sued in his official capacity and was no longer Sheriff. SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Following discovery, BSO's motion for summary judgment was denied. The case then proceeded to trial; a jury was selected on January 14, 2015, and the trial was scheduled to begin the next day. However, on January 13, 2015, this Court issued an opinion in Pellitteri v. Prine, 776 F.3d 777 (11th Cir. 2015), which held that a Georgia sheriff is an "arm of the State" for Eleventh Amendment purposes when exercising his power to hire and fire deputies. Id. at 779. BSO first learned about this holding on the evening of January 14, and it brought the case to the district court's attention on the morning of January 15. The court postponed the trial and ordered additional briefing regarding the question of Eleventh Amendment immunity in light of Pellitteri. After this briefing, BSO again moved for summary judgment. The court granted BSO's motion on September 1, 2015, and Stanley appealed that decision.

Stanley's complaint originally included five prayers for relief: (1) a declaratory judgment that Lamberti's actions violated Stanley's First Amendment rights; (2) an injunction against Lamberti, his successors, or his coworkers from retaliating against Stanley; (3) damages against Lamberti in his official capacity; (4) costs and fees against Lamberti in his official capacity; and (5) other relief as is just. Stanley later conceded that the third item, damages in Lamberti's official capacity, was a "typographical-error relic" from before the decision to sue Lamberti in only his official capacity, and he withdrew that claim. Thus, his remaining claims are for declaratory and injunctive relief, plus costs and fees.

II.

"We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all of the facts in the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant." Haynes v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, 793 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted). Summary judgment is proper if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). District court decisions regarding Eleventh Amendment immunity are also reviewed de novo. SeePellitteri, 776 F.3d at 779.

A.

The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution protects states from being subjected to suit in federal court. The Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Supreme Court has extended this protection to also bar suits against a state in federal court brought by the state's own citizens. See generallyHans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890). However, "the Eleventh Amendment does not immunize municipalities from suit." Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2005) ; see alsoMonell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (noting the absence of "any basis for concluding that the Eleventh Amendment is a bar to municipal liability"). An officer, therefore, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity if he is acting as an arm of the state but not if he is acting as an arm of the county.

The Supreme Court has clarified that in making an arm-of-the-state determination, the question is not whether the officer acts for the state or the county "in some categorical, ‘all or nothing’ manner." McMillian v. Monroe Cty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 785, 117 S.Ct. 1734...