Stanley v. N.M. Game Comm'n

• Docket Number: A-1-CA-38739
• Decision Date: 31 August 2023
• Parties: DAVID N. STANLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW MEXICO GAME COMMISSION and STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Defendants-Appellees, and BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MORA COUNTY, Defendant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

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DAVID N. STANLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW MEXICO GAME COMMISSION and STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Defendants-Appellees,

and BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MORA COUNTY, Defendant.

No. A-1-CA-38739

Court of Appeals of New Mexico

August 31, 2023

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF COLFAX COUNTY Emilio J. Chavez, District Court Judge

Atler Law Firm, P.C.

Timothy J. Atler

Jazmine J. Johnston

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Kerry Kiernan, P.C.

Kerry Kiernan

Albuquerque, NM

Walcott, Henry & Winston, P.C.

Donald A. Walcott

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

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Raul Torrez, Attorney General

Nicholas M. Sydow, Civil Appellate Chief

Neil R. Bell, Assistant Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellees

New Mexico State Land Office

Ari Biernoff, General Counsel and Special Assistant Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

for Amicus Curiae Stephanie Garcia Richard, NM Commissioner of Public Lands

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OPINION

JENNIFER L. ATTREP, CHIEF JUDGE

{¶1} Plaintiff-Counterdefendant David Stanley appeals the district court's final judgment dismissing his complaint for quiet title and declaring certain roads traversing Stanley's property public under various theories, including by prescriptive easement. Stanley also appeals the district court's cost award. Although we remand for certain, limited findings regarding the widths of the roads deemed public by prescriptive easement, we otherwise affirm.

BACKGROUND

{¶2} The litigation in this case, which lasted nearly eight years, began as Stanley's lawsuit to quiet title to his property consisting of approximately 15,000 noncontiguous acres in Colfax and Mora Counties (the Stanley Property), surrounded by, and interspersed with, state trust lands. As relevant to this appeal, Stanley's complaint named the New Mexico Game Commission^[1] and the boards of commissioners of Mora and Colfax Counties as defendants. The State of New Mexico subsequently intervened on the ground that it had an interest in preserving widespread access to state trust lands. The State of New Mexico, the Game

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Commission, and Mora County^[2] all counterclaimed against Stanley, collectively alleging that the public had a right to travel on various roads traversing the Stanley Property because the roads were public-either by prescriptive easement or pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed 1976)^[3]-and title in fee simple to one of the roads, State Road 199, was held by the Game Commission pursuant to Chapter 180 of New Mexico Laws of 1929 (hereinafter the 1929 Law). Meanwhile, Colfax County disclaimed any interest in the Stanley Property (other than its inchoate tax lien) and stipulated to judgment being entered against it. Following an eleven-day bench trial, including a site visit, the district court entered a judgment dismissing all of Stanley's claims with prejudice and granting the State's counterclaims, declaring that eleven roads traversing the Stanley Property are public by prescriptive easement, that six of those same roads are public pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 932, and that the Game Commission possesses title in fee simple to State Road 199 pursuant to the 1929 Law. Additional facts relevant to the resolution of this appeal are addressed as necessary below.

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DISCUSSION

{¶3} Stanley asserts numerous claims of error on appeal. First, Stanley argues the district court's judgment should be reversed as to any road located within Colfax County because the court abused its discretion by not finding the county an indispensable party that could not be joined. Given the procedural history of this case, discussed below, we conclude the district court committed no error in its indispensable-party ruling. Second, Stanley advances numerous arguments why the district court erred in determining the eleven roads in question public by prescriptive easement, including that (A) insufficient evidence supports this determination; (B) certain legal principles negate this determination; (C) even if public prescriptive easements were established, Stanley extinguished those easements; and (D) the district court inadequately defined the precise locations and widths of the roads. We find Stanley's arguments, other than the one relating to the width of the roads, to be without merit, and we accordingly affirm the district court's determination that the eleven roads are public by prescriptive easement. In light of this holding, we do not reach Stanley's argument that the district court's determination that six of the roads are public pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 932 was erroneous. Third, Stanley argues the district court erred in determining that the Game Commission possesses title in fee simple to State Road 199 based on collateral estoppel and the State's failure to meet the requirements of the 1929 Law. The former argument is not supported by the

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record and the latter is not preserved. Fourth and finally, Stanley argues the district court's award of costs to the State was erroneous. Of the cost award arguments that are preserved, Stanley fails to convince us that any are erroneous. We take each of Stanley's arguments up in turn.

I. Colfax County as an Indispensable Party

{¶4} Stanley first argues that the district court's judgment should be reversed as to any road located within Colfax County because the court erred by not finding the county an indispensable party that could not be joined. As Stanley recognizes, our review of this issue is for abuse of discretion. See Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 2002-NMSC-012, ¶ 39, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668. Only "when a ruling is clearly contrary to the logical conclusions demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case" will we find such an abuse. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For the reasons we discuss, we find no abuse of discretion.

{¶5} Several years into the litigation, Stanley moved, as relevant to this appeal, to dismiss the State's counterclaims on the ground that it had failed to join a necessary and indispensable party-namely, Colfax County. According to Stanley, Colfax County was an indispensable party to the State's counterclaims because the county would have a statutory duty to maintain any road the district court deemed "public" within its boundaries. The district court denied Stanley's motion, but ordered the State to join Colfax County as a counterclaim-defendant on the ground that the

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county's rights and responsibilities might be affected should it eventually determine any of the roads public. Colfax County was duly served with the counterclaims and a copy of the district court's order setting forth its reasoning requiring joinder. Shortly thereafter, Colfax County moved to be dismissed from the case. Upon the State's stipulation, the district court dismissed Colfax County with prejudice. Less than one month later, Stanley moved for summary judgment on the State's counterclaims as they pertained to any roads located within Colfax County on the ground that the county was an indispensable party that could no longer be joined due to its dismissal with prejudice. The district court denied the motion, and Stanley now contends this was error because of Colfax County's purported statutory duty to maintain the roads.

{¶6} Stanley's indispensable-party argument is governed by Rule 1-019 NMRA, see Mendoza v. Isleta Resort &Casino, 2020-NMSC-006, ¶ 33, 460 P.3d 467- authority Stanley fails to mention in his appellate briefing. In resolving an indispensable-party issue, Rule 1-019 requires district courts to undertake a three-part analysis. See Gallegos, 2002-NMSC-012, ¶ 39. First, the court must decide the threshold question of whether the absent party is "necessary" to the proceeding. Id. If the party is not necessary, then they are not indispensable and the analysis is over. See id. If the absent party is necessary, however, the court must next decide whether the party can, or cannot, be joined. Id. Third, "if the party cannot be joined, the court

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decides whether 'in equity and good conscience' that party is indispensable to the litigation." Id. (quoting Rule 1-019(B)). Only if the absent party is indispensable should the court dismiss the action for nonjoinder. See id. Because Stanley fails to satisfy the threshold requirement of establishing that Colfax County was necessary to the litigation, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Stanley's indispensable party argument, and we do not address the remaining factors. See Kaywal, Inc. v. Avangrid Renewables, LLC, 2021-NMCA-037, ¶ 48, 495 P.3d 550 (addressing the first factor only because it was dispositive); Moody v. Stribling, 1999-NMCA-094, ¶ 15, 127 N.M. 630, 985 P.2d 1210 (providing that the party asserting relief under Rule 1-019(A) has the burden of establishing the necessary elements).

{¶7} Under Rule 1-019, a party is "necessary" only if:

(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties; or

(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may:

(a) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest; or

(b) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.

Rule 1-019(A); see Kaywal, 2021-NMCA-037, ¶ 48 (providing that whether an absent party is "necessary" to the litigation is governed by Rule 1-019(A)). Nowhere

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does Stanley argue that complete relief between him and the State could not be obtained without...